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This thesis examines the results of merger and acquisition (M&A) activities of 
Indian corporates related to Outward Foreign Direct Investment (OFDI). The key 
issue is the extent to which these M&As create value for the shareholders of the 
Indian acquiring firms.  There are two components to this question relating to the 
short and longer term impacts. First, how does the market react to the 
announcements of OFDI related M&As by Indian corporates in the short term? 
and second, how successful are the Indian companies in creating value to the 
shareholder in the long run? The research further considers the firm specific level 
using a sample of M&A companies and how media material may have contributed 
to the market impacts experienced by the corporates.  
The liberalisation investment policy initiations by the Indian government lead to 
rapid growth in outward foreign direct investments between 2000 and 2008. It is 
interesting to note that India experienced annual average growth of 1399% in 
OFDIs during the period 2001-2008. Encouraged by the financial reforms, an 
increase in large scale mergers and acquisitions (M&As) by Indian corporate 
occurred. The present study examines the performance of Indian corporates 






The research is important because it is the first to assess the success of Indian 
corporates involved in outward foreign direct investments from the short term and 
long term perspective and across sectors. The thesis fills the gap in the literature 
in which it examines the aggregate performance and also looks into firm specific 
level performance. The study links the ownership, location and 
internationalisation (OLI) theory to the strategies of Indian corporates and 
discusses how they are aligning with international brands to stand in the 
international market  
The short-run performance is assessed using an event method utilising a three-day 
short-event window surrounding the acquisition announcement period. Various 
metrics including abnormal returns (AR), cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) and 
standardised cumulative abnormal returns (SCAR) are analysed. The study adopts 
event approach to measure the long term performance and includes: CAR, and 
Buy and Hold Abnormal Returns (BHAR). The study considers parametric and 
non-parametric tests. The other measures like Wealth Relative and Tobin‘s Q are 
also used. The study considers a maximum 36 months following the acquisition 
event month.  
The empirical results showed positive wealth effects to stockholders in the short- 
and long-term periods and the empirical results supported rejection of the null 
hypotheses. However, specific firm-level empirical findings showed mixed results 
in the short term. The variations in the outcomes, such as why one M&A should 
receive an initial positive market reaction while another adverse market reaction, 
relate to the individual contexts and how the market assesses the changing return 
and risk parameters.   
iii 
 
The study proposed explanations for the variations in outcomes based on prior 
findings and OLI theory. Drawing on secondary information the study offers 
explanations for the share market reactions. Commentaries from financial analysts 
and commentators, and media releases from the company concerning a mooted 
M&A may impact investors‘ assessments of the return and risk parameters for 
each company.  Context is important and the specific characteristics of the Indian 
companies affect the outcomes. 
Prior studies undertaken from the context of Indian Internationalisation viewed 
that Indian firms have the capacity and the ability to compete in the world market. 
The attributes of Indian firms, which created such capacities and abilities, are 
embedded in the past and have emerged over a much longer period of time. The 
motivations for Indian firms‘ overseas acquisitions include: gaining access to 
international markets, firm-specific intangibles, such as technology and human 
skills, and benefits from operational synergies, to overcome constraints from 
limited home market growth, and to survive in an increasingly competitive 
business environment. The rationale for OFDI related M&As by firms is to create 
value to their investments  (Pradhan & Abraham 2004; Kumar 2006; Deepak 
2008). 
The study examined five cases of Indian corporates. It identified that Indian 
corporates acquired competitive ownership advantages through the OFDI related 
M&As. For instance, through acquisitions the Indian corporates had the advantage 
of being local in foreign destinations and avoided the disadvantages of being 
foreigners in European, UK & US markets. Likewise, by undertaking integrated 
production networking, the Indian corporates linked the low-end players with the 
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high-end players and were able to draw synergies and deliver value. In other 
words, the initial processing of raw materials was carried out in India closer to 
source and then the remaining processes were carried out in the acquired 
company‘s country which allowed them to have access to the technology and also 
interface with the customers of the acquired companies. The study shows how the 
synergies occur due to disintegrated model of operations subsequent to the 
acquisitions. The explanations of the present study are in line with the prior 
findings.  
By adding to the prior studies and by integrating empirical research of aggregate 
results with explanations of the specific firm level, the thesis opens up 
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Introduction  
This chapter presents a framework for the thesis. It includes a background to the 
study, its significance, research questions, research hypotheses, research methods, 
organisation of the study and a summary of findings and conclusions.  
Following liberalisation of its policy regime by the Indian government, the 
country experienced a rapid growth in outward foreign direct investments between 
2000 and 2008. Encouraged by the financial reforms, an increase in large scale 
overseas mergers and acquisitions (M&As) by Indian corporate occurred.  
In India, the per capita GNP which was US$ 430 in 2000 increased to US$ 1270 
in the year 2011
1
. Encouraged by the financial reforms, an increase in large scale 
cross border mergers and acquisitions (M&As) by Indian corporate occurred. The 
total value of outbound deals by Indian acquiring companies outside India, in 
February, 2011 was $441 million (5 deals) as against $206 million (11 deals) in 
2010 (ET, 12th, March, 2012). The economic effects of these overseas ventures 
have received little evaluation.  This thesis undertakes an analysis and evaluation 
of the economic consequences of the outward foreign direct investment (OFDI) 
related M&As by Indian corporates. The method is to evaluate thirty overseas 
acquisitions by large scale Indian corporates.  
                                                 
1
 Source: World Investment Report (available online). 




The thesis examines the reactions of the shareholders in the stock markets to the 
strategic decisions made by the Indian corporates in going global. The study 
assesses the success of OFDI related M&As by Indian corporates by examining 
short-term performance effects in terms of the stock market reaction to the 
announcement of OFDI related M&As. The study analyses the post-acquisition 
corporate performance and wealth creation by Indian corporates in the post-
acquisition period following OFDI related M&As. The study addresses the 
questions: (1) How does the market react to announcements of OFDI related 
M&As by Indian corporates? and (2) How successful are the Indian companies in 
creating value to the shareholder in the long run? The thesis examines the 
particular results of companies and provides tentative theoretical explanations for 
observed differences. The theorisation opens up possibilities for future empirical 
research.  
With globalization, many nations have liberalized their trade policies and 
removed trade barriers. The transaction costs decreased and the integration of 
economies has contributed to increases in foreign direct investment (FDI) (Leitão, 
2010). As referred by Rugman and Verbeke (Rugman & Verbeke, 2008), FDI is 
one channel for the globalization of world economy. Multinational enterprises 
(MNEs) specifically acquire news markets, because these firms have specific 
advantages, or they want to acquire localization advantages. According to Caselli, 
Gatti and Visconti (2006) mergers and acquisitions aim to achieve a strategic 
transformation of the buyer and target companies, with the expectation of creating 
significant shareholder value. During the last two decades economic activities 




have become increasingly global. Multinational Corporations (MNCs) have 
played a major role in this process of globalisation (Ranjan, 1997). The 
globalisation of business has initiated a search for worldwide competitive 
advantage in scale. The growth in FDI has been particularly marked since the 
mid-1980s with the world economy witnessing a surge in economic activities, 
with FDI being the most common means of serving foreign markets. A key 
characteristic of the growth in FDI since the mid-1980s is the form it has taken. 
FDI can take a variety of forms including the establishment of ‗green-field‘ sites 
and joint ventures. However, the most prevalent form of FDI is via cross-border 
mergers and acquisitions (Gregory & McCorriston, 2005). 
The topic is important because the majority of Indian corporates that were hitherto 
protected and limited to their domestic environment are now exposed to 
international markets.  Owing to the changes in the global investment landscape, 
Indian economic policy reforms and the deregulatory FDI policy of the 
Government of India (GOI), the Indian corporates had to position themselves to 
face the risks and challenges not just at home but internationally as well.  
The approach taken by Indian corporates towards OFDI‘s is different from their 
earlier approach (traditional) where their main focus was cost reduction, 
operational synergies, and short-term goals, whereas the more recent Indian 
acquisitions reflect a strategic and long-term focus (Lawrence, Locke, & 
Geeta.Duppati, 2010). The key issue to examine is whether the changes in 
approach by Indian corporates are likely to create value for the shareholders of the 




acquiring firm. What matters is whether the stock market reacts positively to the 
news of an OFDI related M&A transaction announcement in the short run and, 
more importantly, whether the Indian acquiring firms add value to the stock in the 
long run. 
1.2 Value creation and changes in the investors’ expectations 
The free flow of capital, technology and goods continues to drive an increasingly 
integrated world market. Value creation rests on the efficient combination of 
research, design, production, distribution, marketing, and support wherever these 
functions are located. Investors, too, are increasingly willing to invest in industry 
leaders no matter where they are domiciled. The fundamental trend toward 
globalisation remains very much intact and continues to favour consolidation to 
achieve global economies of scale. Against this backdrop, M&A can be an 
effective tool for accomplishing major corporate objectives (Mamdani & Noah, 
2004). 
The large number of overseas mergers and acquisitions of the 1990s
2
 have 
fostered a view in the popular press that acquisitions destroy shareholder value, 
and the new, stricter corporate governance environment has led to greater calls for 
                                                 
2
In the decade of the 1990s (through June 1997), 96,020 companies have come under new 
ownership worldwide (US corporates) in deals worth a total of US$ 3.9 trillion - and 
that's just counting acquisitions valued at US$ 5 million and over (Mamdani & Noah, 
2004). 
 




companies to return cash to shareholders through dividends and share repurchases 
to eliminate the risk that the cash will be used unwisely. Diversifying acquisitions 
in particular have fallen almost completely out of favour, reflecting in part the 
view of academic research that the potential for value creation lies mainly with 
more focused acquisitions (Mamdani et al, 2004).
3
 
It is interesting to see the responses of the investors to the survey conducted by 
Mamdani et al in the US, 2004. Relating to a question on the corporate 
redeployment of cash, nearly 60% of the investors expressed a preference for 
either share buy-backs or dividend increases instead of reinvestment in the 
company. In response, companies in 2004 have announced the highest levels of 
future share buy-back programmes since 1997. The preference for the return of 
cash to shareholders emphasises investor reluctance to entrust management teams 
with the decision to deploy cash. Subsequently, the majority of investors preferred 
smaller vertical acquisitions or ―bolt-on‖ acquisitions 4  and fewer than 5% of 
investors favoured major acquisitions. 
                                                 
3 For a comprehensive review of the academic findings, see Robert Bruner‘s article 
entitled ―Where M&A Pays and Where It Strays: A Survey of the Research―,   (Mamdani 
& Noah, 2004). 
 
4
A bolt on acquisition is a term in private equity that refers to when a private equity-
backed company acquires another company as a "bolt on" to enhance the private equity-
backed company's value. This method has gained popularity particularly in down markets 
when private equity firms need another source to enhance the appeal of the company 
prior to sale. 




The question facing today‘s executives is what kind of acquisition policy makes 
sense in an environment in which shareholders would rather have their money 
back and investors claim that major diversifying acquisitions have little 
credibility. Acquisitions for the sake of spreading risks are perceived as having 
almost no value to investors, who, if the theory holds, can generally manage such 
risks simply by diversifying their own portfolios. But there is little doubt that 
acquisition capabilities remain a critical component of sustainable long-term 
growth and profitability (Mamdani & Noah, 2004). Furthermore, investors assign 
premium valuations to companies that earn above-average returns through a 
combination of internal investment and judicious acquisition spending (Mamdani 
& Noah, 2004). 
It is evident from finance theory that the goal of financial management is to 
maximise the current value per share of the existing stock (Ross, W.Westerfield, 
Jaffe, & Jordan, 2008). Driven by this, it is expected that common stockholders 
buy and retain stocks that adds value.  
1.3 Significance of the study 
The focus of the study is to examine if the Indian acquiring firms involved in 
thirty OFDI related M&As are able to create value to their shareholders as a result 
of OFDI related M&As. The present study takes a finance perspective and 
believes that corporate decisions are made to benefit and add value to the 
stockholders.  It is obvious from the finance theory that good decisions will 




increase the value of stock and poor decisions decrease the value of stock. Hence, 
the study examines the implications of OFDI related Indian corporates involved in 
M&As by looking at the stock performance in the stock markets. In other words, 
the success of M&A transactions are assessed by measuring the outcomes.  
The positive short-run market return performance is considered as an indication of 
the expectations and confidence vested by the shareholders in management. This 
is in line with the views expressed in literature. According to Kothari and Warner 
(2004), though short run event studies are relatively straight forward and trouble 
free, it should be appreciated that they are at risk, since announcement returns 
tend to reflect the expectations of the investors. So, this study examines whether 
the expectations of investors, as pronounced through the short-run market returns, 
are attained in the long term. 
It is evident from the review of literature presented in Chapter 4 that the Majority 
of the Indian studies documented in the literature are focused on examining the 
trends and patterns of OFDI in India, regulatory issues, motives and magnitude 
and composition of Indian OFDI.  Notable among them is the emerging pattern of 
India's outward foreign direct investment under influence of state policy: a macro 
view (Singh & Jain, 2009; Nayyar, 2008; Rajan, 2000 & Kumar 2008).  
The study of Kale (2009) considered only small scale companies which involved 
the investments less than USD$48 million. The study of Gubbi, Aulakh, Ray, & 
Chittoor  (Gubbi, Aulakh, Ray, & Chittoor, 2010) examined the post-acquisition 
performance for a sample size of 412. Their study did not examine the short term 




announcement effect. The study of Zhu & Malhotra, (2008) considered short term 
and long term performance of Indian acquiring firms. But it is limited in scope in 
which it considered only service sector cross border mergers and acquisitions by 
Indian corporates in the US only. 
The study is important because it is the first to assess the success of Indian 
corporates involved in outward foreign direct investments from the short term and 
long term perspective and across sectors. The study fills the gap in the literature in 
which it examines the aggregate performance and also looks into firm specific 
level performance. 
1.4 Research Questions 
Based on the details presented above, the present study formulates the following 
research questions: 
 How does the stock market react to announcements of OFDI related 
M&As by Indian corporates? 
 How successful are the Indian companies in creating value to the 
shareholder in the long run? 
The present study examines wealth effects of OFDI related M&As from short-
term and long-term perspectives considering the stock performance in the stock 
markets of the Bombay Stock Exchange (BSE). This will be one of the earliest 




studies in India conducted from the context of OFDI related M&As by Indian 
corporates.  
1.5 Research Hypotheses 
Based on the research questions stated above, the background of the study in 
Chapter 2 and the review of literature presented in Chapter 4, the study proposes 
to test the null hypotheses presented below: 
The research hypotheses are formulated from the short-term perspective and long- 
term perspective (more details in Chapter 5). From the short term perspective the 
study examines and tests the short-run stock market reactions following the 
announcement of the OFDI related M&As by the Indian corporates.  
From the long-run perspective the study examines and tests wealth effects and 
value creation to the shareholders following the OFDI related M&As by the 
Indian corporates. 
1.5.1 Hypotheses of the study (Short term and Long term perspectives) 
The following hypotheses will be tested to assess the stock market reactions to 
OFDI-related Indian M&A announcements over the three-day event window: 
1) Ho: There are no abnormal returns on the announcement day (0) following 
the announcement of the OFDI related M&As. 




The following hypotheses will be tested to assess the post-acquisition 
performance following OFDI related M&As with the following hypotheses: 
2) Ho: There are no abnormal returns to the acquiring firms subsequent to the 
acquisition activity in the long run.  
3) Ho: Operating performance in the post-acquisition period is no greater 
than the operating performance in the pre-acquisition period. 
1.6 Research Method 
The research methods used in the study to test the research hypotheses from short-
term and long-run performance perspectives are given below. Likewise, the 
approach for explaining the variations in outcomes of empirical results at firm- 
specific level is also briefed below: 
1.6.1 Research Method – Short-term perspective 
The study uses event method to analyse short-run share price performance of 
Indian acquiring companies engaged in thirty OFDI related M&As. This study 
will concentrate on a short-run event study method, restricting analysis to a three 
day short event window (closely surrounding the announcement day). The event 
date for the study is set to be the date of announcement of a respective M&A 
event. This provides the best comparison of the various methods because the 
shorter the event window, the more precise are the tests. The estimation period of 




the market model is 100 days. It includes returns on each security in the sample 
for 100 days which starts from five days prior to the announcement of the event.  
The data is obtained from the CMIE data Prowess and Thompson Banker. The 
announcement dates obtained from CMIE are cross examined with the daily 
newspapers in India.  The data used involves the firm stock returns and market 
returns on the Bombay Stock Exchange (BSE). 
1.6.2 Research methods from long-run perspective 
Post-acquisition performance is critical to the success of OFDI related M&A 
transactions. Hence, the study considers the long-term perspective.  The present 
study measures the long-run performance of the thirty OFDI related M&As by 
Indian companies. The study considers a maximum 36 months following the 
acquisition event month. The period of the study signifies acquisition activity and 
covers thirty OFDI related M&As by Indian corporates during 2000-2008. The 
estimation period is 24 months prior to the event month. 
The present study pursues two different approaches to test the first null hypothesis 
and assess the long-term performance of the OFDI related M&A firms. They are 
Buy-and-Hold Abnormal Return (BHAR) and Cumulative Abnormal Return 
(CAR) methods. The results obtained are appraised by parametric tests and non-
parametric tests. The method chosen is in line with the prior studies (Ikenberry, 
Lakonishok, & Vermaelen, 1995), (Kothari & Warner, 1997), (Lyon, Barber, & 




Tsai, 1999) and (Zhu & Malhotra, 2008). The market returns of the Bombay Stock 
Exchange (BSE) Index and the monthly returns of the firm are used.  
The second approach calculates long-run abnormal returns considering the Buy-
and-Hold strategy. The study uses a control firm approach and matches the OFDI 
related Indian company‘s abnormal market return with the control firm that is 
chosen from the BSE Index based on a set criteria (more details in Chapter 5).  
The present study employs Tobin‘s Q to test the second hypothesis relating to the 
operating performance of the sample firms. The study uses ex-ante and ex-post 
approaches and considers three years pre-event and three years‘ post-event 
periods. This is in line with prior studies (Zhu & Malhotra, 2008). The study also 
examines and tests the changes in operating performance in the pre- and post-
acquisition period. For this purpose the study considers: Sales, Profit after Taxes 
(PAT), Dividends and Total Assets. The study also employs the wealth relative 
method proposed by Ritter (1991) to explain the performance of the firms in the 
long term. The data for the study are collected from the Centre for Monitoring 
Indian Economy (CMIE), Thomson Banker, Data Stream, Factiva, and the BSE 
website. The test results are processed using E-views and Stata software 
applications.  
1.6.3 Research methods for explaining the empirical results  
The explanations for variations in outcomes in the empirical results are presented 
in Chapter 7.  Understanding the corporate strategy is important in order to 




explain the empirical findings. For this purpose the drivers behind OFDI related 
M&As by the Indian corporates will be identified based on the secondary sources. 
The qualitative data will be obtained from the secondary sources, such as 
corporate reports, corporate official media releases, daily newspapers and 
company online websites. 
The possible reasons for variations in outcomes at firm specific level will be given 
from the short-term and long-term perspectives based on the secondary data 
released into the market at the time of the proposed OFDI related M&As. 
Towards the end of the study a comparison is made between the empirical 
findings and the prior findings from mature markets. This is to show how context, 
situation and environment for OFDI related M&As by Indian corporates are 
different from those of mature markets.  
1.7 Organisation of the study 
The study is made up of eight chapters as shown below: 
Chapter 1: Introduction 
This chapter outlines and presents the structure of the research thesis and includes 
the background to the study, its significance, research questions, research 
hypotheses, research methods and organisation of the study. This chapter is 
considered as the basis for the chapters that follow.  
 




Chapter 2: Background of the Study 
This chapter presents an overview of the changing investment patterns across the 
globe and the shift in the Indian Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) dynamics. The 
study examines the changes in the Indian government policy relating to FDI 
issues, their impact on Outward Foreign Direct Investment (OFDI) related 
activities with special reference to mergers and acquisitions by the Indian 
corporates. This chapter will be of prime consideration and a building block for 
Chapters 6 and 7 which analyses and explains the empirical findings and 
variations in outcomes.  
Chapter 3: Internationalisation: A Theoretical Perspective  
This chapter presents the theories relating to internationalisation from the global 
perspective. From the context of OFDI related M&As this chapter briefs five 
theories.  These theories will elucidate how some components, such as ownership 
competitive advantages, institutional environment, stock-holders value-enhancing 
activities, brownfield investments and absorptive capacity will influence the 
corporates when making considering OFDI related M&As. It helps in 
understanding the emerging Indian corporate dynamics relating to OFDI related 
M&As. 
  




Chapter 4: Review of Literature 
This chapter presents a review of literature relating to Mergers and Acquisitions 
(M&As). The literature review focuses on the empirical research findings in 
M&As from the mature markets and emerging markets (with a special focus on 
Indian findings). It includes various studies undertaken to examine the effects of 
M&As in terms of value creation from short term and long term perspectives.  
This chapter is important because it helps to identify the gaps in the literature, 
raises some research questions and develops research hypothesis. It also helps in 
understanding and explaining the empirical findings from the short and long term 
perspectives following the acquisition announcements and post-acquisition 
performance following the OFDI related M&As by Indian corporates as covered  
in Chapters  6 and  7.  
Chapter 5: Research Method  
This chapter presents and discusses the approaches and methods used to measure 
the announcement effects of OFDI related M&As by Indian corporates in terms of 
value creation from the short-term perspective. It also presents and discusses the 
approaches and methods used to measure the effects of OFDI related M&As in 
terms of value creation from the long-term perspective following the acquisitions. 
This chapter is significant because the short-term and long-term performance of 
the OFDI related M&As by Indian corporates will be tested and examined using 
the models and approaches presented in this chapter. This chapter also outlines the 




approach for explaining the variations in outcomes at firm-specific level based on 
the empirical findings. It also presents the approach to identify the drivers behind 
OFDI related M&As. 
Chapter 6: Empirical findings from short-term and long-term performance 
This chapter analyses the market reactions to the announcements of OFDI related 
M&As by Indian corporates. It examines the short-term stock performance for a 
sample of thirty OFDI related M&As by Indian companies involved in cross-
border mergers and acquisitions in the period 2000 – 2008.  
This chapter also presents the empirical results for long-term stock return 
performance of the OFDI related Indian corporates, subsequent to an acquisition 
event. This chapter addresses the question: How successful are the Indian 
companies in creating value to the shareholder? It presents the results of the thirty 
OFDI related Indian corporates involved in acquisition activity and assesses them.  
This chapter also explains the empirical findings.  
Chapter 7: Theoretical Explanations of the Empirical Findings at Firm-
Specific Level  
This chapter gives theoretical explanations for the differing outcomes in the 
empirical findings at firm specific level based on prior findings and theory.  This 
approach is consistent with positivistic methodology and helps to explain the 
firm-specific empirical findings in a better way, which is not otherwise possible 
by quantitative analysis and hypothesis testing. This approach helps explain the 




underlying facts of certain elements in the empirical results by linking theory with 
the prior findings. By giving possible theoretical explanations to the differing 
outcomes, the chapter also provides testable propositions for future empirical 
researchers.  
Chapter 8: Conclusions 
This chapter outlines the major contributions of the thesis, its limitations and 
provides recommendations for future research.   
Thus, having presented the structure of the thesis, the next chapter will provide 




CHAPTER 2: BACKGROUND OF THE STUDY 
2.1 Introduction 
This chapter presents some background information to the empirical study of 
Indian companies engaged in Outward Foreign Direct Investment (OFDI).  
Context is important to understand the changing dynamics of overseas direct 
investment. The chapter illustrates the emergence of global organisations in India 
and how the forces of globalisation have changed the merger and acquisition 
activity of Indian companies. India is becoming a substantial new player in the 
globalised economy and the growth in overseas investment activity by Indian 
corporates is documented.  
Importantly, the chapter examines the changes in Indian government policy 
relating to the FDI issues, indicating their impact on inwards and outward flows of 
FDI.  In particular, the chapter illustrates the impact of government liberalisation 
policies on the overseas investment activities with special reference to mergers 
and acquisitions by the Indian corporates.  The thirty cases of mergers and 
acquisitions are introduced and which are the subject of empirical analysis (in 
Chapter 6). Some details are provided on the size of the investment, plus 
information on the acquirer and the acquired companies, and the location of the 
investment. Such information will assist the explanation of the empirical results 
later in the thesis (Chapter 7).   




2.2 Regulatory framework of Indian government policy relating 
to OFDI   
According to Ranjan (1997), the new economic policy adopted by the 
Government of India in mid-1991 was based on the twin principles: First, 
deregulation of the government‘s economic interventionist functions and second, 
encouraging competition. The main thrust of this policy was to ensure free flow of 
investment, product, technology and managerial personnel across national borders 
leading to greater integration of the Indian economy with the rest of the world. 
Various Indian regulations have been changed extensively to facilitate 
liberalisation and deregulation. The areas in which changes are made effective 
include:  industrial licensing, monopoly and restrictive trade practices, foreign 
exchange regulation, import and export, capital markets, external commercial 
borrowing, the Companies Act and convertibility of the rupee in current accounts.  
The Indian policy regime, guided by national development priorities, allows 
Indian enterprises to invest abroad for attaining economies of scale and also to 
remain as competitive as their counterparts in other nations. Three stages are 
identified in terms of Indian OFDI policy. 
 The first phase (1974-1990) of Indian economic development under a restrictive 
policy regime (to invest abroad) was aimed at boosting domestic investment, 




which enabled Indian enterprises to learn adaptive capabilities
5
. The policy 
encouraged the formation of joint ventures with international companies. But the 
policy stated that Indian enterprise equity participation should be in the form of 
exporting indigenous plant and machinery and also technical know-how from the 
existing Indian joint ventures. Due to the scarcity of foreign exchange, the cash 
remittance of capital to overseas joint ventures was discouraged but provision was 
made to allow in exceptional cases (Nayyar, 2008). 
This policy increased Indian investment flows abroad in the second half of the 
1970s. India emerged as the third largest exporter of industrial OFDI among the 
developing countries (Lall, 1986). The import substitution (a national economic 
strategy which emphasizes the replacement of imports by domestically produced 
goods) regime enabled Indian companies to adapt to the technology, capital goods 
fabrication capability and human resources. This policy provided opportunities to 
Indian companies to extend their business abroad, which boosted Indian outward 
foreign direct investment. The magnitude of Indian investment abroad declined in 
the early 1980s and a turnaround in OFDI occurred again towards the mid-80s. 
Indian overseas investment largely remained concentrated in the developing 
countries in the 1970s and 1980s. However, some change has been noticed since 
                                                 
5
 Adaptive capacity is the capacity of a business firm to adapt to the changing 
environment. 




the mid-80s where there has been increase in  investment by Indian corporates in 
the advanced industrial countries (N. Kumar, 1995).  
The first phase of India‘s outward foreign direct investment, which spanned over 
1974 to 1990, was quite restrictive as outward foreign investment was possible 
only in the form of minority owned joint ventures. 
The second phase (1991 – 1999) of Indian economic development encouraged 
Indian companies to invest abroad. An automatic route
6
 for Indian investment 
abroad was adopted and overseas investments up to US$2 million were permitted. 
The restrictions on cash remittances and minority ownership were removed. The 
limit on overseas investment through the automatic route was increased to US$4 
million in 1995. An important change with regard to the approval of proposals of 
overseas investment was shifted from the Ministry of Finance to the Reserve Bank 
of India (RBI). The RBI was vested with approval of amounts up to US$15 
million and the approvals beyond US$15 million remained under the purview of 
the Ministry of Finance (Nayyar, 2008).  
                                                 
6
 Procedure under automatic route - FDI in sectors/activities to the extent permitted under 
automatic route does not require any prior approval either by the Government or RBI. The 
investors are only required to notify the Regional Office of the RBI within 30 days of receipt 
of inward remittances and file the required documents with that office within 30 days of issue 
of shares of foreign investors (Source: www.rbi.org.in). 
 




The third and most recent phase (2000-2008) of fast economic growth saw 
expansion of Indian enterprises in domestic and international markets while 
competing with the global brands and multinational enterprises. In the years 2000 
and 2002, the upper limit for automatic overseas investment approval was raised 
to US$50 million and US$100 million respectively.  The prior approval from RBI 
was dispensed with and firms were also allowed to obtain the remittances through 
any authorised foreign exchange dealer. In 2005, banks were permitted to lend 
money to Indian companies for acquisitions through equity in overseas joint 
ventures, wholly owned subsidiaries or other overseas companies as strategic 
investment. In the year 2007, the limit of overseas investment of Indian 
companies was increased to 300% of net worth in June 2007 and further raised to 
400% of the net worth of a company in September 2007.  
The policy changes with regard to Indian overseas investment from the year 2004 
onwards are described as liberal (Nayyar, 2008). The liberal phase of the policy 
changes are described in Appendix table-1.  
The overseas investment policy was aimed to bring transparency to overseas 
investment processes and also to help Indian conglomerates analyse their rights 
and opportunities in the international markets.  




2.3 Trends and Patterns of Indian Outward Foreign Direct 
Investment 
Although Indian corporates have been investing overseas for decades, there has 
been a marked jump in such investments since the 1990s. While India continues to 
maintain controls on most types of capital outflows for prudential reasons (Prasad 
2007) it has been steadily liberalising overseas investments by Indian companies.  
It is evident from Table 2.1 that both outward and inward flows of investment in 
the Indian economy increased quite rapidly. The average foreign direct investment 
inflows during the 1995-2007 period were US$6,771.23 million. The foreign 
direct investment inflows increased during the period under consideration with the 
exceptions of 1998, 1999 and 2003.  
India‘s outward push can be divided into the pre-liberalisation (before 1990) 
period and the post-liberalisation (after 1990) period. Pradhan (2004) rationalises 
the initial OFDI push by Indian firms as follows: in the pre-1990‘s period, there 
were mainly two push factors that led Indian firms‘ entry into foreign markets; (i) 
the stagnant domestic market and (Davidson, Garrison, & Henderson,1987) policy 
restrictions on large firms‘ growth. During this period privately-owned large 
Indian corporates which were desperate to grow found themselves in 
disadvantageous situations created by the Indian policy regime that included the 
Monopolies and Restrictive Trade Practices Act, Foreign Exchange Regulation 
Act, licensing regulation and reservation policies for public-owned and small 




scale sectors. A slow growing domestic market further added to the drive of these 
Indian firms to seek new markets in developing and developed countries. 
Table  2-1: India‘s Foreign Direct Investment Inflows and Outflows (US $ 
Millions) 
Year Inward FDI Outward FDI 
1995 2125 119 
1996 2525 240 
1997 3619 113 
1998 2633 47 
1999 2168 80 
2000 3585 509 
2001 5472 1397 
2002 5627 1669 
2003 4323 1879 
2004 5771 2179 
2005 7606 2978 
2006 19622 12842 
2007 22950 13649 
2008 27300 20947 
Source: UNCTAD (2008)  and RBI report (2009). 
It is evident from Table 2.1 that India experienced annual average growth rate 
of  




1399% in outward foreign direct investments between 2001 to 2008. It is also 
evident that growth in OFDI in M&As in India is partly attributable to factors 
implicit in the liberalisation of the policy regime by the Indian government as 
discussed above.  
The information in Table 2.1 further reveals that a wide gap which is seen 
between the Inward FDI and OFDI flows before 2000, has narrowed from 2001 
onwards. The period 2001-2008 has been described as the arrival of Indian 
companies in developed countries and expanded Indian investment abroad (L. 
Singh & Jain, 2009). 
2.4 Top 30 Foreign Acquisitions by Indian Firms 2000-2008 
Until the year 2000, the incidence of Indian entrepreneurs acquiring foreign 
enterprises (in developed countries) was not so common. The situation has 
undergone a remarkable change since 2002. A growing number of Indian 
enterprises are beginning to see outward investments as important aspects of their 
corporate strategy and are emerging as multinationals (N. Kumar, 2006). The 
Indian corporates acquired a number of strategically significant companies like 
Corus, Novelis, and Betapharm, etc. Table 2.2 presents the 30 major cross-border 
M&A transactions by Indian corporates. The striking feature of these M&As is 
that the majority of the target companies are from developed countries.   It is 
observed that a substantial portion of the total M&A activity in India was during 




2006. Another notable feature is that almost 99% of acquisitions are settled in 
cash. 
Table 2.2 provides information on the top thirty foreign acquisitions by Indian 
firms during 2000-08. Out of the top thirty foreign acquisitions by Indian firms, 
nine foreign acquisitions belonged to the Tata group of companies and three 
belonged to the Indian public sector companies (ONGC-Brazil; ONGC-Sudan and 
HPCL) and the remaining eighteen corporates belonged to private sector.  
Table  2-2 : Top Thirty Foreign Acquisitions by Indian Firms from 2000 to 2008 






1 Tata Steel Corus Steel UK 1907 2007 





Germany 1984 2006 
3 Ranbaxy Terapia SA Pharma Romania 1961 2006 
4 Hindalco Novelis Aluminium US 1958 2007 
5 ISPAT Finmetal 
Holdings 
Steel Bulgaria 1984 2005 
6 Tata Tea Tetly Group Food & 
Beverages 
UK 1983 2000 










Belgium 1984 2005 








Malaysia 1932 2006 




Germany  1992 2004 
11 United Spirits White & 
Mickey 
Spirits UK 1951 2007 
12 HPCL Kenya 
Petroleum 
Refinery 








IT Services Australia 1968 2005 
14 United 
Phosphorous 
Cerexagri Fertilizers Europe 1969 2006 




US 2000 2006 
16 M&M  Stokes Group 
Ltd 
Forging UK 1945 2006 
17 ONGC – 
Videsh 
Petrobas  Petroleum Brazil 1989 2006 















20 M&M  Schoneweiss 
& Co.GmbH 
Forging Germany 1945 2007 
21 Sasken Botania 
Hightec 
 
IT Finland 1989 2006 





Telecom US 1986 2005 




23 Tata Motors Daewoo Automotive Korea 1945 2004 




France  1977 2007 
25 Lupin Kyowa Pharma & 
HealthCare 
Japan 1968 2007 
26 Piralmal 
Healthcare 
Morpeth Pharma & 
HealthCare 
UK 1933 2006 
27 Tata Steel Millennium 
Steel 
Steel Thailand 1907 2006 
28 Tata Motors  Jaguar & 
Land Rover 
Automotive UK 1945 2008 










Chemicals UK 1939 2006 
Sources: Compiled from Indian Business Reports and Business Newspapers 
Table 2.2 further reveals that out of the top thirty foreign acquisitions by Indian 
companies, twenty three acquisitions are in developed countries and seven 
acquisitions are in the other parts of the globe. The sectoral distribution of the top 
thirty foreign acquisitions by Indian companies shows that the largest number of 
foreign acquisitions belong to pharmaceutical & healthcare (8); and metals and 
mining and automobiles (8); information technology and telecommunication (4); 
oil, gas and energy (3); food & beverages (3); chemicals and fertilisers (2); and 
manufacturing and processing (2).  Furthermore, the table also reveals the transfer 
of ownership (or effective control) control from these foreign acquisitions.   




Table  2-3: Transaction Settlement of 30 OFDI related Acquisitions by Indian 
corporates from 2000 to 2008 
S.No Acquirer Target Stake Settlement 
(US $ 
Million) 
1 Tata Steel Corus 100 12100 
2 DRL Betaphar Arzneimttel 
GmbH 
100 570.3 
3 Ranbaxy Terapia SA 97 324 
4 Hindalco Novelis 100 6000 
5 ISPAT Finmetal Holdings 71 400 
6 Tata Tea Tetly Group 100 431.2 
7 Wipro UNZA 100 246 
8 MATRIX Doc Pharma NV 95.5 234.7 
9 Ballarpur Sabah Forest Industries 77.8 209 
10 Opto Circuits Eurocor Gmb H 60 600 
11 United Spirits White & Mickey 100 595 million 
Pounds  




12 HPCL Kenya Petroleum 
Refinery 
67 500 




100 26  
14 United 
Phosphorous 
Cerexagri 100 NA 
15 Tata Coffee Eight ‗o‘ Clock Coffee 100 220 
16 M&M  Stokes Group Ltd 98.6 12 million 
Pounds 
17 ONGC – Videsh Petrobas  15 1400 
18 ONGC – Videsh Greater Nile Oil Project 25 766.1 
19 Videocon 
International  
Thomson SA (CRT 
business) 
100 100 
20 M&M  Schoneweiss & 
Co.GmbH 
90.47 NA 
21 Sasken Botania Hightec 100 210 
22 VSNL Teleglobe International 100 254.3 
23 Tata Motors Daewoo 100 102 
24 Wochdardt Negma Laboratories 100 265 








Morpeth 100 na 
27 Tata Steel Millennium Steel 100 167  
28 Tata Jaguar Jaguar & Land Rover 100 2.3 billion 
29 Sun Pharma Valeant 
Pharmaceuticals 
100 NA 
30 Tata Chemicals Bruner Mond Group 63.5 508 
It is evident from Table 2.3 that among the top thirty foreign acquisitions, 100% 
ownership was reported in eighteen foreign acquisitions, followed by 97% to 51% 
in nine foreign acquisitions, and three corporates have less than 30% in the joint 
ventures.  
2.5 Conclusions: 
It is evident from the above presentation that the Indian Government‘s approach 
towards OFDI underwent drastic changes with a shift from a regulatory OFDI 
policy environment to a de-regulated policy environment. The transformation 
from the restrictive policy regime in the first phase to the liberalised policy regime 
in the third phase is noteworthy. The policy changes enabled the Indian corporates 




to revise their investment strategies. This resulted in increased OFDI related 
M&As by Indian corporates. 
This study examines the effects of the OFDI related M&As by Indian corporates. 
The chapter that follows will present the theories and prior findings relevant to 




CHAPTER 3: INTERNATIONALISATION: A 
THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVE 
3.1 Introduction 
This chapter presents the theories relating to internationalisation from the global 
perspective. From the context of OFDI related M&As, this chapter briefs five 
theories.  These theories will elucidate how some components like: ownership 
competitive advantages; institutional environment; stock-holders value-enhancing 
activities; manager‘s self-interested motives, brownfield investments and 
absorptive capacity will influence the corporates when making decisions about 
OFDI related M&As.  The theories assist our understanding of the emerging 
Indian corporate dynamics relating to OFDI related M&As. 
The rationale for OFDI related M&As by firms is to create value to their 
investments. In the context of an open market economy, the competitiveness of 
firms refers to their ability to survive and grow while attaining their ultimate 
objective of maximising profits (and retaining or improving market share), and to 
adapt to changes in their internal and external environment in a way that 
guarantees their long-term operation. As per the UNCTAD (2006) report, 
developing-countries‘ multinational companies (MNCs) are able to acquire 
competitive advantages, including proprietary expertise and technology, which 
allow them to operate in overseas environments and compete effectively with 
foreign firms. Many of these MNCs possess sophisticated and distinctive 
advantages that they have created and nurtured over many years. There are also 
complementarities in MNC‘s of developed and developing-countries. For 




example, in some electronics industries developed-country MNCs have retained 
R&D, product design, branding and sales of a product, but have disbursed 
production to contract manufacturers. Finally, a number of developing-countries 
MNCs are able to benefit from home-country locational factors, including access 
to natural resources such as oil (often allied to state ownership) and access to 
cheap funds, which translate into significant advantages for these firms 
(UNCTAD, 2006). 
Firms often use acquisitions to reconfigure their mix of products and services 
and/or to expand their product offerings to boost growth (Capron, Dussauge, & 
Mitchell, 1998), (Krishnan, Joshi, & Krishnan, 2004). When two firms merge, 
they can combine and reconfigure their products to create a combination of 
product portfolios that neither firm could create alone (Karim & Mitchell, 2000). 
3.2 Theories relating to Internationalisation 
3.2.1 Ownership, Location and Internationalisation resource-based view 
The theory of the international operation of the firm posits that the ownership of 
some unique advantages having a revenue generating potential abroad when 
combined with the presence of internalisation and locational advantages leads to 
outward FDI (Caves, 1971). Enterprises based in the industrialised countries have 
emerged as multinational enterprises on the strength of ownership advantages 
derived from innovatory activity that is largely concentrated in these countries. 
According to Ownership, Location and Internationalisation theory, a prerequisite 




for a firm becoming international is the ownership of unique advantages (such as 
accumulated learning and managerial skills, technological effort, product 
differentiation, cost effectiveness of processes, firm size, export orientation, 
technological dependence and local ownership) that outweigh the disadvantages 
of being foreign in overseas markets.  
Dunning (1981, 2001) draws together elements of previous theories to identify 
ownership, location and internationalisation advantages that motivate 
internationalisation. Ownership advantages are firm-specific factors such as 
superior proprietary resources or managerial capabilities that can be applied 
competitively in a foreign country (Barney, 1991). Location advantages can 
account for decisions to invest in foreign countries that offer superior market or 
production opportunities to those available elsewhere or opportunities to secure 
valued inputs. Internationalisation may accrue to firms that can reduce transaction 
costs by investing abroad so as to undertake transformation or supporting 
processes more effectively that can be achieved through market transactions. The 
benefits of internationalisation depend on ownership capabilities and in general 
this has been a dominant explanation for the emergence of internationalisation by 
firms. FDI occurs when a firm chooses to exploit the monopolist advantages of its 
intangible assets through direct production rather than exporting from its home 
country or licensing the advantages to a third party abroad. The existence of 
impediments to a free flow of products between nations, such as tariffs and non-
tariff barriers and market failures in the arm‘s-length transactions in intangible 




assets, tends to decrease the profitability of exporting licensing relative to FDI. 
This influential perspective is mainly developed on the basis of studies of large 
western Multinational Enterprises (MNEs), which suggests that 
internationalisation is motivated by a firm‘s wish to exploit its existing ownership 
advantages (Child & Rodrigues, 2005). The rise of MNC enterprises has been 
attributed to efficiency advantages in the management of inter-dependencies 
concerning know-how, reputation, the value chain and marketing through 
internationalisation. Thus conventional view of mainstream theory of 
internationalisation focuses on overseas possibilities of assets exploitation. The 
mainstream perspective in international business assumes that firms will 
internationalise on the basis of a definable competitive advantage that allows them 
to secure enough to cover the additional costs and risks associated with operating 
abroad (R.E. Caves, 1971). 
The ownership advantages for firms stem from better or newer technologies, 
embedded managerial capabilities and established brand names. The location 
advantages for firms arise from market opportunities, cheaper inputs and trade 
barriers in host countries. The international quest of firms reflects a decision to 
source inputs or capture markets through ownership or control rather than trade. 
In sum, this literature argues that the internationalisation of firms through 
investments, mergers or acquisitions is driven by the monopolistic or oligopolistic 
power of these firms (Nayyar, 2008).  




According to Mathews (2006), the seeking ownership advantages through 
ownership, location and internationalisation  approach may not be entirely 
appropriate for an analysis of internationalisation of firms from developing 
countries that often seek to invest abroad to secure a competitive advantage they 
do not possess. Recent explanations of outward foreign direct investment from 
latecomers to industrialisation in East Asia stress this dimension. It is argued that 
firms from developing countries invest abroad to develop linkages with the world 
market in order to leverage strategic resources that in turn promote learning within 
the firm.  In other words, firms from developing countries may use outward 
foreign direct investment not as a means of exploiting existing competitive 
advantage, but as a means of realising and augmenting potential competitive 
advantage. 
Latecomer firms do not possess many intangible strategic resources relative to 
their global rivals and therefore are eager to access superior resources and skills in 
order to compete successfully (Rui & Yip, 2008). These companies want to 
combine their own advantages developed at home with other new assets available 
in foreign countries. Their own advantages lie mostly in small-scale and labour-
intensive production and in the ability to adapt quickly to changes in products and 
production processes (Makino, Lau, & Yeh, 2002). Since required complementary 
inputs, such as more advanced products and technology, belong to the mature 
firms in advanced countries, latecomer firms tend to prefer developed economies 




as their asset-seeking location. These assets can only be accessed through a 
takeover of these firms (Dunning, 2001).  
In addition, through an acquisition, a firm can gain access to intangible as well as 
tangible assets and thus is able to buy not only a single asset but also an entire 
knowledge system under a unified control (Rui & Yip, 2008). 
3.2.2 Institution-based view 
The institution-based view of strategy research adopts the core proposition of 
institutional economics, that variation in national institutional environments 
enables and constrains different strategic choices such as product and geographic 
diversification (Peng & Delios, 2006). The companies‘ internationalisation 
strategies are also shaped by the home institutional environment. This has been 
shown by Buckley (2007) in recent research on the determinants of Chinese 
Outward Foreign Direct Investment (OFDI). Institutional constraints in emerging 
economies tend to be much stronger than those in developed countries and include 
the substantial influence of governments on companies‘ strategy decisions (P. 
Deng, 2008).  
Active government involvement in business via ownership or through the 
regulatory framework is a rather common phenomenon in most of the latecomer 
and transition economies, especially in Asia (Child & Rodrigues, 2005). In 
contrast to the market-oriented model of the West, the emergence of Japan and 
South Korea was much more related to the intervention of their governments, 




which orchestrated oligopolistic competition among large-scale companies 
(Sutherland, 2003). The development-state model of the newly industrialised 
economies (NIEs) in East Asia incorporates development oriented policies and 
applies an interventionist set of industrial policy instruments (Liu, 2005; Nee, 
Opper, & Wong, 2007). The experience of the Asian latecomer firms shows that 
government support has been a decisive factor in these companies‘ successful 
internationalisation (Hoskisson, Lau, & Wright, 2000). Furthermore, the role of 
government in transition economies relates to the definition, diffusion, and 
enforcement of the norms and requirements of the companies‘ business conduct. 
The government can restrain or facilitate the internationalisation of firms through 
different policies. 
3.2.3 Economic Theory view 
Economic theory generally offers two competing thoughts about the efficacy of 
M&As as corporate restructuring strategies. First, the neoclassical theory or the 
value-maximising theory assumes M&As‘ consequences as the motivation for 
M&As, and views corporate M&As as value-enhancing activities in which 
managers work to achieve the shareholders‘ wealth maximisation goal for the 
firm. (Franks & Hariss, 1989).  Second, in contrast, it is managerial theory or non-
value maximising theory, which views mergers as the extension of managers‘ own 
potential interests, undertaken for the purpose of increasing their own wealth or 
prestige by managing a larger post-merger entity (Roll, 1986). The market for 




corporate control is best viewed as an arena in which managerial teams compete 
for the rights to manage resources (Jensen & Richard, 1983). 
While outward FDI related M&As can contribute to a firm‘s competitiveness, it is 
also subject to risks inherent in projects undertaken abroad. First, a newly 
established foreign affiliate has the disadvantage of being foreign, compared to 
established enterprises in a host economy (Hofstede, 1980 & Roth & O'Donnell, 
1996). Second, companies face higher levels of complexity as they establish their 
presence in an increasing number of locations. Additional needs to integrate and 
coordinate activities and concomitant organisational and environmental 
requirements may eventually exhaust managerial capacity (Lall, 1986). 
3.2.3.1 Free cash flow theory and CEO-hubris theory. 
Jensen (1986) proposes a theory of ‗free cash flow‘ to explain why managers may 
undertake projects which yield negative benefits to shareholders. According to 
this theory, free cash flow (FCF), which is cash flow in excess of that required to 
fund the firm‘s positive Net Present Value (NPV) projects, should be paid out to 
shareholders. This will in turn reduce the resources controlled by management, 
and therefore increase the amount of monitoring necessary for the firm to acquire 
new capital. 
Jensen (1988) argues that take-overs benefit both shareholders and society. 
Central to this view is the claim that acquiring firm shareholders earn positive 
returns on hostile takeovers and roughly zero in mergers. This view of acquiring 




firm wealth gains has been undermined by the findings of recent research into the 
long-run performance of acquiring firms (Agrawal & Jaffe, 2000). These results 
pose a major question for finance and management researchers: why is it that 
firms, on average, undertake negative NPV acquisitions? Jensen (1988, p. 34) 
makes a specific and testable claim for this theory: Free cash flow theory implies 
that managers of firms with unused borrowing power and large free cash flows are 
more likely to undertake low-benefit or even value-destroying mergers. 
Roll (1986) presents the theory of Hubris. The hubris hypothesis posits that 
acquisitions are motivated by managers‘ mistakes in the absence of any 
synergistic gain. Berkovitch and Narayana (1993) find support for this argument 
in their study by analysing the target, acquirer and total gain from the deal. 
Hayward and Hambrick (1997) have also identified CEO hubris as one of the 
major motives behind an acquisition and have shown that CEO hubris leads to 
higher acquisition premiums.  
The hubris hypothesis addresses the behavioural explanation for corporate 
acquisitions. Roll (1986) argues that management of the acquiring firm are 
infected by overweening pride and arrogance (hubris) and thus persist in a belief 
that their own valuation of the target is correct, despite objective information that 
the target‘s true economic value is lower. 




3.2.4 Resource-Based View 
According to the resource-based view, post-acquisition resource redeployment 
and the resulting product mix are important sources of value creation in 
acquisitions, and complementary differences in product strategies between 
merging firms can enhance the consolidated firm‘s chances of creating a product 
portfolio that may not be easily replicated by other firms (Karim & Mitchell, 
2000). The theory also views that a firm‘s internationalisation strategy and 
performance depend on the existence of unique tangible and intangible resources 
in its home country which give it a competitive advantage compared to firms in 
the host country. Intangible resources such as management know-how, research 
and development (R&D) capability, brand names, and proprietary technologies 
are crucially important (Barney, 1991; Teece, D., Pisano, G., & Shuen, A. (1997).  
Companies with strong competitive advantages often try to exploit their strength 
by creating a clone of the parent in the host country (Mathews, 2006). According 
to Mathews, greenfield investment is the preferred mode of entry as it is the most 
effective way to transfer the investing company‘s advantages to overseas markets 
and to introduce the firm‘s best practices. Greenfield FDI is one particular form of 
a market penetration. Transnational Corporations (TNCs) consider this option 
when their firm-specific advantages are strong enough to cover the additional 
transaction costs arising from the operation in the foreign market, and when 
location advantages are abroad. Nevertheless, the fact remains that the additional 
costs of the liability of foreignness (Zaheer, 1995) still have a negative impact on 




the performance of the greenfield venture. Slangen and Hennart (2008) argue that 
greenfields, unlike acquisitions, increase substantial external conformity costs 
(due to the need to adapt to the local environment) because they suffer from both 
a liability of newness and a liability of being a foreigner.  
According to Pennings, J.M., Barkena, H and Douma, S (1994), greenfield 
investments are riskier than acquisitions, because as new projects they start at the 
beginning of the learning curve (the liability of newness argument). The situation 
might change for the better if the TNCs, instead of practising greenfield FDI, 
acquire an existing local firm that is well-established in the market [e.g., 
Demirbag, Tatoglu, & Glaister, (2008)]. They may then try to combine the 
subsidiary‘s advantages with their own core abilities, thereby augmenting the 
overall Firm Specific Advantage system (Dunning, 2000). The new combined 
entity may then be able to use these synergies to better overcome the transaction 
cost barrier and to improve its position on the local market (Anand & Delios, 
2002 & Dunning, 2000). In the case of Greenfield FDI, the parent company is 
relying entirely on its own capabilities. As such, the typical greenfield subsidiary 
is determined by the parent company‘s FSAs and its organisational routines 
(Barkema & Vermeulen, 1998 & Hennart & Park, 1993). 
Mamdhani and Noah (2004) investigated the pathways to success in M&As 
through a survey approach by collecting the views of investors relating to cash 
deployment and preferences of size related issues. They concluded that there is no 
single definition of a successful M&A strategy, although discipline and control 




are clearly essential elements. Their study states that investors are not misled by 
acquisitions undertaken for purposes of empire-building. The investors are 
sceptical of management‘s ability to use excess free cash flow for acquisitions and 
would rather have their money back unless it can be demonstrated that the cash 
will be used only to purchase targets with appropriate risk-adjusted projected 
returns. But these returns do not have to be delivered the next quarter. Even in this 
new era of strong corporate governance and enhanced transparency, successful 
acquirers will be able to justify acquisitions on strategic as well as financial 
grounds. While a strategic operating vision is essential, sound execution is also 
critical and requires an uncompromising financial approach to portfolio 
management. A reputation for effective post-merger integration is key to gaining 
investor acceptance of M&A activity. In general, acquisitions must be treated as 
commitments of scarce investor capital and, as with any capital investments, 
should not be pursued when prices exceed projected valuations. 
Companies with weak competitive advantages, by contrast, must acquire new 
resources that they cannot generate themselves. Under these circumstances, a 
foreign acquisition is more effective as it allows the firm to extract such assets 
from the acquired company (Homburg & Bucerius, 2005). Cross-border 
acquisitions, by taking advantage of the firm-specific advantages of the local firm, 
might also be able to react more quickly to changing market conditions and to 
strategic moves of the competitors than a greenfield venture could. At the time of 
market entry, in particular, greenfield investments need more time for planning, 




construction and market positioning than takeovers. Consequently, they may lose 
precious time in relation to cross-border acquisitions before they can develop their 
operations (Anand & Delios, 2002; Carow, Heron, & Saxton, 2004; Hennart & 
Park, 1993 & Larimo, 2003). Thus, foreign rivals opting for cross-border 
acquisition gain time to react and to challenge market entry of competitors.  
The internationalisation of firms from developing countries is driven by a wide 
range of factors such as market access for exports, horizontal or vertical 
integration, delivery of services, capturing international brand names, access to 
technology, sourcing raw materials and global leadership aspirations (Caves, 
1989).  
3.2.5 Organisation Theory View 
According to the literature of organisation theory, the absorptive capacity is 
largely a function of the level of prior related knowledge, which takes the forms 
of basic and recent scientific and technological developments in a given field 
(Cohen & Levinthal, 1990). Such related knowledge is used by a firm to further 
develop capability. 
For successful strategic asset-seeking OFDI, firms from the newly industrialised 
economies (Markides & Oyon, 1998) need to possess related expertise prior to 
engaging in FDI in developed countries. The asset-seeking perspective of FDI 
suggests that such expertise would work as an absorptive capacity that facilitates 
further development of capabilities. In support of this perspective, Van Hoesel 




(1999) found that NIE firms that invested in developed countries tend to possess 
superior technology and marketing advantages over other domestic firms. 
Similarly, Chen and Chen (1998) found that Taiwanese firms investing in the 
USA tended to have a greater R&D intensity and a higher rate of sales growth 
than those investing in less developed countries.  The firms might differ in their 
capabilities to evaluate, acquire, and integrate strategic assets from external 
sources. This difference would lead to a varying degree of the likelihood that the 
firms would engage in strategic asset-seeking FDI in developed countries (Makino, 
et al., 2002). 
3.2.6 Asset-Exploitation and  Asset-Exploration Perspective 
According to Makino, Lau and Yeh (2002), from the asset-exploitation 
perspective, FDI is viewed as the transfer of a firm's proprietary assets across 
borders. They argue that firms from newly industrialised economies engage in 
FDI in developed countries (DC) when they possess certain forms of firm-specific 
advantages exploitable in developed countries. 
According to Makino & et al (2002), the asset-exploration perspective of OFDI is 
viewed as a means to acquire strategic assets (i.e., technology, marketing, and 
management expertise) available in a host country. NIE firms are motivated to 
invest in developed countries when they lack some component of technology that 
is necessary to compete in mature markets which is available in the developed 
countries. In other words, they intend to seek technology-based resources and 




skills in developed countries that are superior or not available in their home 
countries in a particular product market domain. Those that have the capability to 
absorb this technology form the intent to do so, and hence, invest in developed 
countries.  
According to March (1991) exploration involves gaining new information about 
alternatives and thus improving future returns, and exploitation involves using the 
information currently available and thus improving present returns. Both 
exploitation and exploration involve different aspects of organisational learning, 
yet are equally essential for organisational survival and prosperity. Building on 
the organisational learning perspective, Hedlund and Ridderstrale (1997) 
suggested that dominant theoretical perspectives in international business research 
adopted the exploitation rather than the exploration (creation) perspective. 
3.3 Related and Unrelated acquisitions  
Research on corporate diversification is an important area in the strategic 
management literature. As this research developed, some appealing 
operationalisations of diversification have emerged (Rumelt, 1974). These have 
resulted in generalisations about the linkage between diversification strategy and 
profitability. Notable among this research is Salter and Weinhold's (1979) work 
on the strategic relationships between acquiring firms and target firms. These 
authors classified acquisitions into the broad groups of related and unrelated 
transactions. An important contribution of the Salter and Weinhold work was a 




link drawn between the acquisition of key skills or product market positions and 
the potential for value creation. These authors asserted that value would be created 
through the reinforcement of skills or positions critical to the success of the 
combined businesses through related acquisitions. Value in this context should be 
reflected in the stock price of the firms (and specifically in the change in stock 
prices as the market adjusts its expectation of future earnings from the 
businesses). This concept of economic value is consistent with that of financial 
economists.  
The overall criterion for relatedness lay in the key success factor of the acquiring 
and acquired firms. Relatedness was reflected in the transfer of functional skills 
between businesses (functional skills could be subdivided into research and 
development, production, marketing and distribution)
7
. According to prior 
findings (Rumelt, 1974) on diversification strategy, businesses are understood to 
be related if they (1) serve similar markets using similar distribution channels, (2) 
use similar production technologies, or (3) exploit similar scientific research.  
According to Singh and Montgomery (1987), in a related acquisition, value 
creation can arise from three sources: economies of scale, economies of scope, 
and market power. Economies of scale are present when efficiencies arise from 
                                                 
7
 Salter and Weinhold further divided relatedness acquisitions into related-complementary 
and related-supplementary classification. That level of distinction is not used in the 
present analysis. 




the expanded production of a specific product. In a resource framework this 
would mean that a given bundle of resources is being more fully utilised. Scale 
economies can occur in specific functional areas, i.e. manufacturing, research and 
development, selling and distribution. The traditional areas are used to identify 
related acquisitions (Salter & Weinhold, 1979); (Rumelt, 1974), as well as in the 
more general areas of administration and financial management. Economies of 
scope arise when a given bundle of resources are used in the joint production of 
two or more products.  
For example, when some of the assembly facilities in an automobile plant (body 
manufacture) are used, both for cars and light trucks, scope economies may be 
operating. The indivisibility of the resource provides scale economies when 
capacity utilisation is increased through increased production of a single product. 
When capacity utilisation is increased through the production of two or more 
products, scope economies are provided through the utilisation of the indivisible 
shared resource. It is important to note that scope economies can occur outside of 
the production area. Distribution systems and intangible assets like brand names 
can be the source of scope economies if they are used for more than one product.  
The sharing of specialised know-how is another important source of scope 
economies. Due to market imperfections this know-how may be unavailable at the 
same cost to other firms in the market place. This idea is similar to Rumelt‘s 
(1974) concept of diversifying around a core science-based resource. Market 
power effects, in the traditional framework of industrial organisation economies, 




are operating when a market participant has the ability to influence price, quantity, 
and the nature of the product in the market place (Sheperd, 1970). In turn, market 
power may lead to excess returns. In related acquisitions a firm's market power 
may be increased through horizontal acquisitions (where the acquiring and the 
acquired firm are operating in the same product market) or through product or 
market extension acquisitions where a firm's effective size is increased relative to 
its competitors. Overall, Singh and Montgomery (1987) argue that in related 
acquisitions there are several mechanisms available for the combination of the 
two firms to be potentially more valuable than the sum of their pre-acquisition. 
3.4 Prior research relating to motivation for the growth in the 
outward FDI  
Deng (2004) investigated the motivation for outward investments in Chinese firms 
and identifies five motives for Chinese investments; namely, resource-seeking, 
technology-seeking, market-seeking, diversification-seeking and asset-seeking. 
Deng noted some special characteristics present in Chinese firms making outward 
investment, including the monopolistic position of the investing firms in the 
domestic markets and state-ownership. Chinese government policy plays a great 
role in boosting foreign investments. Of the large firms making outward 
investments, only one is privately owned and 25 are government-owned (Deng 
2004). This situation is different from India.  




Zhan (1995) suggests market-seeking as an important motive for Chinese outward 
FDI, as there is excess production capacity available in the manufacturing sector 
for textiles and clothing, bicycles, footwear and electric appliances. Another 
dominant motive as identified by Zhan (1995) is the resource-seeking motive as 
the per capita availability of natural resources is relatively low in China. 
Efficiency-seeking is not a dominant motive as China has abundant supply of low-
cost labour. In yet another study about the determinants of Chinese outward FDI 
during 1984-2001, Buckley et al (2007) found three factors having significant 
impact on outward FDI, namely the host-country market size, cultural proximity 
and policy liberalisation. Asset-seeking and resource-seeking were not found to be 
significant determinants of the outward FDI. 
Wang and Wong (2007) examined the effect of business cycle fluctuations on FDI 
outflows. The results suggest that these fluctuations would have more negative 
impact on FDI outflows when the general economic conditions are not good.  
Antaloczy and Elteto (2000) investigated the motives for Hungarian firms to 
invest in CEE countries. The results of this study suggest that market-seeking is 
the most important motive for outward investments by Hungarian firms, followed 
by strategic asset-seeking 
Mazerolle (2006) compared the effect of enlargement or addition of provinces or 
countries in two regions, the Pan Pearl River Delta Region (Pan-PRD) and EU 25, 
when attracting foreign investment. The results revealed that the addition of eight 
provinces to the Pan-PRD region attracted about 1% of total world FDI stocks, 




whereas the addition of ten countries to the EU helped to attract 2.7% of the world 
FDI stocks. This difference was attributed to the cultural and geographical ties 
between the Central and East European countries and West European countries 
which helped to attract the FDI. On the other hand, Graham, M., Martey, E. and 
Yawson, A (2008) examined the motives for UK firms to invest in less developed 
countries. The results suggest that the firms with high liquidity but rather low 
growth rate are more likely to invest in emerging markets. 
Kyrkilis and Pantelidis (2003) investigated the relationship between outward FDI 
and certain macro-level factors such as income, exchange rate, technology, human 
capital and openness of economy using the data from five European Union (EU) 
and four non-EU countries during the period 1977-1997. The results suggested 
country-wise differences, and also differences between the developed and 
developing countries. However, generally speaking, a significant positive 
relationship between real GNP and FDI outflows was found, whereas exchange 
rate showed a significant negative relationship. 
Instead of focusing on a country, Kreitl and Oberndorfer (2004) surveyed 100 top 
European engineering consulting firms to investigate the motives behind mergers 
and acquisitions. The dominant motives as suggested by the findings were 
diversification and market-seeking. To a lesser extent, increase in firm's market 
share was another motive. However, tax reasons and excess liquidity with the 
firms were not important while making acquisition decisions. 




Dunning (1998) (1981) identified certain motivating factors for the firms 
investing in foreign countries such as resource seeking, market seeking and 
efficiency seeking. According to Nagesh (2008) another motivation for strategic 
asset seeking is not only access to brands and customers, but sometimes also 
proprietary technology. 
Kumar (1998) investigated a recent trend in strategic asset-seeking FDI conducted 
by firms from newly industrialised Asian economies. The study found that the 
amount of the outflow of FDI from Asian newly industrialised economies to 
developed countries has been rapidly increasing over the past decade and 
suggested that the NIE firms investing in developed countries tended to use 
outward FDI to strengthen their non-price competitiveness
8
, whereas firms from 
newly industrialised economies investing in LDCs used FDI primarily to 
strengthen their price competitiveness
9
. Chen and Chen (1998) found a similar 
pattern in outward FDI of Taiwanese firms and supported the findings of Kumar 
(1998). Research also suggests that many of the firms from newly industrialised 
economies investing in developed countries have gained access to established 
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 Non-price competition is a marketing strategy in which one firm tries to 
distinguish its product  or service from competing products on the basis of 
attributes like design and workmanship" (Brue-McConnell (2002) p. 43.7-43.8). 
9
 A price lower than that offered by the competitors, or a price made more 
attractive because of added incentives, such as longer payment terms. 
http://www.businessdictionary.com/definition/competitive-
price.html#ixzz1oBX7S6cE 




brand names, novel product technology and extensive networks of distributors, 
typically through aggressive acquisitions of developed countries‘ firms in the host 
countries (Kumar, 1998).   
As per the prior findings (Kumar, 1996), the drivers behind Indian corporates 
OFDI (1970s and 1980s) were market-seeking in nature and aimed to exploit the 
revenue productivity of the technology and capital goods adapted to developing 
country situations. Hence, Indians were primarily concentrated in relatively 
poorer countries in Asia and Africa and focussed on relatively mature technology 
areas of manufacturing (metal products), edible oil refining, paper and light 
engineering. The most preferred form of investment was greenfield or joint 
venture. India enjoyed competitive ownership advantage in Africa and hence 
preferred greenfield mode. During 1990s, the emergence of Indian corporates in 
generic pharmaceuticals and in IT software services in global markets required 
local presence to support their exports. Hence, the OFDI pattern was characterised 
as trade supporting and was subject to overseas investment regulations. From 
2000 onwards the focus was towards globalisation of operations and increasing 
scales. Therefore, to derive competitive advantages, the Indian corporates 
preferred a brownfield investment strategy by acquiring the target companies from 
the developed countries in Europe, UK and US which emerged as principal 
markets for the Indian corporates going global and provided them with immediate 
scale and global prints. 




It has been argued that outward investment activity prior to 1991 was the market-
seeking type (greenfield investment) where Indian enterprises established 
presence in developing countries on the basis of their intermediate technologies in 
relatively low technology industries such as light engineering (Lall, 1986 &  
Kumar, 1996). In the 1990s, however, outward investments were taken up by 
Indian enterprises to improve their global competitiveness with local presence in 
major markets, acquiring strategic assets, and strategic access to markets in 
emerging trading blocs in the context of increased emphasis on outward 
orientation as a part of reforms (Kumar, 1998). Therefore, outward investment is 
clearly concentrated in the countries that are key destinations for Indian exports 
(viz. EU and the North America) and in the sectors of Indian strength. 
According to Lall (1986), the main source of advantage enjoyed by Indian 
enterprises is their ability to absorb, adapt and build upon the technologies 
imported from abroad rather than developing completely novel technologies. 
Kumar (1996) takes the view that Indian enterprises have accumulated 
considerable learning and technological capability, managerial and technical 
expertise under the strategy of import substituting industrialisation pursued during 
the first four decades of independence.  
According to Sathye (2009), all the Indian corporates that are involved in overseas 
acquisitions in the steel sector belong to the private sector and not a single public 
sector steel company has gone for foreign acquisition. This emphasises the 
relevance of firm-specific advantages of the individual firms, rather than an 




incentive in the form of favourable government policy, as in the case of China. 
Sathye (2008) suggests that rather than following a smooth ‗development path‘ as 
a nation, Indian FDI outflows exhibit a rather uneven and sporadic pattern. The 
reason for this pattern can be attributed to the firm-specific advantages and 
individual decisions of the firms in contrast to that of neighbouring China. 
3.5 Internationalisation Model 
Agarwal and Agmon (1990) developed a new model: A three stage dynamic 
comparative model of government-business relationships, and examined its 
implications as a conceptual framework to address how the government macro 
policies interface with business micro considerations as a given economy 
develops and internationalises. The study looks into the model‘s consistency with 
the experiences of a few Newly Industrialised Countries (NIC); namely Singapore, 
India and South Korea. The study however, does not present a formal empirical 
verification of the model.   
The assumption of the Agarwal and Agmon study is that in NICs the firms operate 
in a competitive market but with the market structure in the home country heavily 
influenced by the government of the NIC. The nature of the specified market 
structure has an effect on the policies followed by firms regarding their strategies 
for dealing with markets for their products. Thus, the proposed model is 
influenced by two major forces: the first is the government policy and the second 




is profit maximising behaviour by firms. The distribution of the weight between 
these two forces changes as the process moves from one stage to the next. 
The model identifies three phases in the multidimensional process of the interface 
between the internationalisation and the business-government relations in NICs. 
They include: Import substitution, Export Promotion and Investment in Foreign 
Markets. The multidimensional process includes: Status of Comparative 
Advantage, Government Role, Corporate Role, Market Structure and Macro 
Policy. 
The Import Substitution Phase: The government takes a lead role in the early 
stages of this phase. The government decides on the nature of the desired long- 
term comparative advantage, and how to get there. The government changes the 
relative changes through taxation, tariffs and by quantitative restriction on imports, 
and determines the market structure in the domestic market. This phase is 
characterised as the period in which the government takes the driver‘s seat and the 
corporate sector follows. This is also referred to as the bureaucratic process of 
decision making. 
The Export Promotion phase: The second phase in the internationalisation 
process is the export promotion stage.  There is duality in terms of market 
structure. Production is carried out in a protected market, but export sales take 
place in a competitive market. This is a transition phase in terms of 
government/corporation relationships. As exports increase in importance, the 




ability of the government to control the corporate sector decreases. Another aspect 
of this stage in the development of international business activities is a sharp 
increase in the level of savings. This is a well-known export led growth 
phenomenon. 
The FDI Stage: In this phase, with NIC investments in target markets, the 
corporates are the driving force. The government acts as a reluctant partner. The 
primary motivation of the NIC firm is to maintain and expand the export market, 
and to reduce the risk associated with changes in trade policies in the target 
markets. Direct investment in target markets, both in marketing related activities 
(pre- and post-sale services) and in production facilities, are usually undertaken 
primarily for risk reduction rather than for maximisation of profits. As more 
investment flows across borders, and more resources are transferred from the 
country of origin to the target market (resources which include human capital), the 
NIC companies become more international. This may maximise the value of the 
shareholders of the company, but it may not necessarily maximise the contribution 
of the company to its home economy from the government‘s point of view. 
This phase is the stabilisation period in terms of the dynamics of the comparative 
advantage. It is also a phase where the comparative advantage becomes more firm 
specific. The planning shifts towards the company and away from the government.  
The study concludes that the government may initiate the process of 
internationalisation and control its initial stages, but the role of government 




diminishes as the country and the corporate sector move successfully through the 
three stages. The three stage dynamic comparative model of government-business 
relationships is specifically found consistent with the development experience in 
India, Singapore and South Korea and it helps in explaining the inconsistencies 
between NIC‘s domestic factor proportions and the relatively sophisticated nature 
of activities of their firms in foreign markets.  
3.6 Conclusions 
The studies suggest that outward foreign direct investments are influenced by 
certain factors like: competitive advantage, institutional investments, managerial 
capabilities and absorptive capacity. The most widely used approach attributes 
such competitive advantage to three factors: ownership, location and 
internationalisation. It is evident from the above discussion that the corporates 
involved in OFDI from developing countries are able to acquire competitive 
advantages, including proprietary expertise and technology, which allow them to 
operate in overseas environments and compete effectively with foreign firms. 
Many of these firms tend to possess firm-specific competitive advantages which 
they have created, acquired and nurtured over many years in their home countries. 
Given the changes in the global economic environment, regulatory framework and 
the time frames, the present study investigates if the Indian experience would be 
in any way different from the earlier empirical experiences. The following chapter 
presents a review of literature from overseas mergers and acquisitions in mature 




markets, and also from emerging markets with special reference to India. It helps 





CHAPTER 4: REVIEW OF LITERATURE 
4.1 Introduction 
This chapter reviews the literature relating to mergers and acquisitions (M&As). It 
focuses on the empirical research findings for M&As in mature markets and 
emerging economies.  The literature discussed below presents various studies 
initiated to examine the effects of M&As in terms of value creation from short- 
and long-term perspectives. Table 4.1 presents a summary of short term prior 
findings and Table 4.2 presents a summary of long-term performance prior 
findings. The literature review also examines issues relating to methods used in 
prior studies and the challenges in estimating the expected returns in the long 
period horizons. Literature relating to India is reviewed..  
4.2 Prior Studies Categorisation 
The observed research domain (as shown below) for M&As to date includes 
studies from mature markets, transition economies and emerging markets. They 
involve event study methods: short-term price performance of the shares of the 
bidding firms; market reactions to M&A announcements; long-term performance 
of the bidding firm; emerging markets‘ literature and motives behind M&As. 
I) Two approaches which dominate in the prior studies (mature markets) are: 
 
 Short-term effect of acquisitions – Event Studies  
 Long-term effect – Value Added Studies 
 
II) The literature review also considers the following: 
 
 Research methods and  models 




 Emerging  and Transition Market Studies 
 Empirical findings from Indian context 
4.3 Short-Term Event Studies 
The first major merger wave of 1900 has been described as a wave to create 
monopolies; the second a wave to create oligopolies (Stigler, 1950); and the third 
wave to create conglomerates (1960s onwards). The distinguishing feature of the 
mergers occurring in the 1960s was to diversify or extend the acquiring 
companies‘ product mixes (Mueller, 1977). The present study considers the prior 
findings in the literature from 1970 onwards because these studies used event 
study methods to assess the abnormal returns to the acquiring firms. 
 The evidence from short-term event studies, conducted primarily in mature 
markets on the outcomes of mergers and acquisitions is both extensive and mixed. 
Mandelker (1974)  conducted one of the first merger studies in the US using an 
event study approach and found no abnormal returns for the bidders. Dodd and 
Ruback (1977) observed that in the announcement month, the bidders earned 
significant positive abnormal returns of 2.83% and the targets earned significant 
positive abnormal returns of 20.58%.  Likewise, Conn (1985), Jensen and 
Rubback (1983)  and Jarrell, Brickley and Netter (1988) concluded that acquiring 
firms tend to enjoy positive performance. Conversely, Roll (1986) found some 
evidence that the value of the bidding firm decreases at or after the announcement 
of an acquisition event.  




A number of subsequent studies examined the returns of the merger participants in 
the US. Studies by Bradley (1980), Bradley, Desai, and Kim (1982),  Jarrell and 
Poulsen   (1989), and Jarrell, Brickley, and Netter (1988), analyse corporate 
takeovers made through tender offers. With the exception of Jarrell and Poulsen 
(1989), all studies covering the pre-1980 era find that successful bidders earned 
significant positive abnormal returns in the range of 2 - 4% and the successful 
targets earned significant positive abnormal returns in the range of 20-32%. Jarrell 
and Poulsen (1989), however, suggest that successful bidders (between 1980 and 
1985) earned statistically insignificant negative abnormal returns. 
Asquith (1979) employed the Black (1972) two-factor model as a benchmark for 
normal monthly returns. The study focuses on the first public announcement date 
concerning mergers in US firms.  This technique was first used by Dodd and 
Rubback  (1977). Their study found statistically significant gains accruing to the 
shareholders of both firms in the announcement month, though these are small in 
percentage terms for acquiring firms. Significant negative performance for 
acquired firms is observed during the period more than six months prior to the 
announcement. In the several months just before the announcement, however, 
acquired firms earn substantial positive abnormal returns. For acquiring firms, 
pre-merger performance is generally positive.  
Dodd (1980) examined unsuccessful as well as successful merger attempts. The 
study computes daily market model forecasting errors and averages them cross-
sectional for given relative dates to obtain average forecasting errors. For acquired 




firms, around the first public announcement date, the study documents large 
positive abnormal returns. In the case of acquiring firms, the announcement 
period is marked by small, but significantly negative abnormal returns.  
Masulis (1980) and Vermaelen (1981) document positive announcement period 
abnormal returns for tender offer stock repurchases. These researchers argue that 
share purchase announcements convey information about the performance of the 
firm.  
Asquith (1983) examined the merger process and considers whether mergers 
result in real gains. The sample is drawn from New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) 
listed firms. The study period is 1962-1976 and includes 480 trading days before a 
merger bid to 240 trading days after a merger bid. Asquith uses daily common 
stock returns for two years before the press date until one year after the outcome 
date. Daily excess returns are calculated and the average daily cumulative excess 
returns are found to be positive throughout the pre-press period for all bidding 
firms.  His findings show little or no reaction on the press day to a merger bid for 
both successful and unsuccessful bidding firms. The two-day excess returns are 
positive at 0.2% for successful acquiring firms. The bidding firms appear to have 
small but insignificant positive excess returns at the press day. All firms involved 
in merger bids have negative excess returns in the post outcome period.   
Harris and Gurel  (1986) found the announcement of adding stocks in the S&P 
500 index can generate temporary positive abnormal returns. The announcement 




does not contain any information about company‘s operational changes, thus the 
empirical evidence only suggests a price pressure effect.  
Mathur, Chhachhi and Sundaram (1992) supports the hypothesis that target 
shareholders receive abnormal positive returns. These returns are explained by the 
bidders‘ willingness to pay a premium over existing market prices for targets to 
capture perceived advantages associated with internationlisation of markets. They 
view the argument that returns to bidder stockholders should be positive due to 
the capture effects of location and because certain firm-specific factors are not 
borne out. It may be that stockholders do not positively price these factors. They 
conclude that the acquisition effects associated with managerial perquisites, the 
winner‘s curse and free cash flows may in the minds of the bidders‘ stockholders, 
outweigh the positive effects of OFDI. 
Mathur et al  (1994), Datta and Puia (1995) reported significant negative 
performance for bidders. Danbolt (1995) analysed bidders from different countries 
that acquired UK firms using both market and index models and reported that 
acquirers earn significant negative abnormal returns. Similar conclusions were 
drawn by Eun, Kolodny and Scheraga (1996) and Aw and Chatterjee (2004) in 
their studies of acquirer firm returns using the mean adjusted return model and 
market model. Their studies find that foreign acquirers earn significant negative 
abnormal returns ranging between 21.20% and 28.07%. In addition to the studies 
that have reported positive and negative performance for bidding firms, a number 
of studies also reported insignificant bidder returns around the announcement time 




of cross-border M&As (CBM&As) [see Gregory and McCorriston  (2005); 
Campa and Hernando (2004); and  Yook and  McCabe (1996)]. 
A number of studies examined the short-run performance of UK acquiring firms 
and reported statistically significant positive return in the short-run for the UK 
acquirers [see Conn et al.,  (2005) (2001) ; Goergen and Renneboog (2003), 
(2004)]. However, Aw and Chatterjee (2004), Mathur et al. (1994) and Eun et al. 
(1996) reported statistically significant negative abnormal returns. In a more 
recent study, Gregory and McCorriston (2005) reported negative bidder returns 
but the result was not statistically significant.  
The studies of Andrade  (2001) and Tuch and O‘Sullivan (2007) showed negative 
performance to acquiring firms in the short-run in the US. Bruner (2002) reported 
that of the 44 studies on acquiring firm performance that he reviewed, 20 reported 
negative returns for the bidders and 24 studies reported positive returns. Of the 20 
studies that produced negative performance for the acquiring firms, 13 reported 
significant and negative performance. In the case of positive return studies, 17 of 
24 studies showed significant positive performance of acquiring firms. These 
results make the conclusions regarding the bidding firms‘ performance more 
complex and confusing. 
Marta (2002) used a sample of 72 global alliances formed between 1987 and 1997 
by Spanish firms listed on the Madrid Stock Exchange. Their study used the event 
study method to examine short-term stock price reaction to global alliance 




announcements. Their findings showed that the Spanish firms gained an average 
abnormal return of 0.2%, on the day of the announcement.  
Antoniou and Zhao (2004) report from a sample of 179 successful British bids 
that equity bids tend to underperform significantly in the first and second years 
following the bid. Moeller et al  (2004) take into account the size effect when 
comparing the announcement effect of equity and cash bids. Large acquirers of 
public targets lose -2.45% if paying with equity and lose only -0.75% if paying 
with cash. Small acquirers gain 2.84% if they pay with cash and lose -0.42% if 
they pay with shares. Conn et al (2005) find that bids financed with any payment 
method other than cash lose -0.47% over 36 months following the announcement. 
Bids financed with cash experience insignificant losses. Overall therefore, the 
available evidence suggests that cash acquisitions perform better than equity bids. 
Elango (2006) studied the impact of international acquisitions on shareholder 
wealth.  The study was based on 52 international acquisitions in 24 countries 
undertaken by US firms in the insurance industry during 1997-2003. Event-study 
method was used to verify the impact of international acquisition announcements 
on an insurance firm‘s shareholder wealth. The changes in the share price of the 
firm during the announcement period (1 day prior to and 20 days after) were 
compared with a prior control period (22 to 247 trading days before the 
announcement). Cross-sectional regression analysis was used. Overall results of 
this study show that the firms undertaking overseas acquisitions face statistically 
insignificant negative market returns.  




Kirchhof,  Schiereck & Mentz (2006), examined the value implications of 69 US 
domestic and cross-border merger and acquisition (CM&A) deals of exchange-
listed real estate finance institutions between 1995 and 2002. To assess the value 
implications of M&A a standard event method was used, which relies on the 
market adjusted model and the market model. Cumulative abnormal returns 
stemming from the market model and the market adjusted model were calculated 
for four different event windows with -80 and +80. The estimation period was 252 
days and the event window was 161 days. Their results document that 
shareholders of targets earn, at least in the closest analysed interval, significant 
positive abnormal returns. There were no significant abnormal returns accruing to 
the shareholders of the bidders in any of the analysed intervals. CARs were 
slightly negative in two of the four event windows, and positive in the remaining 
two.  
Rieck and Canh (2006) employed the event study method to investigate M&As in 
the telecommunication industry and analysed the conditions under which M&As 
could be considered successful. . They considered companies listed on European 
and US stock exchanges (NASDAQ and NYSE). Their findings show that there is 
an overall positive shareholder wealth effect associated with M&A 
announcements in the telecommunication industry. This is especially true for 
telecommunication operators engaged in cross-border M&As. The cross-border 
M&As experience positive abnormal returns and outperform firms that expand 
domestically. In addition, when investigating service diversification and 




international diversification, mergers that are both non-conglomerate and cross-
border are found to add value to the acquiring telecommunications operator, 
whereas no significant stock reactions are found when acquirers engage in 
conglomerate domestic mergers. 
Hassan & Patro  (2007) examined 405 US companies involved in M&A activities 
in the US market as well as non-US markets from 1981 to 2004. They used the 
event study method to examine short-term stock price reaction to M&A 
announcements. They used both the market model with value weighted market 
index and the Fama-French three-factor model (also with value weighted market 
index) to adjust for risk and estimate abnormal return. Their findings do not show 
abnormal returns to acquiring companies. An important finding of their research is 
that when pharmaceutical acquisitions are analysed separately from mergers, the 
results indicate a statistically significant positive abnormal return for acquiring 
companies for both short and longer terms. 
Cummins & Xie (2009) analysed the market response to US property–liability (P–
L) insurer acquisitions and divestitures. The market-value response to acquisitions 
and divestitures is estimated using a standard event study market model. They 
used regression analysis to measure the relationship between firm returns 
(dependent variable) and market returns (independent variable), along with a set 
of control variables. Their results show that acquirers, targets and divesting firms 
all have significant positive abnormal returns around announcement dates.  




Uddin  & Boateng (2009) examined the short-run stock price performance of 373 
UK acquiring firms engaged in cross-border mergers and acquisitions (CBM&As) 
between 1994 and 2003 using a univariate analysis. The study found that the UK 
acquirers do not earn positive abnormal returns on the announcement of cross-
border acquisition decisions. Although the daily abnormal returns (AR) show that 
the acquisition announcement created some positive response on the day of 
announcement and immediately after the announcement, the positive returns 
disappear as the event window increases. Even though the abnormal returns for 
the whole sample become negative in the wider event windows, none of them is 
statistically significant. This indicates that the UK acquirers neither create value 
nor lose value by the announcement of acquisitions abroad. Their study results 
also suggest that selected transaction-specific, firm-specific and geographic 
characteristics (in this case, form of target, acquisition strategy, geographical 
origin of target firm and the payment methods) do affect the abnormal returns of 
acquiring firms. The implications suggestthat attention should be paid to these 
four factors when undertaking mergers and acquisition abroad. However, size of 
the deal appears not to have a positive bearing on the wealth gains of the UK 
acquirers.  
Ben & Alex (2010) examined M&A activity in Australia for the period 1999–
2004. They studied the share returns of bidders and targets, controlling for method 
of financing, hostility and the Fama-French factors. They used the event study 
method to examine short-term stock price reaction to M&A announcements. A list 




of 417 M&A transactions involving at least one publicly listed firm was compiled 
from the Aspect Huntley databases. Targets accrue significant positive returns, 
and this happens at the expense of bidders, who fail to capture the majority of 
economic benefits created from M&As. There is no significant evidence that 
overall bidder returns are different from zero over a trading window greater than 
ten days, except for the window (0.60). Their findings suggest that target 
companies are receiving a transfer of wealth at the expense of the bidder 
companies. 
Spyrou and Siougle (2010), investigated whether short-term reversal/continuation 
patterns were present in security returns following M&A announcements, for 
stocks listed on the London Stock Exchange. News items are sorted into 
categories: whether the firm is a bidder or a target, the level of information 
disclosure, the size of the firm, whether the announcements generate a positive or 
negative reaction, and whether the initial reaction is of a strong magnitude. They 
used event study methodology. The results suggest that investors generally react 
efficiently; however, there is also evidence of short-term return reversals 
following the arrival of M&A information. 
4.3.1 Secondary Information and Stock market reactions 
The literature reviewed below will enable to understand the impact of secondary 
information on the stock markets. This part of the study will be useful while 
explaining the differences in outcomes at firm specific level.  




Evidence of inefficient analysts' forecasts by Mendenhall (1991), DeBondt and 
Thaler (1990) raises the question of whether investor reliance on analysts might 
explain anomalous stock price behaviour. The analysts' earnings forecasts and 
recommendations could be an originating source of stock price under or 
overreaction. 
Mortanges and Rad (1998) examined the effect of marketing strategy on market 
value and found that negative publicity led to a negative response. The study 
examined a new laundry detergent Omo Power launched by Unilever on the 
European market in 1994.  Unilever's rival Proctor and Gamble claimed that the 
product was harmful to clothes. Consequently, Unilever had to modify the product 
and launch an advertising campaign to regain consumer confidence. These events 
caused Unilever's stock price to fall by 9.45% in under five months, indicating 
that investors perceived the basic flaws in Unilever's marketing strategy. 
Zhang and Aldridge (1997) analysed the effects of merger and foreign alliance 
possibilities in the Canadian airline industry and found that news regarding the 
merger/foreign alliance possibilities had a significant impact on the stock prices of 
the companies concerned. Some research shows that following analysts‘ stock 
recommendations can be profitable (e.g. Womack (1996); Barber et al., (2001), 
while more recent studies question their investment value. Indeed, evidence 
suggests that analyst recommendation levels may actually hinder the market‘s 
price discovery process, and these studies show a negative relationship between 
analysts‘ recommendations and future stock performance (Bradshaw, 2004; 




Barniv et al., 2009; & Drake et al., 2011). One rationale for this negative 
relationship is analysts‘ conflicts of interest. Analysts are influenced by their own 
compensation structures. 
According to Hackbarth and Erwan (2006), when there is competition for the 
target and if asymmetric information prevails then the abnormal announcement 
returns arise for two reasons. First, market participants have incomplete 
information regarding the takeover surplus. The management of the bidding firm 
has complete information regarding the potential benefits of the takeover, but 
cannot communicate this information to shareholders (as cited in Carlson, Fisher 
&  Giammarino,2005a; Morellec & Zhdanov, 2005). Outside stockholders have 
imperfect information and decide to accept or reject takeover bids based on the 
informed manager‘s recommendation. Thus, market prices reflect the information 
set of uninformed investors. In such an environment, participating shareholders 
face two sources of uncertainty. If the uncertainty in market beliefs is high, then 
the market‘s expectation of the merger benefits might exceed its true value. 
Therefore, the market overestimates the benefits of the merger and the negative 
abnormal announcement returns are observed for bidding shareholders.  
Theoretical studies posit that when analysts lack sufficient private information to 
produce accurate forecasts or recommendations, either through lack of effort or 
ability, they will tend to mimic outputs from strong analysts (Trueman, 1994; 
Arya, A., Glover, Mittendorf, Narayanamoorthy, 2005). This herding behaviour 
among analysts is an attempt to alleviate the observable effects of their lack of 




information and has been documented in empirical studies (Hong, Kubik, & 
Solomon, 2000; Clement & Tse, 2005; Mensah & Yang, 2008). Bloomfield and 
Hales (2009) provide evidence that in some situations, analysts may use the 
consensus forecast as a substitute for individual effort. 
Rosen (2006) examined the effects of mergers on bidding firms‘ stock prices and 
found evidence of merger momentum: bidder stock prices are more likely to 
increase when a merger is announced at the time when recent mergers by other 
firms have been received well (a ―hot‖ merger market) or if the overall stock 
market is doing better. However, the study also found long-run reversal. Long-run 
bidder stock returns are lower for mergers announced when either the merger or 
stock markets were hot at the time of the merger than for those announced at other 
times. 
According to Malmendier and Shanthkumar (2007), analysts tend to positively 
bias the information they provide to investors, as evident in the very low number 
of sell and strong sell recommendations. While large investors adjust their 
reaction to hold and buy recommendations downwards, small investors take 
recommendations literally. Small investors also fail to account for the additional 
distortion due to underwriter affiliation. Potential explanations are higher costs of 
information and naiveté about distortions in analyst recommendations. Their study 
found it hard to explain in a standard framework why only large traders but not 
small investors adjust their trade reaction to the general upward bias of analyst 
recommendations, given that there seem to be some conditions under which it 




would be more profitable to make that adjustment and given that the general 
upward bias is visible to any trader reacting to recommendations. It is also striking 
that small traders do not focus on analysts from independent brokerages. The 
latter findings suggest that small investors are naïve about the distortions and trust 
analysts too much. 
Twedt and Rees (2012), examined whether two qualitative attributes of financial 
analysts‘ reports - detail and tone - are significant in explaining how the market 
responds to analysts‘ reports, after controlling for the information contained in the 
reports‘ quantitative summary measures. Report detail is hypothesized to reflect 
the level of effort expended by the analyst in preparing the report, and therefore 
the usefulness of their intrinsic firm value estimates. Report tone is predicted to 
signal the analyst‘s underlying sentiment regarding the firm and may be used to 
assess the extent to which analysts‘ conflicts of interest interfere with the mapping 
of firm value estimates into stock recommendations. Consistent with these 
hypotheses, they found that the tone of financial analyst reports contains 
significant information incremental to the reports‘ earnings forecasts and 
recommendations; and report complexity (one component of report detail) helps 
explain cross-sectional variation in the market‘s response to the reports‘ 
recommendations. 




4.4 Long -Term Studies 
The prior findings are reviewed from the context of post-acquisition performance. 
This review enables us to understand the prior experiences relating to long-term 
performance and wealth effects to the stockholders of the acquiring companies. It 
will be interesting to see if the experiences documented in the literature will be in 
any way similar to the experiences of Indian corporates involved in 30 OFDI 
related M&As that are considered in this study. 
Hogarty (1970) studied 43 firms between 1953 and 1964. These 43 acquiring 
firms were selected from the population of firms listed in the 1965 edition of 
Moody's Industrial Manual. The accounting measures are subjected to univariate 
statistical analysis and include investment performance and earnings per share 
(EPS). The findings of his study show that the investment performance of firms 
involved in acquisitions is generally worse than the average investment 
performance of firms in their industries. EPS also indicates under-performance for 
the merged firms. Philippatos, Choi and Dowling (1985) examine 119 firms 
between 1978 and 1981, applying the univariate analysis. The accounting 
measures examined included operating expense ratio.  
Mandelker (1974) examined the impact of mergers on the returns to the 
stockholders of the constituent firms. The study employed the two-factor market 
model, following Black-Jensen-Scholes and Fama-MacBeth, which considers 
changes in risk when analysing the impact of mergers on stock prices. The results 




of the study are consistent with the hypotheses that the market for acquisitions is 
competitive and that information regarding mergers is efficiently incorporated in 
the stock prices. Stockholders of acquiring firms earn returns from mergers 
commensurate with other investment-production activities of similar risk levels. 
Stockholders of acquired firms earn abnormal returns of approximately 14% on 
average in the seven months preceding the merger.  
Langetieg (1978) re-examined the pre-merger and post-merger stock performance 
from the perspective of a three-factor performance index. The sample was drawn 
from NYSE for a period of 72 days before the event and 72 days following the 
mergers during 1929 and 1969. The study concluded that the post-merger excess 
returns (net of control group influence) are found not to be significantly different 
from zero, providing no support for merger benefits.  
Schipper and Thompson (1983) measured the impact of acquisitions‘ activity on 
firm value by differentiating between specific merger events and programmes of 
acquisition activity.  Based on a sample of 55 firms listed on NYSE, they found 
significantly positive abnormal performance associated with the announcement of 
acquisition programmes and significantly negative performance associated with 
certain institutional changes during 1967-1970 relating to acquisition activity (the 
Williams Amendments, the 1969 Tax Reform Act, and APB Opinions 16 and 17).  
Jensen and Ruback (1983) concluded, based on an analysis of 16 studies in US, 
that the return to bidders in successful mergers was zero, and in successful 




takeovers was +4.0%. Their evidence indicates that corporate takeovers generate 
positive gains, while the target firm shareholders benefit and the bidding firm 
shareholders do not lose. 
Malatesta (1983)  examined the net effects of the long-run sequence of events 
leading to merger, and of merger per se, on shareholder wealth. The period of 
study was from 1969 – 1974 and the sample size comprised 256 acquiring firms 
and 85 acquired firms from the US. The appropriate measure of the wealth effect 
is shown to be the abnormal dollar return cumulated over time. Using this 
measure, the long-run wealth effect of the event sequence culminating in merger 
is significantly negative for acquiring firms. For acquired firms, the effect is 
negative, but not significant. The evidence also reveals that measured abnormal 
rates of return to acquiring firms are sensitive to a slight variation in model 
specification and dependent on firm size, with smaller firms earning significantly 
negative post-merger returns. 
Weidenbaum and Stephen Vogt (1987) concluded, based on an analysis of 10 
studies from the US, that negative returns to shareholders for acquisitions are 
more prevalent. Clearly, there are winners and losers in the takeover game. Most 
studies confirm that, in general, target firm shareholders are winners.  
Singh and Cynthia (1987) investigated the conceptual argument that acquisitions 
which are related to product/market or technological terms create higher value 
than unrelated acquisitions. Related acquisitions are found to have greater total 




dollar gains than acquired firms in unrelated acquisitions. These findings indicate 
that related target firms benefit more from acquisition than unrelated target firms.  
Caves‘ (1989) survey of US firms contrasts the favourable appraisal of mergers 
derived from ex-ante event studies to the increasingly negative findings based on 
ex-post evaluations. The ex-ante literature recognises managerial behaviour in 
target firms as an inefficient deterrent to mergers, but managerial behaviour by 
bidders at least as clearly promotes excessive mergers.  
Harris and Ravenscraft  (1991) examined foreign direct investment by studying 
shareholder wealth gains for 1273 US firms acquired during the period 1970-1987 
and suggest three findings. First, cross-border takeovers are more frequent in 
research and development-intensive industries than are domestic acquisitions; 
furthermore, in three-quarters of cross-border transactions the buyer and seller are 
in related industries. These industry patterns suggest that costs and imperfections 
(information asymmetry) in product markets play an important role in foreign 
direct investment. Second, targets of foreign buyers have significantly higher 
wealth gains than do targets of US firms. This cross-border effect is comparable in 
size to the wealth effects of all-cash and multiple bids, two effects receiving 
substantial attention in the finance literature. Third, while the cross-border effect 
on wealth gains is not well explained by industry and tax variables, it is positively 
related to the weakness of the US dollar, indicating a significant role for exchange 
rate movements in foreign direct investment. 




Franks, Harris and Titman (1991) investigated share price performance following 
corporate takeovers. They used the multiple-benchmarks from the portfolio 
evaluation literature that overcome some of the known mean-variance 
inefficiencies of more traditional single-factor benchmarks. Studying 399 US 
takeovers consummated in the 1975-1984 period, they conclude that previous 
findings of poor performance after takeover are likely due to benchmark errors 
rather than mispricing at the time of the takeover. 
 Jaffe and Mandelker (1992) use an exhaustive sample of mergers from 1955 to 
1987 between NYSE acquirers and NYSE/AMEX targets, measuring post-
acquisition performance after adjusting for the firm size effect as well as beta risk. 
They find that shareholders of the acquiring firms suffer a statistically significant 
wealth loss of about 10% over the five years following the merger completion. 
Their results are robust to a variety of specifications and do not relate to changes 
in beta following the merger. Therefore, they conclude that the efficient-market 
anomaly of negative post-merger performance highlighted in Jensen and Ruback 
(1983) does exist. 
Datta, Pinches, and Narayanan (1992) considered 41 studies, and concluded that 
bidders earn a return of less than one-half of 1%. They conclude that the synthesis 
of ex-ante event studies presented in this paper provides robust evidence that, on 
average, shareholders of bidding or acquiring firms do not realise significant 
returns from mergers and acquisitions. 




Healy, Palepu and Ruback (1992), examine post-acquisition performance for the 
50 largest US mergers between 1979 and mid-1984. Merged firms show 
significant improvement in asset productivity relative to their industries, leading 
to higher operating cash flow returns. This performance improvement is 
particularly strong for firms with highly overlapping businesses. Mergers do not 
lead to cuts in long-term capital and R&D investments. There is a strong positive 
relationship between post-merger increases in operating cash flows and abnormal 
stock returns at merger announcements, indicating that expectations of economic 
improvements underlie the equity revaluations of the merging firms. 
Polasky and Mason (Spring 1998) analysed the short- and long-run profitability 
and welfare consequences of horizontal mergers, where the equilibrium responses 
to a merger can differ over time. Although firms can anticipate the merger, they 
can only adjust their capacity in the long run. They found a greater range of 
profitable mergers than in static models. For a merger to raise welfare, it is 
sufficient that the short-run welfare effects are positive, and necessary that the 
long-run effects are positive. They relate these conditions to the inside firms‘ 
market shares and the Herfindahl index.  
According to Mauldin (18 April, 2003) earnings drive the price of a stock and the 
study illustrates that the real (inflation-adjusted) earnings growth for the period 
1965-1982 being roughly the same as for 1982-1999. Yet the S&P 500 had 
significantly different results. The first period was one of no stock price growth, 




and the latter saw growth of over 1000%. Why the difference in results? The 
suggestion is that the investors perceived the relative value of the earnings. In a 
period of high inflation, earnings growth of 6-7% is not all that impressive but in 
today‘s low inflation environment it makes a difference.  
Ismail Ahmad (2008) studied shareholder returns using 16,221 US takeovers 
between 1985 and 2004. The study found that single acquirers out-perform 
multiple acquirers by 1.66%, and that the gap widens to 5% in equity exchange 
offers. In contrast to multiple acquirers, single acquirers generate higher returns in 
equity deals than in cash and mixed offers, due to the high returns earned through 
the acquisition of non-public targets. Unsuccessful first time acquirers learn, but 
successful first time bidders suffer from hubris behaviour in subsequent 
acquisitions. The study finds that size, relative size, and valuation differences 
could explain the higher returns for single acquirers, and that the toehold presence 
leads to paying lower premiums.  
Fung, Jo and Tsai (2009), examined the ways in which stock market valuation 
and managerial incentives jointly affect merger and acquisition (M&A) decisions 
and post-M&A performance of US firms. Their finding suggests that market-
driven acquisitions could be value destroying when managers engage in 
opportunistic acquisitions for reasons of self-interest. Managerial myopia, 
overconfidence, misaligned incentives, empire-building motives and poor 




corporate governance can all exacerbate the agency problem of market-driven 
acquisitions. 
Dutta and Jog (2009) examine the long-term abnormal returns and operating 
performance of Canadian acquiring firms by using a comprehensive sample of 
1300 acquisitions during the period 1993–2002. They use event-time and 
calendar-time methods and improved benchmarks to detect long-term abnormal 
returns. Consistent with the viewpoint of Fama (1998) and Mitchell and Stafford 
(2000), they did not find any significant negative long-term abnormal returns for 
Canadian acquirers, when they accounted for method discrepancies.  
Further, they found that their results were robust across factors such as: (i) mode 
of acquisition  target type (public or private), related or unrelated target, (iv) 
payment type (shares, cash or mixed), (v) growth or value acquirer, (vi) board 
independence, (vii) level of managerial ownership, and (viii) relative size of the 
deals. They also note that the Canadian market corrects for its overreaction to an 
acquisition announcement event within a short period of time and this is 
consistent with the long-term operating performance results in the post-acquisition 
period.  
Savor and Lu  (2009)  examined 1773 US firms listed on the NYSE between 
1978-2003. Their findings support the hypothesis that overvalued firms create 
value for long-term shareholders by using their equity as currency. They found 
that unsuccessful stock bidders significantly underperform successful ones. This 




underperformance increases with the length of the holding period. Over a one-
year horizon, the mean abnormal return of failed acquirers is 13.6% lower than 
that of successful acquirers, and this differential grows to 22.2% for a two-year 
horizon and 31.2% for a three-year horizon. Moreover, unsuccessful acquirers 
continue performing poorly even after merger failure is announced, by which time 
any information related to the bid presumably became public.  
4.5 Literature on Research Methods  
It is important to understand the research methods and models used in the prior 
studies. A review of the research methods and models will help in choosing an 
appropriate method or model to assess the performance of the Indian corporates 
involved in thirty OFDI related M&As in the present study. Hence, the literature 
relating to the research methods is reviewed below:  
Beaver (1968) pioneered the use of the variance of abnormal returns as a measure 
of information content, and the method was later refined by Patel (1976). 
According to Yadav (1992), event studies typically define an ‗event‘ window over 
which potential abnormality in the event-related returns distribution is analysed. 
Abnormality is measured with reference to an ‗estimation‘ period which is used to 
determine the benchmark value of the parameters of the model specified for 
generating ex ante returns. The model most commonly specified to generate ex 
ante returns has been the market model, which aims at eliminating market wide 
influences from price changes. 




Brown and Warner (1980) point out that an event study must clearly define what 
―abnormal‖ performance is. There are three commonly used models for defining 
abnormal performance: market model (OLS model), market adjusted model and 
average mean model. The market model (OLS model) is the most widely accepted 
approach reported in research studies to calculate abnormal returns because the 
risk is adjusted. 
Brown and Warner (1985) examine how the particular characteristics of daily 
stock return data affect event study methods. Using simulation procedures with 
actual daily data, their paper investigates the impact of a number of potential 
problems of concern in the literature. These include (1) non-normality of returns 
and excess returns, (2) bias in OLS estimates of market model parameters in the 
presence of non-synchronous trading, and (3) estimation of the variance to be 
used in hypothesis tests concerning the mean excess return, and specifically the 
issues of autocorrelation in daily excess returns and of variance increases on the 
days around an event. In addition, the effect of cross-sectional dependence of 
excess returns on variance estimation, which is an issue even with monthly data, 
is also investigated. 
Dimson and Marsh (1986) studied 862 press recommendations which 
demonstrated that the size effect can distort longer-term performance measures, 
and hence event studies. Relative to similar sized companies, post-publication 
performance is neutral. They found that the market adjustments, the capital asset 
pricing model (CAPM) and market model, with equally- or capitalization-




weighted indexes, all produce biased results. Event studies are most exposed to 
such bias when the measurement interval is long, event securities differ 
systematically in size or weighting from the index constituents, the size effect is 
large and/or volatile, and when CAPM-type methodologies are used. These 
distortions are avoided by explicitly controlling for size. 
Maynes and Rumsey (1993) examine the procedures for measuring abnormal 
performance around events when securities do not trade daily. The empirical 
frequency distributions of the rank test statistic and a conventional test statistic are 
assessed under different rules for handling missing stock returns. The results 
suggest that the traditional procedures are reasonably well specified for thickly 
and moderately traded stocks but mis-specified for thinly traded stocks. The rank 
test, however, performs well for all trading frequencies and trade-to-trade returns 
are the best way to handle missing returns. 
As pointed by Andrade.G, Mitchell.M, and Stafford.E (2001) and Moeller (2003), 
the three-day window is one of the two most commonly used event windows for 
merger studies. The other window most commonly used starts before the 
announcement and ends with the completion of the merger (Moeller.S, et al., 
2003). According to Schwert (2000), the longer window makes it possible to take 
into account bid revisions and other actions taken by the bidder in reaction to 
defensive actions taken by the target. However, a longer window would increase 
the possibility of the integration of a confounding effect. 




According to Bruner (2004), one of the two main research approaches which help 
form a view of M&A profitability is the event study.  It examines the abnormal 
returns to shareholders in the period surrounding the announcement of a 
transaction. These studies are based on the assumption that stock markets are 
forward-looking and that share prices are simply the present value of expected 
future cash flows to shareholders. Since the 1970s, these studies have dominated 
the field. 
McWilliams and Siegel (1997) gave a good reason for conducting event studies: 
The event study method has become popular because it obviates the need to 
analyse accounting-based measures of profit, which have been criticised because 
they are often not very good indicators of the true performance of firms. 
Therefore, it is expected that event studies will continue to be a valuable and 
widely used tool in economics and finance. 
According to Bruner (2004), before looking at the findings, we need to define the 
tests. The benchmark for measuring performance is investors‘ required returns, 
commonly defined as the return investors could have earned on other investment 
opportunities of similar risk. Three possible outcomes can be seen against the 
benchmark, they include: (a) Value is destroyed. In this case, investment returns 
are less than those required by investors. Investors are justifiably unhappy because 
they could have done better investing in another opportunity of similar risk; (b) 
Value is created. The investment earns a rate of return higher than required. 
Investors should be happy and (c) Value is preserved. The investment just earns 




its required rate of return. Economically speaking, investors earn ―normal‖ 
returns. They should be satisfied. Judgments about the success or failure of M&A 
transactions should be linked to these measurable economic outcomes. In 
economic terms, an investment is ―successful‖ if it does anything other than 
destroy value. 
According to Bruner (2004), one of the basic conclusions of economics is that 
when markets are reasonably competitive, players will earn a fair rate of return. 
The intuition for this is simple: when information is free-flowing and entry is 
easy, a firm earning very high returns will draw competitors. The entry of these 
other firms will drive returns down to the point where the marginal investor earns 
just a fair rate of return. This idea, which has been tested extensively in financial 
markets, leads directly to the concept of market efficiency, which says that prices 
incorporate all publicly available information quickly and without bias. With tests 
of capital market efficiency, the hypothesis can be tested using one of three 
classes of measures: (1) Weak form. Did the share price rise? Are the shareholders 
better off after the deal than they were before? Such a before-and-after 
comparison is widespread, especially in the writings of journalists and securities 
analysts. But it is a weak test in the sense that it fails to control for factors 
unrelated to the deal that might have triggered a price change; (2) Semi-strong 
form. Did the firm‘s returns exceed a benchmark? Are shareholders better off 
compared to the return on a comparable investment?  The introduction of a 
benchmark, such as the return on the S&P 500 index, or the return on a matched 




sample of peers that did not merge, strengthens the analysis. This kind of test, 
which is commonly used in academic research, is more reliable than weak-form 
tests because it controls for the possibility that the observed returns were actually 
driven by factors in the industry or the entire economy, rather than by the merger. 
But this kind of test is at best semi-strong because benchmarks are imperfect; and 
(3) Strong form. Are shareholders better off after the deal than they would have 
been if the deal had not occurred? This is the true test of the cost of lost 
opportunity, the economists‘ ―gold standard‖ of comparison. The problem, of 
course, is that strong-form results are unobservable because there is no way to 
know for certain what would have happened in the absence of the deal. 
According to Ahern (2009), the simplest method used to predict a normal return is 
to simply subtract a security‘s time series average from an event date return 
(mean-adjusted return) and the most commonly used prediction method is the 
market model, where the firm‘s returns are regressed on a constant term and a 
market index. In other words, the return on the shares is adjusted by subtracting 
the expected return from the present return, so that any significant difference is 
considered as an abnormal excessive return or residual. 
Ahern (2009) conducts simulations of event studies where sample securities are 
grouped by the common characteristics of market equity, prior returns, book-to-
market, and earnings-to-price ratios using daily returns from 1965 to 2003. A 
battery of prediction models and test statistics are compared for possible null 
rejection biases when returns are expected to have zero abnormal performance, 




when returns are artificially increased and decreased, and when variance is 
artificially increased. In support of Brown and Warner (1985), when samples are 
randomly drawn, all the prediction models generate abnormal returns with only 
minor differences from zero with correct rejection rates in general.  
4.6 Issues relating to methods and models used in M&As studies 
Roll (1978) argued that estimates of abnormal performance can be sensitive to the 
choice of benchmark, and that estimates generated with inefficient benchmarks 
are not generally meaningful. In his view, the results of earlier studies of post- 
merger performance are therefore suspect, since they use benchmark portfolios 
(e.g., the Chicago Research in Security Prices (CRSP) equally-weighted or value-
weighted indexes) that are known to be inefficient and hence are not appropriate 
for judging performance. In particular, these benchmarks generate abnormal 
performance that is related to firm size and dividend policy and thus are likely to 
generate negative performance measures for larger-than-average acquiring firms 
even if their actual performance is favourable. 
Brown and Warner (1980) conclude that ‗beyond a simple one-factor market 
model, there is no evidence that more complicated methodologies convey any 
benefits. Dimson and Marsh (1986), demonstrated that the size effect can distort 
longer-term performance measures and hence event study results, unless it is 
explicitly taken into account in research design. Zhu and Malhotra (2008) tested 
the announcement effect on the Indian firms involved in US cross-border 




acquisitions. They used CAR and BHAR methods to estimate abnormal returns in 
the long run. They stated that the Fama-French three factor model cannot be easily 
applied in the Indian stock market.  
Shanken (1985) developed a cross-sectional regression test (CSRT) of the Capital 
Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) and explored its connection to the Hotelling T
2
 test 
of multivariate statistical analysis. Algebraic relations between the CSRT, the 
likelihood ratio test and the Lagrange multiplier test were derived and a useful 
small-sample bound on distribution function of the CRST was obtained. An 
application of the CRST suggested that the CRSP equally-weighted index is 
inefficient, but that the inefficiency was not explained by a firm size-effect from 
February to December, 1985. This application illustrated the value of the 
multivariate test as a tool to be used in conjunction with more traditional methods 
and not necessarily as an alternative to those methods. 
Franks et al (1991) focused on post-merger performance and examined whether 
the negative abnormal returns found in prior studies were due to an incorrect 
adjustment for risk. Their study is based on the viewpoint of the portfolio 
performance evaluation literature which emphasises that correctly adjusting 
returns for risk requires a benchmark that is mean-variance efficient. They 
evaluated post-merger performance with efficient multi-factor benchmarks. Past 
studies of post-merger performance have generally used single-portfolio 
benchmarks that are now known to be inefficient (Shanken, 1985). Hence, Franks 
et al used two-multiple-portfolio benchmarks in addition to using CRSP equally-




weighted index and the CRSP value-weighted index as single-index benchmarks. 
Their study included 399 acquisitions made by NYSE and AMEX firms and 
measured over 36 months after takeover during the period January 1975 to 
December 1984. Their findings show that different benchmarks generate very 
different measures of abnormal performance for the same given sample. The 
performance measures against the equally- and value-weighted indexes are 
significantly different from each other and have opposite signs. The value-
weighted index generates significant positive post-merger abnormal performance 
of over 0.3% per month whereas the equally-weighted index generates monthly 
abnormal performance of about – 0.2%. On the other hand, the ten-factor and 
eight factor benchmarks yield no evidence of abnormal post-merger performance. 
Their conclusions are consistent with Jensen and Ruback (1983), and the results 
indicate that the prior findings of negative post-merger share-price performance 
for bidders are more likely due to benchmark errors than to mispricing at the time 
of announcement. 
Agrawal, et al  (1992) concluded that existing literature on the post-merger 
performance of acquiring firms is divided and hence they re-examined the issue 
by considering an exhaustive sample of mergers between NYSE acquirers and 
NYSE/AMEX targets. They found that stockholders of acquiring firms suffered a 
statistically significant loss of about 10% over the five-year post-merger period, a 
result robust to various specifications. They concluded that the issue was by no 




means resolved, because of methodological problems and conflicting results of 
prior studies.  
Lindenberg and Ross (1981) investigated the relationship of Tobin's Q to industry 
market structure. Lindenberg and Ross (1981) find that the Tobin's ratios of firms 
are stable over time and that firms with high Tobin's ratios tend to have unique 
products and factors of production, all of which contribute to earnings in excess of 
the minimum necessary to induce the firm to produce in the short run. Firms with 
low Tobin's ratios are typically in relatively competitive or tightly regulated 
industries. Lindenberg and Ross (1981) find a high correlation between price-cost 
margins and Tobin's, but a low correlation between q and concentration ratios.  
Even if the estimate of Tobin's is biased due to measurement errors, it may be 
possible to analyse the relationship between Tobin's and market structure in a 
regression, as long as one adjusts for the measurement problems by adding 
variables like the advertising-sales ratio and research and development costs. This 
procedure is similar to that used in the price-average variable cost regressions. 
Kothari and Warner (1997) used four models; market-adjusted model, market 
model, capital asset pricing model (CAPM), and Fama-French three factor model 
(FF). Ikenberry, Lakonishok and Vermaelen (1995) used CAR and BHAR 
methods to study long term performance.  Hazelkorn, Zenner, & Shivdasini 
(2004) calculated for industry-adjusted long-term excess returns. The 
methodology they used is similar to the one they used for the short-term 
calculation of market-adjusted excess returns except that they substituted the 




return on an appropriately chosen industry index for the S&P 500. The estimation 
period is one year prior to announcement and ends 30 days prior to the 
announcement date. The alpha (intercept) and beta (slope) are estimated from this 
regression. The one-day ―expected return‖ is equal to alpha plus beta, times the 
return on the market index. The one-day excess return for a stock is equal to the 
stock‘s actual return less its expected return. 
4.7 Challenges in estimating expected returns for Long Term 
periods 
There are many studies in finance and financial economics analysing the long-run 
behaviour of stock returns following major corporate decisions like mergers and 
acquisitions, stock splits, and dividend declaration. It is evident from the literature 
that estimating abnormal returns in the long horizon is a challenging issue for  
researchers. 
Over a long horizon, the variations in expected return estimates across different 
benchmark models can be large (Ball, 1978), (Fama, 1992). Thus, long-horizon 
results are potentially very sensitive to the assumed model for generating biases 
and misspecification (Eugene & French, 1993), although the market model could, 
in principle, circumvent this problem (Schwert, 1983). The degree of 
misspecification is not highly sensitive to the model employed (Kothari & 
Warner, 1997). Kothari and Warner (1997) studied the distributional properties of 
long-horizon abnormal returns and concluded that the skewness exists but it does 




not drive to test misspecification. Procedures that do not require pre-event 
parameters, e.g., matched-portfolio procedures are also found to be mis-specified 
(Ikenberry, et al., 1995). Care must be taken when calculating long-run 
performance, because the findings can be sensitive to the procedures used 
(Chopra, Josef, & Jay, 1992). 
According to Kothari and Warner (2006), in long horizon tests, appropriate 
adjustment for risk is critical in calculating abnormal price performance. This is in 
sharp contrast to short-horizon tests in which risk adjustment is straightforward 
and typically unimportant. The error in calculating abnormal performance due to 
errors in adjusting for risk in short-horizon tests is likely to be small. Daily 
expected returns are about 0.05% (i.e., annualised about 12-13%). Therefore, even 
if the event firm portfolio‘s beta risk is mis-estimated by 50% (e.g., estimated beta 
risk of 1.0 when true beta risk is 1.5), the error in the estimated abnormal error is 
small relative to the abnormal return of 1% or more that is typically documented 
in short-window event studies. Not surprisingly, Brown and Warner (1985) 
conclude that simple risk-adjustment approaches to conducting short-window 
event studies are quite effective in detecting abnormal performance. 
Kothari and Warner (2006) discussed the problems of risk adjustment at length 
and stated that the problem of risk adjustment error is exacerbated in long-horizon 
event studies because the potential for such error is greater for longer horizons. In 
many event studies, (1) the event follows unusual prior performance (e.g., stock 
splits follow good performance), or (2) the event sample consists of firms with 




extreme (economic) characteristics (e.g., low market capitalisation stocks, low-
priced stocks, or extreme book-to-market stocks), or (3) the event is defined on 
the basis of unusual prior performance (e.g., contrarian investment strategies in 
DeBondt and Thaler, 1985, and Lakonishok, Shleifer, and Vishny, 1994). Under 
these circumstances, accurate risk estimation is difficult, with historical estimates 
being biased because prior economic performance negatively impacts the risk of a 
security (Binder, 1998). Therefore, in long-horizon event studies, it is crucial that 
abnormal-performance measurement be on the basis of post-event, not historical 
risk estimates (see Ball, Kothari, and Shanken, 1995, and Chopra, Lakonishok, 
and Ritter, 1992).  
The prior literature shows evidence that for a particular benchmark, the results 
using the event-time and calendar-time (portfolio) approaches are similar. 
However, different benchmarks may generate very different measures of 
abnormal performance (Franks, et al., 1991). The standard event study 
methodology involves the use of Sharpe‘s (1964) market model, or of alternative 
adjustments for market movements such as the ex-post forms of the Sharpe 
(1964); Black (1972) CAPM. Issues were raised in prior literature questioning the 
integrity of the CAPM approach, since it is recognised that event studies entail a 
joint hypothesis about market efficiency and the validity of the benchmark 
employed (Dimson & Marsh, 1986). However, most research in this area suggests 
that simple adjustments for market movements are usually adequate. In simulated 
event studies, the gains from using more complex models appear small. Most 




event studies therefore continue to use CAPM or market models. Alternative 
benchmarks are used only in studies where the stocks come from a single 
industry, e.g., Collins and Dent (1978) and Dyckman and Smith (1979). 
Dutta and Jog (2009) acknowledged that there are still controversies surrounding 
long-term performance methodologies that may distort empirical results. For 
example, it is argued that BHAR lacks statistical power (Kothari and Warner, 
2006), and that the Fama-French three factor approach suffers from model 
specifications. There are two unpublished papers by Connor and Shegal (2001) 
and Bahl (2006) who tested the relationship between the FF-Model and CAPM in 
an Indian context. Their empirical results suggested that the FF-three factor model 
has a higher explanatory power than the CAPM. Kothari et al (S P Kothari, Jay, & 
Sloan, 1995) cast doubt on the explanatory power of book-to-market equity and 
see evidence of size effect in explaining the average returns. Loughran and Ritter 
(2000) worry that the calendar-time portfolio approach is not well suited for 
detecting abnormal performance associated with events, such as mergers, that are 
clustered across time.   
Barber & Lyon (1997) evaluated three approaches for developing a benchmark to 
estimate abnormal returns. They include (1) a reference portfolio, (2) an 
appropriately matched control firm, and (3) an application of the Fama-French 
three factor model. They argue that the long buy-and-hold abnormal returns 
should be calculated as the long-run-buy-and-hold return of a sample firm less the 
long-run return of an appropriate benchmark, which is referred to as BHAR. Most 




importantly, they identified a method of measuring long-run abnormal returns that 
yields well-specified test statistics. They document that matching sample firms to 
control firms of similar size and book-to-market ratios yield well-specified test 
statistics. By matching sample firms to control firms on specified firm 
characteristics, they could alleviate the new listing bias (since both sample and 
control firms are listed in the identified month), the rebalancing bias (since the 
returns of the sample and control firms are compounded in an analogous fashion), 
and the skewness bias (since abnormal returns calculated using this control firm 
approach are reasonably symmetric).  
4.8 Estimation period used in the prior findings 
Brown and Warner (1985) employed simulation procedures using actual stock 
return data to investigate the distribution of excess returns and the empirical 
properties of the test statistics. They examined 250 samples of 50 securities which 
had been randomly selected. The data is obtained from Center for Research in 
Security Prices at the University of Chicago (CRSP). Each time a security is 
selected, a hypothetical event day is generated. Events are selected with 
replacement and are assumed to occur with equal probability on each trading day 
from July 2, 1962, through December 31, 1979. The estimation period is 239 days 
prior to the event period. The condition for the security to be included in a sample 
is that it must have at least 30 daily returns in the entire 250 day period, and no 
missing return data in the last 20 days. The event period is 11 days (-5 to +5). 




Markides and Oyon (1998) tested the valuation consequences of international 
acquisitions with the total sample of 236 acquisitions consisting of 47 Canadian 
and 189 European acquisition announcements. Standard event-study methodology 
was used to assess the impact of acquisitions announcement on shareholders 
wealth. The estimation period was six months (alternatively, expressed as 126 
days). The event window is two days (0, +1). 
Liang (1999), investigated if the analysts‘ recommendations in the ―Dartboard‖ 
column of the Wall Street Journal have an impact on stock prices and whether this 
impact is temporary or long-lived.  The period of study is from January 1990 to 
November 1994 and included 54 contests. The estimation period used was 100 
days (-125 through day -26). 
Ruiz, Gonzalbez and Moreno (2002) examined the determining factors of firm 
performance in Spain as a direct consequence of its diversification strategy in its 
expansion into foreign markets, considering factors like the market, the product 
and the company itself. The period of study was 1992 to 1996 and included 35 
news releases of 11 companies. They used the event study methodology to 
estimate the excess of returns. They employed the market model, the event 
window they considered was -5, 0, +5 and the estimation period was 75 days (-80 
to -6). 
Ruiz, Gonzalbez and Moreno (2002), examined the determining factors of a 
firm‘s performance, as a direct consequence of its diversification strategy in its 




expansion into foreign markets, considering certain factors like the market, the 
product and the company itself. They used event-study method to estimate the 
excess returns generated by its shares on the stock market, based on a sample of 
35 expansion announcements into external markets corresponding to 11 
diversifying companies in Spain. They also carried out a regression analysis to 
examine the impact of these factors, market, product and company, on the 
excesses in returns observed. They concluded that positive and significant returns 
are detected on the day following publication of the event (t=1) as well as CAR on 
two days (0; +1). They suggested that, on average, the market reacts positively to 
the announcement of a company‘s diversified expansion into external markets. 
Hazelkorn, Zenner, & Shivdasini (2004) used the market model to test the 
announcement effect.  The market-adjusted ―excess return‖ around the 
announcement date is equal to the total return adjusted for general market 
movements over a pre-specified window surrounding the announcement. They 
first determined a stock‘s ―beta‖ by regressing returns on the stock in question 
against the returns of a market index (we use the S&P 500) over a period that 
begins one year prior to the announcement and ends 30 days prior to the 
announcement.  
Goergen and Renneboog (2004) analysed the short-term wealth effects of large 
intra-European takeover bids for the period 1993-2000. They found 
announcement effects of 9% for the target firms compared to a statistically 
significant announcement effect of only 0.7% for the bidders. They concluded that 




the type of takeover bid has a large impact on the short-term wealth effects, with 
hostile takeovers triggering substantially larger price reactions than friendly 
operations. When a UK firm is involved, the abnormal returns are higher than 
those bids involving Continental European targets and bidders. They found 
evidence that the means of payment in an offer has an impact on the share price. A 
high market-to-book ratio of the target leads to a higher bid premium, but triggers 
a negative price reaction for the bidding firm. They also investigated whether the 
predominant reason for takeovers was synergies, agency problems or managerial 
hubris. Their results suggest that synergies are the prime motivation for bids and 
targets and bidders share the wealth gains. 
Martynova, Oosting and Renneboog (2006) investigated the long-term 
profitability of corporate takeovers where all acquiring and target companies were 
from Continental Europe or the UK. Their study found that the acquiring and 
target companies significantly outperformed the median peers in their industry 
prior to the takeovers, but the raw profitability of the combined firm decreased 
significantly following the takeover. However, their study found that the decrease 
became insignificant after controlling for the performance of the peer companies 
which were chosen in order to control for industry, size and pre-event 
performance. None of the takeover characteristics (such as means of payment, 
geographical scope, and industry-relatedness) explain the post-acquisition 
operating performance. Still, they found an economically significant difference in 
the long-term performance of hostile versus friendly takeovers, and of tender 




offers versus negotiated deals: the performance deteriorated following hostile bids 
and tender offers. The acquirer‘s leverage prior takeover seems to have no impact 
on the post-merger performance of the combined firm, whereas the acquirer‘s 
cash holdings are negatively related to performance. This suggests that companies 
with excessive cash holdings suffer from free cash flow problems and are more 
likely to make poor acquisitions. Acquisitions of relatively large targets result in 
better profitability of the combined firm subsequent to the takeover, whereas 
acquisitions of a small target lead to a profitability decline. 
Zhu and Malhotra (2008) used standard event analysis method to examine the 
impact of cross-border M&As on the Indian acquiring firms‘ stock price. They 
used the mean-adjusted return model to calculate the abnormal returns and the 
estimation period was 120 to 30 days prior to the M&A announcement. The event 
period was five days before the announcement and 20 days after the 
announcement date. The period of study was 1999-2005.  
Ahern (2009) performed simulations to compare a battery of short-run event study 
prediction and testing methods; simulating 1000 samples of 250 securities each by 
random selection with replacement from a sub-set of securities in the CRSP Daily 
Stock dataset between January 1965 and December 2003. The abnormal returns 
are generated and tested by the introduction of artificial performance and variance 
on event date returns. The estimation period is 489 days (-244, +244) where the 
pre-event estimation period is defined as (-244, -6), the event period is (-5, +5), 
and the post-event estimation period is (+6, +244). However, if a firm has at least 




50 non-missing returns in the pre-event estimation period, at least 50 non-missing 
returns in the post-event estimation period, and no missing observations in the 
period (-15, +15), then it is included in the sample.  
4.9 Emerging10 and Transition Market Studies 
Emerging markets are entering the global markets following the economic 
reforms initiated in their respective countries. The following literature unfolds the 
empirical evidence. 
According to Cartwright and Cooper (1993), effective acquisitions have been used 
to achieve rapid entry into high growth markets, acquire expertise, technology, 
products, brands, market presence, experienced management, reduce exposure to 
risk, and to complement on going internal product development. They minimise 
the costly time lag associated with the internal development of products, markets, 
and their required supporting structures; and are particularly useful where product 
                                                 
10
 An emerging market economy (Clement & Tse) is defined as an economy with low to middle per capita 
income. Such countries constitute approximately 80% of the global population, and represent about 20% of 
the world's economies. The term was coined in 1981 by Antoine W. Van Agtmael of the International 
Finance Corporation of the World Bank. 
. 
Although the term "emerging market" is loosely defined, countries that fall into this category, varying from 
very big to very small, are usually considered emerging because of their developments and reforms. Hence, 
even though China is deemed one of the world's economic powerhouses, it is lumped into the category 
alongside much smaller economies with a great deal fewer resources, like Tunisia. Both China and Tunisia 
belong to this category because both have embarked on economic development and reform programs, and 
have begun to open up their markets and "emerge" onto the global scene. EMEs are considered to be fast-
growing economies (www.investopedia.com). 
 




life-cycles are short or the danger of a profitable market window closing is high 
(Cartwright & Cooper, 1993; Haspeslagh & Jemison, 1991).  
Kumar and Alka Chadha (2008) examined the case of the steel industry that has 
become an important sector of overseas activity for Chinese and Indian companies 
with a string of major acquisitions of foreign MNEs for acquiring footprints and 
natural resources in order to identify the sources of ownership advantages and 
strategies of outward investments from emerging countries. The study pointed out 
that Indian and Chinese enterprises have emerged as important outward investors 
in recent times with their involvement in a number of prominent greenfield 
investments and acquisitions.  
Ma, Pagan and Chu (2009) studied abnormal returns to shareholders of bidder 
firms around the day of M&A announcement for ten emerging Asian Markets: 
China, India, Hong Kong, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, South 
Korea, Taiwan, and Thailand. Using a sample of 1,477 M&A deals in the ten 
emerging Asian markets, they found positive cumulative abnormal returns in three 
different event windows: a two-day (0,1) window, a three-day (-1, +1) window, 
and a five-day (-2, +2) window. The findings suggest that the investors reap 
benefits associated with M&A deals. 
Matej Lahovnik (2011) examined the factors that influenced the performance of 
acquisitions in Slovenia and found that the strategic and organisational fit between 
companies involved in M&A play an important role in improving the operational 




performance of the acquired companies in the post-acquisition period. Successful 
acquirers not only had a background in detecting below-average or less than full 
potential performance, but they also had some skills and competencies to improve 
the performance of an acquired firm.  
Bertrand  and Betschinger (2011) compared the effect of domestic and 
international M&As in a Russian context. They found rather negative effects 
associated with acquisitions. However, their study shows that firm resources are 
of relevance and can be leveraged in domestic deals to improve the impact of 
acquisitions. Furthermore, their findings suggest that emerging market firms 
suffer from the inability to leverage value due to low M&A experience and 
capabilities, especially when making international acquisitions. Also, high-tech 
firms seem to be able to draw larger benefits from cross-border transactions than 
domestic ones, taking advantage of new market opportunities abroad. 
4.10 Empirical findings from Indian context 
Literature reviewed in this section is different from earlier empirical studies 
because it deals with the prior literature from an Indian context.  
Kumar (1995) examined the trends and patterns in FDI inflows into India over the 
post-independence period as well as the emergence of Indian enterprises as direct 
investors abroad in the background of a changing regime. Their findings revealed 
a shift in the sectoral pattern of FDI in India inward and outward moving in 
favour of more technology and skill-intensive industries as the country 




industrialised itself.  The study states that the Indian government policies played a 
significant role in shaping the pattern of FDI by affecting relative configuration of 
ownership, internalisation and locational advantages of foreign investors in the 
country. 
Ranjan (1997) looked at the growing economic power of emerging nations and the 
implications so far as world-wide strategies of MNCs are concerned. The study 
identified a range of strategic choices that MNCs can initiate to exploit 
opportunities that are opening up in newly liberalising economies, as well as 
factors that influence such choices. The study also provides a framework which 
describes a set of ―defensive‖ strategies that domestic firms can pursue to respond 
adequately to the offensive strategies of MNCs. The study gives details about the 
managerial implications of the findings and also provides directions for future 
research. 
Beena (1998) analysed the significance and characteristics of mergers following 
the liberalisation movement. The study suggests that acceleration of the merger 
movement in the early 1990s was accompanied by the dominance of mergers 
between firms belonging to the same business group with similar product lines. 
The participation of foreign-controlled firms in the merger process has increased 
significantly since 1992-93. The study argues that the merger wave in the early 
1990s was more a means of internal restructuring rather than an instrument to 
further the product market or asset share. 




Pradhan & Abraham (2004) examined the patterns and motivations behind the 
overseas M&As by Indian enterprises. The study found that a large majority of 
overseas M&As originated within the services sector, led by the software industry 
and were directed towards developed countries. The main motivations for Indian 
firms‘ overseas acquisitions were to access international markets, firm-specific 
intangibles such as technology and human skills, benefits from operational 
synergies, to overcome constraints from limited home market growth, and to 
survive in an increasingly competitive business environment.  
Kumar (2006) analysed the trends, patterns and determinants of outward 
investments by Indian enterprises that have increased notably since the onset of 
economic reforms. He developed an analytical framework for explaining the 
probability of an Indian enterprise investing abroad using a large dataset of Indian 
enterprises. The findings of the study suggest that Indian enterprises draw their 
ownership advantages from their accumulated production experience, cost 
effectiveness of their production processes and other adaptations to imported 
technologies made with their technological effort, and sometimes with their 
ability to differentiate product. Firm size exerts a positive but a non-linear effect. 
Enterprises that are already in export markets are more likely to be outward 
investors. Finally, policy liberalisation during the 1990s has pushed Indian 
enterprises abroad. 
Prasad (2007) analysed the trends, direction and composition of cross-border 
M&As in India. The study throws light on certain issues and examines the 




preparedness of the regulatory authorities in India to frame suitable guidelines for 
M&As. M&As have emerged as a natural process of business restructuring 
throughout the world. In India, the early M&As were arranged either by 
government agencies or by the financial institutions within the framework of a 
regulated regime. However, since 1991, Indian industries have been increasingly 
exposed to both domestic and international competition. This has forced the 
Indian corporate sector to restructure and re-engineer in order to be competitive.  
Indian industries have undergone significant structural change due to changes in 
the regulatory policies in the post liberalisation period. Although the liberalisation 
programme has progressed considerably, overseas investors perceive the degree of 
openness to be low. The recent upsurge in M&A in India coincides with a current 
wave of international M&A. Prasad (2007) takes the view that the regulatory/ 
policy framework in India needs to be modulated carefully to prevent adverse 
effects associated with M&As. 
Deepak (2008) analysed the rapid expansion in outflows of foreign direct 
investment from India and the spurt in foreign acquisitions by Indian firms, in the 
decade to 2007, situated in the wider context of international investment from 
developing countries. Much of the investment is in manufacturing activities and 
most of the acquisitions are in industrialised countries. The economic stimulus 
and the strategic motive for the internationalisation of firms from India are 
provided by a range of underlying factors driving the process, which differ across 
sectors and firms. The rapid growth in investment and acquisitions by Indian 




firms are partly attributable to factors implicit in the liberalisation of the policy 
regime and the greater access to financial markets. Deepak (2008) also feels that it 
must be recognised that Indian firms cannot have become international without 
the capacity and the ability to compete in the world market. The attributes of 
Indian firms, which created such capacities and abilities, are embedded in the past 
and have emerged over a much longer period of time. 
Sayantan. G (2008), presents an overview of the Indian cross-border mergers and 
acquisitions. They presented the procedural aspects as to the applicable laws 
relating to cross-border mergers and acquisitions by Indian firms. The study also 
presents overseas direct investment which had been playing a part for the cross 
border mergers and acquisitions. Further, the study concludes by summing up the 
reforms recommended by the Irani Report and by discussing the various 
transactional issues required for finalizing an acquisition. 
Kumar & Bansal (2008) studied claims made by the Indian corporate sector that 
they were going for domestic M&As to generate synergy and examined whether 
or not , these synergies were being achieved.  The study assumed that while going 
for mergers and acquisitions, management expect financial synergy or/and 
operating synergy in different ways. This empirical study was based on secondary 
financial data and used tabulation, ratio analysis and correlation techniques for 
analysis. The results indicated that in many cases of M&A, the acquiring firms 
were able to generate synergy in the long run in the form of higher cash flow, 
more business, diversification, cost cuttings, etc.  




Kumar (2008) examined the sources of Indian companies‘ ownership advantages 
and trends, patterns and implications. He argues that the source of their ownership 
or competitive advantage lies in their accumulation of skills for managing large 
multi-location operations across diverse cultures in India and in their ability to 
deliver value for money with their frugal engineering skills honed while catering 
to the larger part of the income pyramid in India.  
Zhu & Malhotra (2008) examined the short-term stock performance of a sample 
of Indian firms acquiring US firms in the period 1995-2005. Their event study 
showed that the Indian stock market reacts positively to the acquisition 
announcement. However, they found that the positive returns last for only three 
days, after which the returns become negative. They concluded that 
announcement returns in cross-border M&As are mainly driven by the pressure 
effect rather than the informational effect.  
Kale (2009), examined if the small-sized overseas acquisition by an Indian 
company created value for its shareholders, in terms of abnormal stock market 
gains following acquisition announcement. The study considered overseas 
acquisition deals closer to $ 48 million only. Their sample included 412 overseas 
acquisitions done by publicly-listed Indian firms during 1999-2008. The findings 
show that, on average, created a value of +1.76% (in terms of abnormal stock 
returns) for shareholders of the Indian acquirer firms. The average value creation 
in the first 5 years of this period (1999-2003) was +2.89%, whereas in the latter 5 




years (2004-2008) it was down to +1.51%. Acquisitions of companies in 
developed economies, which account for almost three-fourths of the total number, 
created more value (+2.26%) for Indian companies than of companies in 
developing economies. The value creation in the latter case was statistically not 
different from zero.  
According to Rajan (2009), OFDI by Indian corporates has been aiming at 
accessing high-growth markets, buying brand names, acquiring technology, 
processes, management know-how and marketing and distribution networks, 
consolidating existing markets and seeking new ones. Their outward push has 
been facilitated by policy reforms. While the first wave of Indian OFDI pre-
liberalisation was made by a handful of firms and concentrated largely on Asian 
and African developing countries, the second wave of Indian OFDI post-
liberalisation, especially since 2000, has been to developed countries primarily in 
the form of M&A, as opposed to greenfield
11
 establishments, with participation by 
many Indian firms (Rajan, 2009). 
Athukorala (2009) examined emerging patterns and economic implications of 
Indian foreign direct investment against the backdrop of the evolving role of 
                                                 
11
 Greenfield strategy is to establish a business from the start. This strategy is more appropriate 
to the firms which have competitive advantage. It is also referred as organic growth. Brownfield 
strategy is opposite to Greenfield strategy (Lawrence et al, 2010).  




developing country firms (emerging multinational enterprises) as an important 
force of economic globalisation.  
Kumar (2009) examined the post-merger operating performance of Indian 
acquiring companies involved in merger activities during the period 1999-2002. 
The study is intended to identify synergies, if any, resulting from mergers. The 
study compares the pre-merger and post-merger performance of companies using 
accounting data (ROCE) to examine merger related gains to the acquiring firms. It 
is observed that post-merger profitability, assets‘ turnover and solvency of the 
acquiring companies, on average, show no improvement when compared with 
pre-merger values. It appears that, contrary to common beliefs and expectations, 
mergers usually do not lead to an improvement in the acquirer‘s financial 
performance. 
Sharma (2009) tested the efficiency of the Indian stock market by considering 
open offer as an event, using the market-adjusted abnormal return model. The 
study considered domestic mergers and acquisitions. The focus of the study was 
to examine the efficiency of the capital market for open offers as they frequently 
take place in India. The Securities and Exchange Board of India (SEBI) 
Regulation Act of 1997 clearly specified the requirements for making an open 
offer. This made it obligatory on the part of the acquirer to make an open offer for 
at least 20% of the issued capital. Their study concludes that markets are not 
efficient in the semi-strong form. 




Singh and Jain (2009) examined India‘s outward foreign direct investment in an 
evolutionary perspective. Besides tracing the emerging pattern of India‘s outward 
foreign direct investment, the study hints at the facilitating role of state policy to 
encourage the outflow of foreign direct investment. The study provides insights 
into the achievement of the Indian economy and provides a review of theory and 
practice of emerging multinationals from developing countries. 
Rajan (2009) presented data on the magnitude and composition of Indian outward 
foreign direct investment (FDI).  While India has become an attractive destination 
for foreign capital, the country is also becoming a significant source of outflows. 
Many Indian enterprises view outward investments as an important dimension of 
their corporate strategies. The study discussed the rationale for and the empirical 
determinants of overseas acquisitions by Indian companies and concludes with a 
broader discussion of the impact of the global rise of Indian companies on the 
Indian economy. 
Beena (2010) examined the nature, extent and structure of cross border mergers 
and acquisition (CBMA) deals in India and found that the current surge in cross-
border deals involves the push factors from home country such as market 
constraint, need for low priced factors of production, increasing global 
competition as well as the pull factors from foreign firms such as the wider market, 
technology and efficient operation and suggests that CBMA should be viewed 
from a multi-factor dimension. 




Sinha and Kaushik  (2010) examined the impact of mergers and acquisitions on 
the financial efficiency of the selected financial institutions in India. They used 
two approaches. First, by using the ratio analysis approach, they calculated the 
changes in the position of the companies during the period 2000-2008. Second, 
they examined changes in the efficiency of the companies during the pre- and 
post-merger periods by using a nonparametric Wilcoxon signed rank test. They 
found a significant change in the earnings of the shareholders, and no significant 
change in the liquidity position of the firms. The result of the study indicates that 
the acquiring firms are able to generate value. 
Gubbi, Aulakh, Ray, & Chittoor  (2010), conducted an event study of 425 cross-
border acquisitions by Indian firms during 2000–2007.  Their study examined, (1) 
if the International acquisitions by Indian firms generate positive abnormal 
returns/value for acquiring firms‘ shareholders and (2) if international acquisitions 
that are made by emerging-economy firms, those that involve target firms in more 
advanced economies (characterized by higher-quality complementary resources 
and developed institutional environment) will generate greater abnormal 
returns/value. Their findings show positive abnormal returns to the acquiring 
firms in the post-acquisition period. They argue that international acquisitions 
facilitate internalization of tangible and intangible resources that are both difficult 
to trade through market transactions and take time to develop internally, thus 
constituting an important strategic lever of value creation for emerging-economy 
firms. Furthermore, the magnitude of value created will be higher when the target 




firms are located in advanced economic and institutional environments: country 
markets that carry the promise of higher quality of resources, and therefore, 
stronger complementarity to the existing capabilities of emerging economy firms.  
4.10.1 Indian Stock Market Studies 
Srivastava (1984) examined the relationship between earnings and dividends on 
stock market performance. They examined 327 companies for the year 1982-83 
and concluded that high dividend rates are associated with higher market prices of 
securities. The study found that the Modigliani-Miller model is not applicable in 
the Indian context.  
There are several studies from India that have commented upon the Indian capital 
market in general, and trading systems in the stock exchanges in particular, and 
which suggest that the systems therein are rather antiquated and inefficient and 
suffer from major weaknesses and  malpractices. According to most of these 
studies, significant reforms are required if the stock exchanges are to be geared up 
for the envisaged growth in the Indian capital market. The studies include: Sahni 
(1985), Kothari (1986), Lal (1990), Chandra (1990b ), Francis (1991), Ramesh 
Gupta (1992) (1991), Raghunathan, Varma (1992), Gupta (1992) and Sinha 
(1983).  
The investment decision making process of individuals has been explored through 
experiments by Barua and Srinivasan (1986)  (1991) (1987). They concluded that 
the risk perception of individuals is significantly influenced by the skewness of 




the return distribution. This implies that while taking investment decisions, 
investors are concerned about the possibility of maximum losses in addition to the 
variability of returns. Thus the mean variance framework does not fully explain 
the investment decision making process of individuals.  
Bhat (1988) studies the relationship between the regional market indices in the 
Indian stock market over the period 1971-85 using monthly data. He finds that the 
regional price indicators respond immediately to the all India index, but cautions 
that his study is not adequate to conclude the existence of an integrated national 
market.  
Subramaniam (1989) found that in the case of political events, the market 
appeared to respond more efficiently to events where the impact on share values 
was characterised by low complexity and high clarity. The market seemed to have 
difficulty with ambiguous and complex events. Ramachandran (1985) and 
Srinivasan (1988) found that the market was by and large efficient in responding 
to the information content of bonus issues and rights issues respectively.  
4.11 Boards and Performance 
The literature relating to boards of directors is reviewed in order to understand the 
dynamics of boards in decision making and value addition.  
Yermack (1996) found a negative relationship between board size and firm market 
value, using a sample of large US public companies. Similar results were reported 




using European data. Eisenberg, Sundgren & Wells (1998) studied small non-
listed Finnish firms and found a negative correlation between firm profitability 
and the size of the board. The study by Conyon and Peck (1998) showed inverse 
relationships between return on shareholders‘ equity and board size for five 
European countries. Expanding the number of directors provides an increased 
pool of expertise because larger boards are likely to have more knowledge and 
skills at their disposal. Besides, large boards may be able to draw on a variety of 
perspectives on corporate strategy and may reduce domination by the CEO 
(Forbes & Miliken, 1999); (Goodstein, Gautam, & Boeker, 1994). However, 
increasing board size might significantly inhibit board processes due to potential 
problems with group dynamics associated with large groups. Larger boards are 
more difficult to coordinate and may experience problems with communication 
and organisation. Furthermore, large boards may face decreased levels of 
motivation and participation and are prone to develop factions and coalitions. 
Finally, boards may have difficulties to further cohesiveness and may suffer from 
a diffusion of responsibility or ―social loafing‖ often found in large groups. 
Consequently, these group dynamic problems may hinder boards of directors in 
reaching a consensus on important decisions and may put a barrier on the ability 
of the board to control management (Judge & Zeithaml, 1992; Goodstein et al., 
1994; Eisenberg et al., 1998; Forbes & Milken, 1999; Golden & Zajac, 2001). 
The number of directors is a relevant feature that can have much to do with board 
monitoring and control activity. In fact, the ability of the board to monitor can 




increase as more directors are added, but the benefits can be outweighed by the 
costs in terms of poor communication and decision-making associated with larger 
groups (Lipton & Lorsch, 1992); (Jensen, 1993), along with the fact that the CEO 
may be more likely to control the board of directors. There are number of studies 
focusing on the role and proportion of inside, outside and independent directors. 
In general, two theories form the basis for the reliance on insider or outsider-
dominated boards. Agency theory focuses on the conflicts of interest that occur 
among the shareholders (principals) and the managers (agents), stemming from 
the separation of ownership and control. Managers who gain control may have the 
potential to pursue actions that maximize their self-interest at the expense of the 
shareholders. The board of directors is one of the mechanisms designed to 
monitor these conflicts of interest (Jensen & Meckling, 1976; Fama & Jensen, 
1983). Thus, from an agency perspective, boards should be able to act 
independent of management and therefore must include a preponderance of 
outside directors. 
The opposite perspective is grounded in stewardship theory. According to 
stewardship theory, managers are good stewards of company assets. Managers do 
not misappropriate corporate resources at any price because they have a range of 
non-financial motives, such as the intrinsic satisfaction of successful performance, 
the need for achievement and recognition, etc. Reallocation of control from 
shareholders to management leads to maximization of corporate profits and hence, 




shareholders return (Muth & Donaldson, 1998). Following this reasoning, boards 
of directors dominated by insiders are preferable. 
Academic research provides evidence that supports both perspectives. The effect 
of outsider-dominated board on performance is indeed contradictory. Greater 
representation of outside directors on the board has a negative impact on firm 
performance, as measured by Tobin‘s Q (Agrawal & Knoeber, 1996) and on 
Market Value Added (Coles, McWilliams, & Sen, 2001). In contrast, Rosenstein 
and Wyatt (1990) found that a clearly identifiable announcement of the 
appointment of an outside director leads to an increase in shareholders‘ wealth. 
Baysinger and Butler (1995) also reported that firms with higher proportions of 
independent directors ended up with superior performance records. Wagner et al 
(1998) conclude that both greater insider and outsider representation can have a 
positive impact on performance, while other studies conclude that there is 
virtually no relationship between board composition and firm performance 
(Dalton, Daily, Ellstrand, & Johnson, 1998; Hermailin & Wiesbach, 2000). 
Evidence suggests that board composition is also related to strategic decisions 
taken by the board and to the monitoring of management. Outsider-dominated 
boards are more involved in restructuring decisions  (Johnson, Ellstrand, & Daily, 
1996) and positively influence diversification strategies (Baysinger & Hoskisson, 
1990). Similarly, higher insider representation has a negative effect on overall 
board involvement in the strategic decision-making process (Judge & Zeithaml, 
1992). The presence of outside directors has a negative implication for the 




intensity of R&D (Baysinger and Hoskisson, 1990). The inclusion of insiders in 
the board may be useful because they have access to information relevant to 
outside directors in assessing both strategic initiatives and managerial 
performance (Fama & Jensen, 1983; Baysinger & Butler, 1995). 
CEO duality has been the dominant board leadership structure of US corporations, 
in which 70-80% of them combine the roles of chief executive officer (CEO) and 
chairperson (Rechner & Dalton, 1991). However, the prevalent corporate 
governance practice in Europe separates the CEO and chairperson, while only 
10% of UK publicly-listed companies combine these two roles (Coles, et al., 
2001; Higgs, 2003; Kang & Zardkoohi, 2005). On the other side of the world, the 
board leadership structure of Asian companies lies in the middle of these two 
extremes. Hong Kong is a former British colony and has a well-developed 
regulatory framework and capital market. Hong Kong companies are 
characterised by their concentrated ownership, and most have a major shareholder 
or controlling family (HKSA, 1995; Claessens, Djankov, & Lang, 2000a). The 
proportion of CEO duality for public companies in Hong Kong was 54% in 1996 
(Gul & Leung, 2004), and 52% from 1995 to 1998 (Chen, Cheung, Stouraitis, & 
Wong, 2005). India and Hong Kong companies do not have the same corporate 
governance structure as the US and Western companies, so the empirical findings 
for US companies may not apply to Hong Kong and other Asian companies.  
Most of the research suggests that paying high premiums is likely to result in 
negative firm performance, due to an inability to earn adequate returns beyond the 




premiums paid (Datta, et al., 1992). A large premium places a major burden on 
managers of the acquiring firm to recoup those costs and extract sufficient 
synergies from the merged firm. Research suggests that about 70% of acquiring 
firms fail to deliver the necessary results to recoup the premium payment 
(Sirower, 1997). 
One reason for high premiums is executive hubris (Roll, 1986). In this context, 
hubris is executives‘ overconfidence that they can achieve the synergy projected 
when the firm is acquired and integrated. Yet, firms acquired where hubris is a 
major factor are unlikely to achieve the needed synergy. As a result, firms may 
pay too high a premium and are unable to earn adequate returns to compensate for 
the premium and also produce a positive return (Hayward & Hambrick, 1997). 
When hubris is instrumental in the acquisition, it is not uncommon for the CEO to 
do a less than adequate job of due diligence or to ignore negative information 
provided by the due diligence process  (Hitt, Harrison, & Ireland, 2001).  
4.12 Conclusions 
It is evident from the literature reviewed above that most of the studies conducted 
are from mature markets and the findings reveal varied results relating to the 
abnormal returns around the event window. The outcomes of the empirical 
findings are mixed. There is no unanimity in their findings in short-term and long-
term studies. 




The review of the literature also reveals various issues relating to benchmarking 
and shows how the use of various benchmarks might produce different results 
given the same sample. The literature reviewed the experiences of mature markets 
and emerging markets with special reference to Indian studies. The study also 
reviewed the methods used in prior studies and identified the gaps in the literature. 
Majority of the Indian studies documented in the literature are focused on 
examining the trends and patterns of OFDI in India, regulatory issues, motives 
and magnitude and composition of Indian OFDI.  Notable among them is the 
emerging pattern of India's outward foreign direct investment under influence of 
state policy: a macro view (Singh & Jain, 2009; Nayyar, 2008; Rajan, 2000 & 
Kumar 2008). The study of Kale (2009) considered only small scale companies 
which involved the investments less than USD$48 million. The study of Gubbi, 
Aulakh, Ray, & Chittoor  (Gubbi, et al., 2010) examined the post-acquisition 
performance for a sample size of 412. Their study did not examine the short term 
announcement effect. The study of Zhu & Malhotra, (2008) considered short term 
and long term performance of Indian acquiring firms. But it is limited in scope in 
which it considered only service sector cross border mergers and acquisitions by 
Indian corporates in the US only. 
The study is important because it is the first to assess the success of Indian 
corporates involved in overseas investments from the short term and long term 
perspective and across sectors. The study now proceeds to look into the 
experience of the Indian corporates involved in OFDI related M&As. The 




following chapter will present research methods to assess the performance of the 
Indian corporates involved in OFDI related M&As. 
 




















Average cumulated residuals of −0.045 
during the announcement month 
(statistical significance not reported). 
Dodd (1980) 1970-77 151 
takeovers 
US -40 to +40 
days 
Bidders earn -0.23% (insignificant) at 
theannouncement date from completed 
bids. 









US -20 to +20 
days 
Unsuccessful bidders gain, on average, 
2.32% over -20 to +1 day, but lose 
2.96% as soon as the bid failure is 
revealed (+2 to +20 days). Both 
statistically significant. 
Unsuccessful bidders exhibit 
insignificant gains of -0.64% over -20 











UK -4 to +1 
months 
Bidders earn around 1% average 
abnormal returns during the 
announcement month (significant). 
During the period -4 to +1 month, 
bidders gain between 2.4% and 7.9% 
depending on the abnormal returns 
measure (both significant). 








US -5 to +5 
days 
Negative impact on bidder returns when 
the bid is made by a low Tobin‘s q firm. 
Acquirers earn 0.8% from unopposed 
bids and -0.14% from opposed bids 
(neither is significant). 




US -1 to +1 Abnormal returns of -1.66% to 
acquiring firms that are restructured 








days following the bid and 0.70% to 
acquiring firms that are not restructured 
in the post-bid period (both significant). 








US 5 to +5 
days 
Negative abnormal returns ranging 
from -6% to -7% from single, opposed 
bids (significant). Insignificant 








and targets US 5 days 
before the 
initial bid 
and 5 days 
after the 
final bid 









UK 0 to +2 
months 
Negative abnormal returns of -1.25% to 








UK 0 to +3 
months 
Insignificant gains between 
announcement until completion. 
 
Negative acquirer returns of −1.70% 
(significant) from the acquisition of 











US -2 to +2 
days 
Negative market adjusted abnormal 
returns of −0.84% (significant). 
No significant abnormal returns based 






acquirers UK -1 to +1 day Bidders earn abnormal returns of 
between -1.39% and -1.47% (all 













US -10 to +10 
days 
Bidders lose a significant 1.57% over 
the -1 to 0 day period. Returns for the 
−10 to -2 days or +1 to +10 days are 
insignificant. The returns are calculated 
from a market 
model, based on an equally weighted 
market index. 
A regression of the sub-samples of bids 
with positive returns and those with 
negative returns shows that in the 
negative return regression, relative size 
does not 
matter. In the positive return regression, 
bids for targets with relatively high 










US -1 to 0 days Acquiring firms with a period of more 
than a year of ‗dormant‘ bid activity 
receive a positive abnormal return of 
about 1%. Acquirers with a ‗dormant‘ 










EU -30 to +30 
days 
Regulated EU acquirers lose −1.96% 
over 60 days around the bid 
announcement. Bidders from 
unregulated industries do not earn 










Canada -1 to +1 
days 
Acquiring firms earn 1.6% over 3 days. 
Returns are calculated using the market 
model. 
Source: Compiled from prior studies 
 


















Firth (1980) 1969-75 642 takeovers UK -48 to + 36 
months 
-1.0% to unsuccessful and -4.8% to 
successful bidders over 84 months 
around the announcement date 
(statistical significance not reported). 
Asquith 
(1983 
1962-76 285 takeovers US +1 to +240 
days 
Losses of -7.2% to successful bidders 
and -9.6% to unsuccessful bidders in 
the post-outcome period (both 
significant). 
Bradley et al. 
(1983) 





US -6 to +60 
months 
No significant gains to unsuccessful 
bidders over the period -20 to +180 





firms US -60 to +12 
months 
0.043% average abnormal return from -
60 months until the announcement 
month (significant). -0.054% average 
abnormal return (significant) from 









UK 0 to +24 
months 
-12.6% significant average abnormal 
return 
from the market model. +4.5% average 








UK 0 to +24 
months 
Insignificant -1.66% from month 0 to 
12 months after the bid and 
insignificant -4.67% over 24 months 
(CAPM). 
- 5.55% (significant) after 12 months 
and 
-14.96% (significant) after 24 months 






Agrawal et al. 
(1992) 




US 0 to +5 years Abnormal returns of -10.26% 
(significant) to acquirers 5 years 
following the bid. 
Mergers exhibit significantly negative 
abnormal returns of -10% while tender 
offers show insignificant abnormal 








UK 0 to +24 
months 
Different benchmark methods 
controlling for firm size, risk and 
growth opportunities reveal significant 
abnormal returns from -8.15% to -
11.25% over the 24-month post-
acquisition period. Between 31% and 









US 0 to +5 years Average acquirer losses of −6.5% 








UK 0 to +3 
months 
Insignificant gains of -0.74% over +1 to 
+12 months, -0.14% after 24 months, 








acquirers UK +1 to +750 
days 
Significant abnormal returns of between 
-8.71 and -21.89% (all significant) 
based on size and MTB ratio portfolio 





1984-92 197 bids by 
UK Acquirers 
on US targets, 
97 bids by UK 
acquirers on 
EU targets 







0 to +5 years Significant abnormal return of -9.36 
and -27% over years +3 and +5 
respectively in the US. 
No significant abnormal returns from 
EU bids, but positive gains from bids 
other than EU countries or the US. 




other than US 
or EU 
Conn et al. 
(2005) 










UK 0 to +36 
months 
Public domestic bidders lose -19.78% 
on average over 36 months. The BHAR 
returns are control firm adjusted 








UK 0 to +36 
months 
Abnormal loss of between -0.55% to 
1.02% 
(all significant) from the CAPM and 
Fama and French models. Both based 
on equally weighted and value 
weighted portfolios. 




CHAPTER 5: RESEARCH METHODOLOGY   
5.1 Introduction 
This chapter presents the research methods used in the study. From the short-term 
perspective, the research measures the announcement effects of OFDI related 
M&As by Indian corporates. From the long-term perspective, the effects of OFDI 
related M&As in terms of value creation following the acquisitions are measured. 
The chapter also outlines the approach taken to explain the variations in outcomes 
at firm-specific level and presents the approach taken to identify the drivers 
behind OFDI- related M&As. 
The chapter is organised into three parts:  
Part A deals with methods used to examine short term performance  
Part B deals with methods used to examine long term performance 
Part C outlines the approach for theoretical explanations 
5.2 Part A: Short Term Methods 
This chapter presents the models and approaches used to investigate the market 
reactions to the announcements of the thirty outward foreign direct investment 
(OFDI) related mergers and acquisitions (M&As) by Indian corporates.  





It is evident from Chapter 4 that the majority of the prior research relates to 
M&As from mature markets. The study is important because it is the first to 
assess the success of Indian corporates involved in overseas investments from the 
short term and long term perspective and across sectors. The study fills the gap in 
the literature in which it examines the aggregate performance and also looks into 
firm specific level performance. Besides, the present study is wider in scope and 
the sample considered for the study includes Indian corporates involved in OFDI 
related M&As across seven sectors. The study will address the following research 
question from short term perspective:  
- How does the market react to announcements of OFDI related M&As by 
Indian corporates? 
 
5.2.1  Research Hypothesis 
The study uses the event method to test the stock market reactions to OFDI related 
M&A announcements by Indian corporates with the following hypothesis over  
the three day event window: 
Ho: There are no abnormal returns on the announcement day (0) following the 
announcement of OFDI related M&As. 




5.2.2  Research Method 
The research method is categorised into three. First, the study presents the 
relevance of event studies from the short-term perspective. Second, the study 
deals with the event window framework and its taxonomy. Third, it deals with the 
procedures involved in measuring the stock value and test statistics. 
5.2.3 About Event Study Methods 
Event studies have been used since the early 1930s (Mackinlay, 1997). The event 
study method is a widely used procedure for assessing the economic impact of 
new information on equity value. It is a commonly employed research method 
which is used as an attempt to separate the effect of a particular event on a stock‘s 
return for some post-event estimation period. This method is applied to a variety 
of situations ranging from firm-specific to economy-wide. Some examples include 
earnings announcements, initial public offerings, share repurchases, mergers, 
acquisitions, stock splits, and macro-economic variables such as the trade deficit, 
etc. Bruner (2002) points out that of the four research approaches that are 
employed to measure M&A profitability (event studies, accounting studies, 
surveys, and clinical studies) event studies clearly dominate in the literature. 
The event study method is based on the assumption that capital markets are 
efficient for estimating the impact of new information on anticipated future profits 
of firms. The core assumption of event study methodology is that if information 
communicated to the market contains any useful and surprising content an 




abnormal return will occur. In a capital market with semi-strong efficiency one 
can assess the impact of the event in question on the market value of the company 
by calculating the abnormal return, i.e., the difference between the actual post-
event return and the return expected in the absence of the event (Mackinlay, 1997). 
The procedure involved in conducting an event study is sequenced as follows: 
Define the event to be tested, define abnormal returns, define the pre-event, event, 
and post-event observation windows, collect a set of events from an unbiased 
dataset, measure and test aggregate abnormal performance post-event. However, 
one needs to be cautious about the assumptions used in the event methods. 
McWilliams and Siegel (1997) presented a vigorous discussion on this issue. The 
main points of their concerns are presented below: 
 An important assumption of an event study is that markets are efficient. 
Market efficiency implies that stock prices incorporate all relevant 
information that is available to market traders and any new information 
(such as an M&A announcement) will be immediately reflected in the 
stock price. This assumption is more appropriate for a short event window. 
 The second assumption is that the event is totally unanticipated and traders 
gain information from the announcement only. However, it is possible that 
an event will have been anticipated or information leaked to the market in 
advance of a formal announcement. In such situations an event study will 
be inappropriate. 




 The third assumption is based on the claim that a researcher has isolated 
the effect of an event from the effects of other events. It is assumed that 
there are no confounding effects from other events
12
. 
 Finally, in event studies, it is generally assumed that there is no cross-
sectional dependence among different events. Brown and Warner (1985) 
investigated this issue and concluded that there is no substantial impact on 
the outcome. However, Brown and Warner (1985) maintain adjustment for 
cross-sectional dependence is not always necessary for reasonable test 
statistic specification. If the degree of dependence is small, as in studies 
where event dates are not clustered, ignoring the dependence induces little 
bias in variance estimates. Furthermore, dependence adjustment can 
actually be harmful compared to procedures which assume independence.  
5.2.4 Event Window Framework and Taxonomy 
According to McKinlay (1997), an event study can be roughly categorised into the 
following five steps: 
1. Identifying the events of interest and defining the event window size 
2. Selection of the sample set of firms to include in the analysis. 
                                                 
12 Confounding events can include the declaration of dividends, announcement of 
an impending merger, announcement of a new product, announcement of 
unexpected earnings, change in key executives, etc. 




3. Prediction of a ―normal‖ return during the event window in the absence of 
the event 
4. Calculation of the abnormal return within the event window, where the 
abnormal return is defined as the difference between the actual and 
predicted returns. 
5. Testing whether the abnormal return is statistically different from zero. 
To facilitate the measurement and analysis of the abnormal returns the study 
defines some notations. Returns will be indexed in the event time usingDefining 
0 as the event day, T1T2 represents the event window, and 
T0+ 1 to T1 constitutes the estimation window. Let L1 = T1 – T0 and L2 = T2 
– T1 be the length of the estimation window and the event window respectively. It 
is important to note that in spite of the event being considered on a given date it is 
typical to set the event window length larger than one (McKinlay, 1997). This 
makes possible the use of abnormal returns around the event day in the analysis. 
When appropriate, the post event window will be from = T3 and of length L3 = 
T3 – T2. The timing sequence is illustrated with a time line in Figure 1. 
Figure 1: Time line for event studies 
    [estimation window]  [event window] [post-event window] 
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It is important that the estimation window and the event window do not overlap. 
This design provides for the parameters of the normal return model which are not 
influenced by the returns around the event. Including the event window in the 
estimation of the normal model parameters could lead to the event returns having 
a large influence on the normal return measure. In this situation the normal and 
the abnormal returns would contain the event impact. This would be problematic 
because the methodology is built around the assumption that the announcement 
effect is observed through the abnormal returns on the announcement day. The 
intention of this approach is to increase the robustness of the normal market return 
measure to gradual changes in its parameters. 
McWilliams and Siegal (1997) suggest that the length of the event window is the 
most crucial research design issue in an event study. In deciding the length of the 
event window, it is important to understand that the event window should be short 
enough to increase the power of the test and at the same time it should be long 
enough to capture the full (considerable) effect of the event under consideration. 
5.2.5 Event Study Approaches 
In the literature, a variety of models have been proposed, analysed and/or used to 
measure the expected rate of return and then calculate the abnormal return 
estimates. Abnormal returns are measured based on any of the following given 
models:  
 Mean-adjusted returns model 




 Market-adjusted returns model  
 Market model returns  
This section analyses and appraises the three models mentioned above.  
1) Mean-adjusted returns  
This is calculated by subtracting the average return for stock i during the 
estimation period from the stock returns during the event periods. This method 
does not explicitly control for the risk of the stock or the return on the market 
portfolio during event periods. This approach is simpler because it estimates only 
one parameter and market returns are not required.  
            ̅i   - - - - (1) 
 ̅   
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From the expression given above      can be defined as the excess return for 
security i at day t.      is the observed arithmetic return for security i at day t and 
 ̅          expected average return. 
2) Market Adjusted Model (MAR): 
Under the market-adjusted return model, the return on market index is subtracted 
from the return of firm security. This method is simpler than estimating market 
model abnormal returns because it is done in ―one step‖, rather than two. When 
this model is used, no statistical parameters are estimated. 




The abnormal return for security i in month t is 
                     
Where Rit is the monthly return for security ―i in month ―t‖ and     is the monthly 
return on the market index. 
3) Market Model (MM) 
The market model approach is straight–forward and relatively easy to use  
(Binder, 1998). Parameters are estimated using a pre-event period sample with 
ordinary least squares regression. The parameter estimates and the event period 
stock and market index returns are used to calculate the abnormal returns. It 
involves two steps to estimate the abnormal returns. In the first step parameters 
are estimated and in the second step abnormal returns are estimated. This method 
controls for the risk (market factor beta) of the stock and movement of the market 
during the event period.  
The normal expected return using the market model is 
                           
Where    and β are market model parameter estimates obtained by regressing 
monthly returns for security ‗i‘ on the equally-weighted market returns over the 
estimation period. 
5.2.6 Measuring AR under OLS Market Model 
The market reaction to short run sentiment of acquisition performance is 
measured by calculating the Abnormal Returns (AR), Cumulative Abnormal 




Returns (CAR) and Average Abnormal Returns () and Standardised Cumulative 
Abnormal Returns (SCAR).  
Measuring Abnormal Returns (AR), Cumulative Abnormal Returns (CAR), 
Average Abnormal Returns and Standardised Cumulative Abnormal Returns 
(SCAR). 
1) Abnormal Returns 
According to the market regression model abnormal returns are defined as the 
returns over the event window minus the normal returns, i. e., the returns that 
would be expected if the event did not take place (Campbell, Andrew, & 
Mackinlay, 1997). Intuitively, abnormal returns indicate the market response to 
the announced event (Anand & Singh, 1997).  
             ̂   ̂                      
Under null hypothesis (Ho) the distribution of abnormal returns in the event 
window is assumed to be normally distributed with zero mean and constant 
variance, as shown below: 
    (     )  (   
       )                 
2) Cumulative Abnormal Returns 
The daily abnormal returns are summed up over the event window to derive the 
cumulative abnormal returns (CARs).  
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3) Average Abnormal Returns  
Average Abnormal Returns are obtained by averaging the residuals across firms 
on a day t.  
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Where Nt is the number of companies under consideration with a return in event 
window t. The AAR minimises the impact of other information, except the 
announcement about the OFDI related M&As, because they are calculated across 
the sample for the given day. 
4) Standardised Abnormal Returns:  
The wealth effects following the announcements are also tested by standardising 
the abnormal returns. That is, through standardising the abnormal returns with the 
estimated standard deviation. This approach provides robust results since this 
method assumes that the event-induced increase in the variance is proportional for 
each firm. Portfolio abnormal returns are standardised in order to produce 
independent and identically distributed abnormal returns (Paul. Asquith & Kim, 
1982). 
The procedure is as follows: 




AR obtained from (7) above should be divided by its estimated standard deviation 
to yield a standardised abnormal returns, A'i,t. 
               ̂(     )                 
Where  
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The sum of the standardised abnormal returns (through time-series) is referred to 
as standardised cumulative abnormal returns (SCAR). 
5.2.7 Approaches of the Present Study 
The study adopts an event study method and uses a market model involving thirty 
OFDI related M&As by Indian corporates between 2000 and 2008 from seven 
sectors ((1) Metals & Mining; (2) Oil, Gas & Energy; (3) Chemical/Fertilisers; (4) 
Food & Beverages; (5) Information Technology; (6) Healthcare & 
Pharmaceuticals; and  (7) Manufacturing & Processing).  
To capture the effect of trade following the announcement, the study extends the 
interval to pre-event day (-1). (0) event day (announcement day) and post-event 
day (+1). The study tests the value effects of the OFDI-related M&As firm 
securities transacted on the Indian Bombay Stock Exchange (BSE) surrounding 
the event window. 




The study follows the method adopted by Scholes (1972) to examine the 
announcement effect relating to the acquisitions by the OFDI related Indian 
corporates in the stock market  on the event day.  The method used by Scholes is 
an adaptation of the method used by Fama (1969). According to Scholes (1972), a 
secondary distribution (event distribution) is an infrequent event for any particular 
company.
13
 Brown and Warner (1985), conclude that a simple methodology based 
on the market model is both well-specified and relatively powerful under a wide 
variety of conditions, and in special cases even simpler methods also perform well.  
Movements in security prices are associated with market-wide information that 
differentially affects the value of securities. The market model proposed by 
Sharpe (1963) and tested by Blume (1968) provides a particularly simple and 
effective way to do so.
14
 The model assumes that individual security returns, Ri,t 
are linearly related to the returns on a market portfolio, Rm,t, and that the usual 
assumptions of the regression model are satisfied.
15
 €it is assumed to be zero. The 
market model asserts that 
                                                 
13Eugene Fama, Lawrence Fisher, Michael C. Jensen, and Richard Roll, used a 
similar approach in their study but used the logarithmic or continuously 
compounded rate of return on securities.  
14 See William F. Sharpe (1963). 
15 Extensive tests of this model by Blume and by Fama et al. indicate that the 
assumptions of linearity, stationarity, and serial independence of the residuals are 
not violated. The estimated residuals, however, appear to be more closely 




                            
Where, 
Rit= Returns for firm i for the day t, measured  
Rmt = Market portfolio return for the day t,  
αi =It is the constant return on the share price 
βi= Sensitivity of the return on the share i to the variations in the return of the 
market 
€it= Residual or random disturbance 
 
The advantage of the shorter window is that the results will be typically 
insensitive to the model chosen for the expected returns (Moeller.S, et al., 2003). 
Following the literature, this study will concentrate only on a short-run event 
study method, restricting analysis to a short event window (closely surrounding 
the announcement day). The event date for the study is set to be the date of 
announcement of a respective M&A event. This provides the best comparison of 
the various methods because the shorter the event window, the more precise the 
tests. The three days‘ event window includes: -1, 0, +1 in which the event window 
is made up of one day prior to the announcement day, the announcement day and 
a day following the announcement day. 
                                                                                                                                     
approximated by a member of the stable class of distributions with a characteristic 
exponent of less than two.  




5.2.8 How is the present study different from the prior studies? 
The present study is different from the extant literature in the following given 
ways: First, it has no problems with missing data and therefore eliminates the 
need for rebalancing which is prominent among the issues identified in the prior 
studies. This is because the sample size in this study is small and the firms chosen 
are listed on the BSE for the entire study period. Hence, the problem of 
rebalancing is not an issue in contrast to the previous studies of mature markets 
where the sample size was large and the period of study was vast, extending three 
to four decades, and where the data was drawn from data bases like CRSP. The 
length of the estimation period was more than 250 days unlike this present study 
which is 100 days. 
Most of the prior studies choose more than 100 hundred days as an estimation 
period because of the rebalancing problem. But after making adjustments to 
ensure continuity in the time series of the data, the number of days is normally 
reduced closer to 100. The estimation period of the present study is 100 days. In 
spite of these variations, the estimation period chosen for the present study is in 
line with the literature.  
It is evident from the literature presented in Chapter 4 that though the estimation 
period is 250 days, 100 days is considered to fit the selection criteria.  Hence, the 
period of the present study is intact with the literature. 




5.2.9 Sample and Data 
The present study measures the short-run performance of thirty OFDI related 
M&As by Indian companies. The study considers a three-day short-event window 
surrounding the acquisition announcement period. It includes a day prior to the 
announcement and the event day (announcement day) and a day following the 
announcement. The study will concentrate only on a short-run event study method, 
restricting analysis to a short event window (closely surrounding the 
announcement day). The event date for the study is set to be the date of 
announcement of the respective M&A event. This provides the best comparison of 
the various methods because the shorter the event window, the more precise the 
tests.  
The coefficients of the market model are estimated using 100 days of stock return 
data on each security in the sample of thirty OFDI related Indian corporates 
involved in acquisitions from the BSE Index (Bombay Stock Exchange). The αi & 
βi are the OLS parameter estimates obtained in the regressions for the period t five 
days preceding the event. The method of estimation period is the same as adopted 
by Scholes (1972), with the exception that the present study does not include post-
event data in the estimation period.  The estimation period excludes five days 
prior to the event day. The estimation period of the market model is 100 days.  
Returns are calculated as the difference in natural logarithm of two consecutive 
daily stock prices. It estimates each security‘s systematic risk relative to the 




market portfolio. The Bombay Stock Exchange (BSE) Price Index is used as a 
proxy for the market portfolio. It controls for market-wide variations through the 
independent variable Rmt.  Any variation due to factors not present in the market 
portfolio will be captured in the disturbance term €it. 
The data is obtained from the CMIE data Prowess, corporate documents, and 
Thompson Banker. The announcement dates are obtained from the daily 
newspapers. The data used involves firm stock returns and market returns on the 
Bombay Stock Exchange (BSE). The test results will be processed using STATA, 
e-views software applications. 
5.3 Part B: Long term Methodology 
It is evident from part A that the approaches and methods used to estimate 
abnormal returns from a short-term perspective are quite straight forward meaning 
there are not many issues relating to the models used. Unlike the short-term 
studies, the approaches and methods employed in long-term studies to estimate 
abnormal returns are varied in the extant literature and pose challenges to 
researchers.  
5.3.1  Introduction 
It is evident from the prior studies (Chapter 4) that over the last two decades 
mergers and acquisitions related issues have drawn considerable interest from 
practitioners and academics. As a result, scores of empirical studies have 




documented various aspects of M&As including trends in M&A activity, and 
characteristics of the transactions and corresponding gains or losses to 
shareholders. This chapter presents the methods used to examine the long-term 
performance of OFDI-related Indian corporates following merger and acquisition 
activity.  
While a majority of the existing empirical evidence focuses on stock returns 
immediately surrounding announcement dates, a smaller body of research has 
examined long-run post-acquisition returns (Martynova & Renneboog, 2008).  
According to Malkiel (2003) the stock market in the short run is a voting 
mechanism, while in the long run it is a weighing mechanism. True value will win 
out in the end. And before the fact, there is no way in which investors can reliably 
exploit any anomalies or patterns that might exist. He is sceptical about the 
predictable patterns that have been documented in the literature were ever 
sufficiently robust so as to have created profitable investment opportunities and 
after they have been discovered and publicized, they will certainly not allow 
investors to earn excess returns.  
The majority of the long-horizon studies examined US data and concluded that 
acquiring firms experience significant negative abnormal returns over a one- to 
three-year period after the merger (Agrawal, et al., 1992); & (Moeller.S, et al., 
2003). It was pointed out by Fama (1998) and Mitchell and Stafford (2000)  that 
many empirical studies employ different methodological choices (event-time vs. 




calendar-time approach) and that various factors (such as payment methods, 
merger, or tender offer) may affect the conclusions of these papers.  
Besides, it is evident from the extant literature from the Indian context that the 
majority of studies examined the trends and patterns of foreign direct investments 
involving cross-border mergers and acquisitions.  There are few studies that have 
examined the post-acquisition performance of Indian firms in which they 
examined domestic acquisitions only. The present study will fill the gaps of the 
prevailing Indian literature and examine the post-acquisition long-term 
performance of the OFDI related Indian acquiring firms. It examines the 
shareholders wealth effects as a consequence of thirty OFDI related M&As by 
Indian corporates. The study raises the following research question based on the 
review of literature presented in Chapter 4: 
 Is there any value creation to the shareholders in the post-acquisition 
period following OFDI related M&A activity? 
5.3.2 Hypotheses of the Study: 
The study proposes to test the following two null hypotheses relating to the long-
term performance of OFDI related M&As by Indian corporates: 
1) Ho: There are no long-run abnormal returns to the acquiring firms following 
acquisition activity.  




- This hypothesis is tested by considering the stock market performance in 
the post-acquisition period.   
2) Ho: Financial performance in the post-acquisition period is no greater than 
the financial performance in the pre-acquisition period. 
- This hypothesis is tested by considering the Tobin‘s Q in the pre- and 
post-event period. 
5.3.3 Approaches and methods for estimating abnormal returns in the long-
term studies 
There are two approaches identified in the literature for estimating long-run 
performance. They are: (a) event-time approach and (b) calendar time approach.  
In the event approach, the methods used to estimate the long-term abnormal stock 
returns can be categorised as: (i) Cumulative Abnormal Returns (CAR) and Buy-
and-Hold Abnormal Returns (BHAR). CAR can be estimated by employing four 
models. They are market-adjusted model, market model, mean model and capital-
adjusted-pricing-model. Like CAR, BHAR is calculated in two ways: by using (i) 
a reference portfolio return, and control firm return. 
The calendar-time portfolio approach was first used by Jaffe (1974) and 
Mandelker (1974) and is advocated by Eugene (1998). Further, there are three 
calendar-time portfolio methods that are evident in the literature. They include the 
Fama and French (1993) three factor model, the Mitchell and Stafford (2000) 
adjusted intercept approach, and the Fama French four factor model.  




 The models used to estimate the long horizon abnormal returns are presented 
below: 
1) Market Adjusted Model (MAR) 
The abnormal return for security i in month t is 
                         
Where     is the monthly return for security ―i‖ in month ―t‖ and     is the 
monthly return on the market index. 
2) Market Model (MM) 
The abnormal return using the market model is 
                                  
Where    and β are market model parameter estimates obtained by regressing 
monthly returns for security ‗I‘ on the equally-weighted market returns over the 
estimation period. 
3) Cumulative Abnormal Returns 
The monthly abnormal returns are summed up over the event period to derive the 
cumulative abnormal returns (CARs).  
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4) Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) 
                  [        ]          




Where β is from CAPM regression model (i.e. slope from a regression of (    
    ) on (         for the estimation period and     is normally 91 days Treasury 
bill used as a proxy for the risk-free return. 
5) Fama French Three Factor Model 
Fama-French (1992) (1993) provided evidence that the extensively documented 
inadequacies of the CAPM model in describing the cross-section of expected 
return are remedied by an expanded form of the CAPM that includes size and 
book-to-market factors. Some recent event studies adjust for both these factors. 
                   [        ]                           
Where                    the OLS coefficients estimated by regressing ―I‘s‖ 
monthly excess returns on the monthly market excess returns, book-to-market, 
and size factor returns for the estimation period.      and       are the Fama-
French book-to-market and size factor returns.      is the high-minus-low book-
to-market portfolio return in month ―t‖ and      is the small-minus-big size 
portfolio return in month ―t‖.    
Factor Portfolios: 
The Fama and French model uses three explanatory variables for explaining the 
cross section of stock returns. The first is the excess market return factor - that is 
the market index return minus the risk-free return.  The second is the risk factor in 
returns relating to size small minus big (SMB). The simple average of the monthly 




returns of the three big size portfolios (B/L, B/M, B/H) is subtracted from the 
average of the three small size portfolios (S/L, S/M, S/H) to get the monthly 
return of the SMB factor
16.
 This factor is free from BE/ME effects as it has about 
the same weighted-average BE/ME. The third factor is related to value - high 
minus low (HML). Each month, the difference between the simple average of the 
returns on the two high BE/ME portfolios (S/H and B/H) and the two low BE/ME 
portfolios (S/L and B/L) is calculated
17
. It is free of size effects. 
6) Buy-and-Hold Abnormal Return (BHAR)  
This approach has become increasingly popular since the end of the 1990s. Barber 
and Lyon (1997)  and Lyon, Barber, and Tsai (1999)  propose the use of buy-and-
hold abnormal returns. They argue that this method captures investor experience 
accurately. In contrast to the CAR method, the buy-and-hold return (BHAR) has 
been defined as the return on buy-and-hold investment in the sample firm less the 
return on a buy-and-hold investment in an asset/portfolio with an appropriate 
expected return, or: 
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 (S/L+S/M+S/H)/3 – (B/L+B/M+B/H)/3 
17
 (S/H+B/H)/2 – (S/L+B/L)/2 




To test the null hypotheses that the mean cumulative abnormal returns are equal to 
―0‖ for a sample of ―N‖, the common parametric test statistics used is: 
               δ         √             
 Where        is the sample average and         ) is the cross-sectional sample 
standard deviations of abnormal returns for the sample of ‗N‘ firms18. 
Like CAR, the expected returns E(Rit) for BHAR (equation 5) is calculated in two 
ways: by using (i) a reference portfolio return, and (Davidson, et al.) control firm 
return. 
7) Reference Firm Approach 
Under this approach, all the firms listed on a stock exchange are categorised into a 
number of groups (generally 25 to 50) based on each firm‘s respective ―size‖ and 
―book-to-market value information‖. Each of these groups serves as a reference 
portfolio and BHAR is calculated by taking the difference between the buy-and-
hold return of a sample firm and the buy-and-hold return of the closest reference 
portfolio in terms of ―size‖ and ―book-to-market value‖ information. As reported 
by Barber and Lyon (1997), BHAR with a reference portfolio is subject to a new 
listing bias and a rebalancing bias.  
8) Control Firm Approach  
                                                 
18
 In the case of a value-weighted BHAR, the market-value-weighted average BHAR and 
corresponding standard deviation in the t-statistics. 




As an alternative to the use of reference portfolios for the calculation of abnormal 
returns, a control firm return is used in the BHAR calculation. In this approach, 
sample firms are matched to a control firm on the basis of specified firm 
characteristics. Three methods are identified in the literature. They include 
matching a sample firm to a control firm closest in size (as measured by market 
value of equity), matching a sample firm to a control firm of similar size and 
book-to-market ratio, and matching a sample firm to a control firm of similar 
book-to-market ratio. 
Barber and Lyon (1997) show evidence about the efficacy of a control firm 
approach for detecting long-run abnormal stock returns. They document that 
matching sample firms to control firms of similar size and book-to-market ratios 
yields test statistics that are well specified in all sampling situations they 
considered.  
As per Barber and Lyon (1997), the control firm approach eliminates the new 
listing bias (since both the sample and control firm must be listed in the identified 
event month), the rebalancing bias (since both the sample and control firm returns 
are calculated without rebalancing), and the skewness problem (since the sample 
and the control firms are equally likely to experience large positive returns). 
Finally, the cross-sectional dependence problem in the test statistics can be 
alleviated by the methodology provided by Mitchell & Stafford (2000).  
9) Wealth Relative Method 




Ritter (1991) proposed the wealth relative model as an alternative to the 
cumulative abnormal returns method. This method implicitly assumes monthly 
portfolio rebalancing and computes a three-year holding period return as, below: 
    ∏               
  
   
 
Where      is the return on firm i in event month t. This measures the total return 
from a buy-and-hold strategy where a stock is purchased at the first closing 
market price after going public and held until the earlier of its three years. Wealth 
relative (WR) is a performance measure and is defined as follows: 
             WR = 
                                          
                                               
 
A wealth relative of greater than 1 is interpreted as firm‘s security outperforming 
the benchmarking firm; a wealth relative of less than 1 indicates that the sample 
firm underperformed. 
10)  Tobin’s Q - A measure to assess the operating performance 
Tobin's is a measure of performance. It is the ratio of the market value of a firm's 
assets (as measured by the market value of its outstanding stock and debt) to the 
replacement cost of the firm's assets (Tobin 1969). If a firm is worth more than its 
value based on what it would cost to rebuild it, then excess profits are being 
earned. These profits are above and beyond the level that is necessary to keep the 
firm in the industry.  




The advantage of using Tobin's q is that the difficult problem of estimating either 
rates of return or marginal costs is avoided. On the other hand, for Tobin‘s q to be 
meaningful, one needs accurate measures of both the market value and 
replacement cost of a firm's assets. Market capitalisation is the market value of a 
company's issued shares. It is calculated by multiplying a company's issued shares 
by the current share price.  
It is usually possible to get an accurate estimate for the market value of a firm's 
assets by summing the values of the securities that a firm has issued, such as 
stocks and bonds. It is much more difficult to obtain an estimate of the 
replacement costs of its assets, unless financial reports use current value. 
Moreover, expenditures on advertising and research and development create 
intangible assets but these tend not to be capitalised in balance sheets.  
5.3.4 Issues relating to the methods used in estimating abnormal returns in 
the long-period studies 
It is evident from the extant literature that the question of which model is 
appropriate to assess the expected returns remains an unresolved issue. Fama 
(1998) concludes that all models for expected returns are incomplete descriptions 
of the systematic patterns in average returns which can lead to spurious 
indications of abnormal performance in an event study. Issues relating to the 
methods used to assess the long-term performance are presented below: 
1) Market Adjusted Model  




Issues: This model is intuitive and relatively easy to use. However, as Barber 
and Lyon (1997) have pointed out, it suffers from three types of biases. First, 
the new listing bias arises because in event studies of long-run abnormal 
returns, sampled firms generally have a long post-event history of returns, 
while firms that constitute the index (or reference portfolio) typically include 
new firms that begin trading subsequent to the event month. Second, the 
rebalancing bias arises because the compound returns of a reference portfolio, 
such as an equally weighted market index, are typically calculated assuming 
periodic (generally monthly) rebalancing, while the returns of sample firms 
are compounded without rebalancing. Third, the skewness bias arises because 
long-run abnormal returns are positively skewed. Moreover, this model does 
not consider the ―size‖ and the ―book value to market value‖ factors while 
determining the abnormal returns. 
2) Market Model  
Issues: Since this model uses the market index return, this would also suffer 
from new listing bias and rebalancing bias as discussed above. Another issue 
is that this model uses the pre-bid period for the identification of    and 
   parameters, whereas the characteristics of bidders‘ security may change as a 
result of the bid. Post outcome returns would reflect these changes and bias 
the results (Limmack, 1991). 
3) Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) 




Issues: Issues mentioned for the market model are again applicable for CAPM. 
Moreover, this model assumes the stationarity of the risk-free rate (Loderer & 
Martin, 1992). The risk free rate could be driven up if the acquisition intensity 
increases in a period of time and alternatively, it could decline if the acquisition 
activity subsides. In addition, the CAPM model has the ―joint hypothesis‖ 
problem, i.e., it assumes that the CAPM truly represents the expected return of the 
security (Dutta, 2006). 
4) Fama French Three factor Model 
Issues: Ikenberry, Lakonishok and Vermaelen (1995) made two observations 
against this approach. First, returns are rebalanced monthly, thus the abnormal 
performance measured under this approach is less representative of a realistic 
investment strategy. Second, this procedure assumes that the coefficients are 
stable over time, which implies that the characteristics of the portfolios are not 
changing.  
Barber and Lyon (1997) identified two disadvantages of the three-factor model. 
They are: First, given four parameters in the regression, it requires at least five 
observations of monthly returns post-event. This creates a survivor bias among 
remaining sample firm.
19
 The second, observation is similar to Ikenberry, 
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  It is not clear, ex ante, what effect this survivor bias has on tests for long-run abnormal returns. 
The direction of the bias depends on the returns of firms in the months immediately prior to 
delisting. In the case of a merger, acquisition, or private transaction, these returns are likely 
positive, while in the case of a bankruptcy or liquidation these returns are likely negative. 




Lakonishok and Vermaelen (1995) and further explains that in contrast to the 
size/book-to-market portfolios, in which a firm‘s portfolio assignment is allowed 
to change once per year, the regression approach assumes that a firm‘s market, 
size, and book-to-market characteristics are stable over time.
20
 
5) Buy-and-Hold-Abnormal Return (BHAR): Reference Firm Approach 
The BHAR approach and the characteristic-based matching approach (BHAR) 
have been in use widely following the works of Ikenberry et al. (1995), and 
Barber and Lyon (1997), Lyon et al. (1999). Mitchell and Stafford (2000) termed 
BHAR returns as the average multiyear return from a strategy of investing in all 
firms that complete an event and selling at the end of a pre-specified holding 
period versus a comparable strategy using otherwise similar non-event firms. An 
appealing feature for using BHAR is that buy-and-hold-returns better resemble 
investors‘ actual investment experience than periodic (monthly) rebalancing 
entailed in other approaches to measuring risk-adjusted performance.
21
 The joint-
test problem remains in that any inference on the basis of BHAR hinges on the 
validity of the assumption that event firms differ from the otherwise similar non-
                                                 
20
  Barber and Lyon, considered an alternative application of the FF three factor model, which is 
analogous to a traditional market model approach. Post-event abnormal returns can be calculated 
using a sample firm‘s realised return less an expected return eg.,reference and control methods.   
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 Apart from similarity with the actual investment experience, the BHAR approach also 
avoids biases arising from security microstructure issues when portfolio performance is 
measured with frequent rebalancing (see Blume and Stambaugh, 1983, Roll, 1983, and 
Ball, Kothari, and Shanken, 1995). 




event firms only in that they experience the event. The researcher implicitly 
assumes an expected return model in which the matched characteristics (e.g., size 
and book-to-market) perfectly proxy for the expected return on a security. Since 
corporate events themselves are unlikely to be random occurrences, i.e., they are 
unlikely to be exogenous with respect to past performance and expected returns, 
there is a danger that the event and non-event samples differ systematically in 
their expected returns notwithstanding the matching on certain firm 
characteristics. This makes matching on (unobservable) expected returns more 
difficult, especially in the case of event firms experiencing extreme prior 
performance. 
Issues: Barber and Lyon (1997) present two insights. First, it is problematic to 
calculate the abnormal returns using reference portfolios, such as an equally 
weighted market index or size decile portfolios. The abnormal returns calculated 
using reference portfolios yield test statistics that are mis-specified (empirical 
rejection rates exceed theoretical rejection rates).  
The three reasons identified for the observed biases include: 
1) New listing bias, which arises because in event studies of long-run 
abnormal returns, sampled firms generally have a long post-event history 
of returns, while firms that constitute the index (or reference portfolio) 
typically include new firms that begin trading subsequent to the event 
month; 




2) Rebalancing bias, which arises because the compound returns of a 
reference portfolio, such as an equally weighted market index, are 
typically calculated assuming (generally monthly) rebalancing, while the 
returns of sample firms are compounded without rebalancing; and 
3) Skewness bias, which arises because long-run abnormal returns are 
positively skewed. 
5.3.5 Rationale behind choosing models for the study 
The present study measures the long-run performance of 30 OFDI related M&As 
by Indian companies. The study considers a maximum 36 months following the 
acquisition event month. The period of the study signifies acquisition activity and 
covers selected Indian firms involved in OFDI-related M&As during 2000-2008. 
The present study pursues two different approaches to test the null hypothesis and 
assess the long-term performance of the OFDI-related M&A firms.  The method 
chosen is in line with the studies conducted and documented in the literature 
(Ikenberry, et al., 1995), (Kothari & Warner, 1997a), (Lyon, et al., 1999) and (Zhu 
& Malhotra, 2008). The first is one of the most commonly used techniques in the 
literature. i.e., CAR using the market model (see equation 2 above). The market 
returns of the Bombay Stock Exchange (BSE) Index and the monthly returns of 
the firm on BSE are used.  
The coefficients of the market model are estimated using 24 months prior to 
acquisition event month. The monthly stock return data for each security in the 




sample of 30 OFDI-related M&As by Indian corporates and the monthly market 
returns from the BSE Index (Bombay Stock Exchange) are used to estimate the 
expected returns. The αi & βi are the OLS parameter estimates obtained by 
regressing the firm returns with the market returns (BSE Index). The alpha 
(intercept) and beta (slope) are estimated from this regression. The expected 
return is equal to alpha plus beta, times the return on the market index. The excess 
return for a stock is equal to the stock‘s actual return less its expected return. 
Returns are calculated as the difference in natural logarithm of two consecutive 
monthly stock prices. It estimates each security‘s systematic risk relative to the 
market portfolio. The Bombay Stock Exchange (BSE) Price Index is used as a 
proxy for the market portfolio. It controls for market-wide variations through the 
independent variable Rmt.  Any variation due to factors not present in the market 
portfolio will be captured in the disturbance term €it. The event period is 36 
months following the acquisition month. The excess of firm returns over the 
estimated returns are abnormal returns.  
The second approach calculates long-run abnormal returns considering the buy-
and-hold (BHAR) strategy. Under BHAR, the study uses a control firm approach 
to avoid the issues relating to new listing bias, rebalancing bias and skewness 
bias. Following the control firm approach, the study matches the OFDI related 
Indian company‘s abnormal market return with the control firm that is chosen 
from the BSE Index based on a set criteria. To be considered, the control firm 
should be of the same size, belong to the same sector and should not be involved 




in acquisition activity. The selection criteria is in line with Barber and Lyon 
(1997) who document that matching sample firms to control firms of similar size 
yields test statistics that are well specified in all sampling situations. Further, the 
study uses the performance suggested by Ritter (1991) i.e., wealth relative 
method. The wealth relative model also uses the control firm (which is used under 
the BHAR method) as benchmarking firm. 
The study tests the second hypothesis by assessing the operating performance of 
the sample firms. The study uses ex-ante and ex-post approach and employs 
Tobin‘s Q and considers three years‘ pre-event and three years‘ post-event in line 
with prior studies (Zhu & Malhotra, 2008). The significance of the mean changes 
in the two periods is tested by using t-test. The study also employs the wealth 
relative method proposed by Ritter (1991) to explain the performance of the firms.  
The data for the study is collected from the Centre for Monitoring Indian 
Economy (CMIE) database, Thompson Banker, BSE portal and Factiva. The data 
is processed using stata and e-views software application to obtain the test results. 
5.3.6 Tests used in the study 
The long run performance of the OFDI-related Indian corporates involved in 
acquisition activity is assessed using two methods. They are BHAR and CAR. 
The present study uses parametric tests and non-parametric tests to decide 
whether or not to reject null hypotheses. This is in line with prior studies (S P 
Kothari & Warner, 1997b) (Ikenberry, et al., 1995) which recommended 




consideration of nonparametric procedures as they have been used in few studies 
and seem likely to reduce misspecifications. Zhu and Malhotra (2008) used 
parametric tests and non-parametric tests (such as Wilcoxon ranked sign test and 
sign test) to check the robustness of the findings of the abnormal returns on Indian 
international acquisition of US firms.  Under a parametric approach the study uses 
the test statistic of t-test, and Anova F-test. The t-value, p-value and f-value are 
used to decide whether or not the null hypotheses should be rejected in the 
hypotheses test.  
The t-test assesses whether the means of two groups are statistically different 
from each other. This analysis is appropriate whenever the means of two groups 
are compared.  Under the BHAR approach, the t-test is used to assess the 
significance in the relationship between the firms‘ returns of the OFDI-related 
Indian corporates involved in acquisition activity with the matching firm. In the 
CAR approach, the risk adjusted firm returns are compared with the benchmark 
returns (BSE Index). In the case of Tobin‘s Q, the three years‘ mean of before 
acquisition and the three years‘ mean of Tobin‘s Q after acquisition event are 
compared and tested.  
The critical value(s) for a hypothesis test is a threshold where the values of the 
test statistic are compared to decide whether or not the null hypotheses should be 
accepted or rejected. In the present study the mean cumulative abnormal market 
returns of the OFDI-related Indian corporates involved in acquisition activity are 




compared with the critical values to determine whether or not the null hypothesis 
is rejected. The level of significance at which the test is carried out is at 1%, 5% 
and 10%.  
The F-test commonly used in one-way ANOVA is based on the assumption that 
all of the groups share a common, but unknown, standard deviation (σ). In 
practice, this assumption rarely holds true, which leads to problems controlling 
the Type I error rate. Type I error is the probability of incorrectly rejecting the 
null hypothesis (concluding the samples are significantly different when they are 
not). To have robustness in testing the null hypotheses the present study considers 
the Anova F-test. 
The p-value is compared with the actual significance level of test results and, if it 
is smaller, the result is significant. That is, if the null hypothesis were to be 
rejected at the 5% significance level, this will be reported as "p < 0.05". 
Small p-values suggest that the null hypothesis is unlikely to be true. The smaller 
it is, the more convincing the rejection of the null hypothesis. It indicates the 
strength of evidence for say, rejecting the null hypothesis H0, rather than simply 
concluding "Reject H0' or "Do not reject H0". 
The Wilcoxon Mann-Whitney test is one of the most powerful nonparametric tests 
for comparing two populations. It is used to test whether two independent samples 
of observations are drawn from the same or identical distributions. An advantage 




with this test is that the two samples under consideration may not necessarily have 
the same number of observations.  
5.3.7 Tests for assessing the performance of Indian corporates involved in 
the OFDI related M&As in the pre-acquisition and post-acquisition 
period  
For the purpose of academic analysis the study examines the relationship between 
OFDI‘s by Indian corporates with the size and performance drivers during the 
period 2000 – 2008 (they include: the total assets (size), sales, PAT, PBDIT and 
Dividends). For this purpose a correlation matrix is used. In statistics correlation, 
(often measured as a correlation co-efficient), indicates the strength and direction 
of a linear relationship between two random variables. In general statistical usage, 
correlation refers to the departure of two variables from independence. The 
correlation is 1 in the case of an increasing linear relationship, −1 in the case of a 
decreasing linear relationship, and some value in between in all other cases, 
indicating the degree of linear dependence between the variables. The closer the 
coefficient is to either −1 or 1, the stronger the correlation between the variables.  
If the variables are independent then the correlation is 0, but the converse is not 
true because the correlation coefficient detects only linear dependencies between 
two variables.  
The study also looks into the annual percentage growth rate of change in sales, 
dividends and profit after taxes in the pre- and post-acquisition periods and 




compares the change in annual growth rate between the pre- and post-acquisition 
periods. For this purpose it uses the following equation: percentage change = 
[(latest-past)/past *100]/N, where N represents the number of years between the 
two values i.e. latest and past periods.  
While calculating the change in growth rate in the pre-acquisition period the 
period considered is four years prior to the acquisition event year. The earlier 
period in pre-acquisition period is denoted as past; the later period of the pre-
acquisition period is denoted as latest. Like-wise the period considered while 
calculating the change in growth rate in the post-acquisition period is also four 
years following the acquisition event year. The earlier period of post-acquisition 
period is denoted as past; the period closer to of the post-acquisition period is 
denoted as latest. The change in growth rate is examined to look into the changes 
in performance drivers after the OFDI related M&A‘s by the Indian corporates. 
5.4 Part C: Research methods for explaining the empirical 
results 
For the purpose of giving explanations to differences in outcome of empirical 
findings a firm-specific approach is adopted. The study presents the approach for 
describing the variations in outcomes of the empirical findings at firm-specific 
level. The study considers discussion of the empirical findings significant for the 
following reasons: 




- Theoretical discussion helps to understand the differing outcomes in 
empirical findings. For a reasonable discussion the firm-level specific 
empirical findings are linked to the following: (1) the secondary 
information released at the time of OFDI related M&A announcements by 
Indian corporates, (2) related theories like value maximising theory, OLI 
and resource based theories as presented in Chapter 3 and (3) prior 
findings as presented in Chapter 4. This approach helps to explain the 
underlying facts of certain elements in the empirical results.  
- Theoretical explanations to the differing outcomes will provide a base for 
testable propositions for future empirical researchers. 
The study selects five companies for explaining the variations in outcomes. The 
selection criteria include: the companies should have a minimum of three decades 
of history in the domestic market; the companies should have at least one unique 
feature from the rest of the sample: in terms of bid amount, sector they represent, 
identified driver, outcome/end result from short term and long-term perspective. 
Long experience in the domestic market is considered vital, more from a long-
term perspective than from short-term. As such, there are possibilities that the 
stock market results may vary in the short term and long term and they may give 
scope for a better discussion. Therefore, the study considers the Indian corporates 
chosen based on the above criteria as appropriate to describe them to understand 
the competitive advantages of Indian corporates in the domestic market.  




To further understand the firms, the study identifies the drivers behind OFDI by 
obtaining information relating to the OFDI related M&As by Indian corporates. 
Obtaining the required data is a challenging issue. In fact, the Reserve Bank of 
India, which is the primary source of data on foreign direct investment, does not 
show the specific details of the OFDI related M&As in India. The other sources 
for obtaining data include the Federation of Indian Chamber of Commerce and 
Industry (FICCI) and Centre for Monitoring the Indian Economy (CMIE) which 
has the listing of OFDI related M&As‘ information. Other alternative sources 
include media reports relating to firm-specific official corporate press release 
statements, information on the internet, company annual reports, business 
periodicals, previous empirical evidence and daily newspapers. 
Towards the end, the study undertakes comparative analyses of the performance 
of the OFDI related Indian corporates involved in acquisition with the reported 
empirical findings in the literature relating to mature markets.  
5.5 Conclusions 
To examine the effects of OFDI related acquisition announcements of Indian 
corporates on the short-run stock performance, this chapter presented the 
theoretical framework and approaches relating to the event study methods. The 
chapter presented different approaches and methods for estimating the abnormal 
returns in the long run. It also outlined the approach for explaining the differing 
outcomes of empirical findings at firm-specific level. It is evident from the above 




discussion that the methods and models used are diverse. The results are 
influenced by the methods chosen which pose challenges to the researcher for 
choosing a particular approach and method. The method chosen to test the 
hypotheses is in line with the prior literature and relates specifically to the study 
conducted from an Indian context. The research results obtained by using these 
methods (from short-term and long-term perspectives) are presented and analysed 
in Chapter 6 and used in Chapter 7. 
It will be interesting to examine whether or not the Indian corporates deliver and 




CHAPTER 6: EMPIRICAL INVESTIGATION OF 
SHORT TERM AND LONG TERM 
PERFORMANCE  
6.1 Introduction 
From a short-term perspective, this chapter presents the empirical findings of the 
stock market reactions in terms of returns following the announcements of OFDI- 
related M&As by Indian corporates. It examines if the stock market in any way 
reacts differently to the announcements of thirty OFDI related M&As by Indian 
corporates.   
From a long-term perspective, this chapter presents the empirical findings relating 
to the stock market performance of the Indian corporates involved in OFDI-
related M&As in the post-acquisition period. The key issue examined in this 
chapter is whether the thirty OFDI related M&As by Indian corporates deliver 
value to their shareholders in the post-acquisition period.  
The details of the sample size, models and approaches used in this chapter were 
explained in the previous chapter. 
This chapter is organised into two parts: 
Part A deals with short-term performance and 
Part B deals with long-term performance 




6.2 Part A: Short Term Performance 
The empirical findings of the study from a short-term perspective are presented 
below: 
6.2.1 Stock market reactions following announcement of thirty OFDI 
related M&As by Indian Corporates 
The results obtained through the OLS market model are presented in Table 6.1. 
The average abnormal returns, Cumulative Abnormal Returns (CAR) and 
Standardised Cumulative Abnormal Returns (SCAR) returns throughout the event 
window, along with the results relating to tests of significance of the Indian 
corporates involved in OFDI related M&As, are presented. The abnormal returns 
are positive throughout the event window (-1, 0, +1). The AAR is statistically 
significant at 1% level on the day prior to announcement; it is statistically 
significant at 5% level on the announcement day, statistically significant at 10% 
level on the post announcement day.  The 1% significant AAR before the 
announcement day could be due to the media hype closer to the announcements of 
the OFDI related M&As by the Indian corporates. The market corrects in the post-
event day. The AAR results support the rejection of the null hypothesis at 5% 
level of significance on the announcement day 
The CAR and SCAR over the event window (-1, 0, +1) are statistically significant 
at 1% level.  The results support the rejection of the null hypothesis at 1% level of 
significance. The empirical results are providing evidence of value addition to the 




stockholders of the bidding firms following the announcements of OFDI-related 
M&As by the Indian corporates. The results indicate that the stockholders 
remained positive to the announcements relating to OFDI-related M&As by 
Indian corporates. 
It is evident from Table 6.1 that OFDI-related M&A announcements have a 
positive effect in the stock market. This implies the market‘s initial confidence in 
the management‘s decision in general. 
Table  6-1: Average Abnormal Returns and Cumulative Abnormal Returns 
Event Window Mean p-value 
Pre-Event Day-AAR 0.0102 0.03* 




Event Window (-1,0,+1) 




Note: * 1% Significant level; ** 5% Significant level and *** 10% Significant 
level 
Table 6.2 presents the results of firm-wise abnormal returns (AR) to the 
shareholders on the announcement day of thirty OFDI related M&As by Indian 
corporates. It is evident from the table that out the total 30 OFDI-related M&As 




by Indian corporates, 19 M&A transactions show positive AR and 11 M&A 
transactions show negative AR.  
Table  6-2: Firm-wise abnormal returns (AR) on the event announcement day 
S.No Companies    AR Result 
1 Tata Steel -0.1017 N 
2 DRL 0.0861 P 
3 Ranbaxy 0.0297 P 
4 Hindalco -0.1281 N 
5 Ispat -0.0175 N 
6 Tata Tea -0.0289 N 
7 Wipro 0.0228 P 
8 Matrix -0.0017 N 
9 Ballarpur 0.0251 P 
10 Optic 0.0138 P 
11 United Spirits 0.0869 P 
12 ONGC -0.0042 N 




13 HPCL -0.0251 N 
14 Piramal Nicholas 0.1118 P 
15 United Phosphorous 0.0208 P 
16 Tata Coffee 0.2091 P 
17 M&M  0.0086 P 
18 Sun Pharmaceuticals 0.0337 P 
19 ONGC -0.0135 N 
20 Videocon -0.0051 N 
21 Lupin 0.0789 P 
22 Sasken Communications  0.0944 P 
23 VSNL 0.0205 P 
24 Tata Motors 0.0265 P 
25 Wochardt -0.0091 N 
26 M&M  -0.0009 N 
27 Tata steel  0.0210 P 
28 Tata Motors 0.0168 P 




29 TCS 0.0789 P 
30 Tata Chemicals 0.0379 P 
Although the empirical results show positive stock market reactions in the short 
run following the announcements of OFDI related M&As by the Indian corporates, 
there are few companies that showed negative abnormal returns. Hence, there are 
differing outcomes in the short term at firm-specific level.  
6.2.2 Pre-Acquisition performance 
To understand the stock market behaviour following the announcements by Indian 
corporates about the OFDI related M&As, the study examines the pre-acquisition 
performance of the Indian corporates involved in OFDI-related M&As.  
Details of the changes in the sales, dividends, Profit after Tax (PAT) and total 
assets in the pre-acquisition period are given below in Table 6.3.  
Table  6-3: Paired t-test results showing changes in Sales, Dividends, PAT & Total 
Assets in the pre-acquisition period 
 
Variables Mean 
 (Beg -End) 
SD 
  (Beg -End) 
t-values P-values 




Sales 4853 5859 4.53 0.000 
Dividends 348 666 2.71 0.005 
 PAT 900 1232 3.93 0.00 
Total Assets 2882 3175 4.97 0.00 
Table 6.3 presents the change in Sales, Dividends, PAT & Total Assets for four 
years before acquisition. It is evident from Table 6.3 that the changes observed in 
early and later periods of pre-acquisition financial performance is statistically 
significant with respect to all four variables used i.e., the sales, dividends, profit 
after tax and total assets. The results indicate a progress in the performance of the 
Indian corporates involved in OFDI- related M&As in the domestic market prior 
to overseas acquisitions.  
6.2.3 Describing the Short Term Empirical Results 
It is evident from the empirical results that stockholders are positive to news of 
OFDI related M&As announcements by Indian corporates. The positive short run 
results indicate expectations vested by stockholders for the long run period. 
According to the finance theory, the established maxim is that the motive behind 
any business organisation with a commercial objective is wealth maximization. 
This objective is attained when the investment decisions made in the firm earn a 
return higher than the costs and adds value to investments. In other words, good 




investment decisions will add value and bad investment decisions will decrease 
the value of stock. It also indicates that the investors in the stock markets are 
satisfied as long as they earn a reasonable return on their investments. The stock 
markets will react positively if they are convinced of the rationale behind the 
investment decisions.  
The overall understanding is that the Indian corporates have been performing well 
in the pre-acquisition period. It is evident from Table 6.3 that the growth in sales, 
PAT, dividends and total assets when compared four years prior to acquisition 
with the period closer to acquisition is significant at 1% level. The increase in 
sales indicates the growth in the market share operations of the Indian corporates 
in the domestic market; the increase in the profits after tax indicates the efficiency 
of the Indian corporates in organising resources and generating profits, and the 
increase in the total assets indicate the growth of the corporate size. The increase 
in dividends indicates that the Indian corporates are generating returns for their 
shareholders and hence those shareholders are likely to be positive about the 
performance and the managerial decision making of the Indian corporates.  The 
performance of the firms in the domestic market might have also driven the stock 
prices. This is in line with the prior finding of Mauldin, (2003). 




6.3 Part B: Long Term Performance 
6.3.1 Introduction 
This part of the chapter presents and analyses the results of long term performance 
of the OFDI-related Indian corporates following acquisition activity. The positive 
short-run market return performance is considered as an indication of the 
expectations and confidence vested by the shareholders in the company 
management. The study therefore examines whether the expectations of investors, 
as pronounced through the significant positive short-run market returns, are 
attained in the long term. 
This chapter assesses the performance of thirty OFDI related M&As by Indian 
corporates in the post-acquisition period. For this purpose, the period considered 
is 36 months following acquisition. The study evaluates the long-run post-
acquisition performance on the stock market by testing the following null 
hypotheses: 
1) Ho: There are no abnormal returns to the acquiring firms following the 
acquisition activity in the long run 
2) Ho: Financial performance in the post-acquisition period is no greater than 
the financial performance in the pre-acquisition period. 
6.3.2 Findings of the study 
The findings of the study are presented below: 




6.3.3 Results of Parametric and Non-Parametric Tests 
Table 6.4 presents parametric test results of the 30 OFDI related M&As by Indian 
corporates involved in acquisition events. The set of results presented includes: 
(1) BHAR using matching firm model, (2) CAR-Market Model and (3) Tobin‘s Q.  
The table summarises two test results - t-test and Anova F-test. It also presents the 
t-value, P-values and F-values to test the null hypotheses. 
Table  6-4: Parametric Tests 
Method t-test Anova F-test 
 t-value P-value F-value P-value 






CAR-Market Model 2.22 0.03 4.90 0.03 
Tobin’s Q 1.74 0.08 3.05 0.08 
It is evident from Table 6.4 that the observed BHAR t-value is significant at 1% 
level of significance. The probability of committing a Type I error when the t-
value is 5.38 is 0.000.  The Anova F-value BHAR results are significant at 1% 
level. The probability of committing a Type I error when the F-value is 27.21 is 
0.000. It is also evident from Table 6.4 that the observed CAR t-value is higher 




than the critical t-value at 5% level of significance. Likewise, the F-value CAR 
results are significant at 5% level.  
It is also evident from the table that the observed Tobin‘s Q t-value is higher than 
the critical t-value at 10% level of significance. In other words, the probability of 
committing a Type I error when the t-value is 1.74 is 0.08.  Likewise, the F-value 
Tobin‘s Q results are significant at 10% level.  
The test results of abnormal returns under the two approaches BHAR and CAR   
show evidence of the abnormal returns to the acquiring firms‘ shareholders in the 
post-acquisition period. Therefore, the results support rejection of the null 
hypotheses at 1% level of significance in the case of the BHAR approach, and a 
5% level of significance in the CAR approach.  
The second null hypothesis of operating performance in the post-acquisition 
period is no greater than the operating performance in the pre-acquisition period. 
The test results which tested the mean of Tobin‘s Q support the rejection of the  
null hypothesis at 10% level of significance.  
Table 6.5 presents non-parametric test results of the 30 Indian corporates involved 
in acquisition events. The set of results presented includes (1) BHAR using the 
matching firm model, (2) CAR-Market Model and (3) Tobin‘s Q.  The table 
summarises the test results of the Wilcoxon/Mann-Whitney test results and P-
values.   




Table  6-5: Non- Parametric Tests 
Method Wilcoxon/Mann-Whitney 
 
 Value Probability 
BHAR – Matching Firm 4.98 0.0000 
CAR-Market Model 2.03 0.0421 
Tobin’s Q 2.35 0.0187 
It is evident from Table 6.5 that the observed BHAR Wilcoxon/Mann-Whitney 
value is higher than the critical Wilcoxon/Mann-Whitney value at 1% level of 
significance.  
It is also evident from Table 6.5 that the observed CAR Wilcoxon/Mann-Whitney 
value is higher than the critical Wilcoxon/Mann-Whitney value at 5% level of 
significance. In other words, the probability of committing a Type I error when 
the Wilcoxon/Mann-Whitney value is 4.98 is 0.0421.   
Therefore, the two tests results under BHAR and CAR approaches support the 
rejection of the first null hypothesis of no abnormal returns to the acquiring firms 
following the acquisition activity in the long period following OFDI-related 
M&As by Indian corporates at 1% level of significance under the BHAR 




approach and 5% under CAR. The test results indicate wealth effects to the 
stockholders in the post-acquisition period. 
It is evident from the results in Table 6.5 that the Tobin‘s Q mean is significant at 
1%. As such, the test results do not support the null hypothesis and therefore the 
study rejects it at 1% level of significance. This indicates performance operating 
improvement in the post-acquisition period. 
6.3.4 Relating to wealth relative and summary performance of the OFDI-
related Indian corporates involved in acquisition activity 
Ritter (1991) proposed a wealth relative model as an alternative to the cumulative 
abnormal returns method. This method implicitly assumes monthly portfolio 
rebalancing and computes a three-year holding period returns. A wealth relative of 
greater than 1 is interpreted as firm‘s security outperforming the control firm; a 
wealth relative of less than 1 indicates firm‘s security underperforming the control 
firm. 
  




Table  6-6: Wealth Relative of the OFDI-related Indian M&A Firms 
S.No Firms Wealth 
Relative 
 Firms Wealth 
Relative 
1 Tata Corus >1 17 VSNL >1 
2 DRL >1 18 Tata Motors >1 
3 Ranbaxy >1 19 Wochardt's < 1 
4 Hindalco >1 20 TCS >1 
5 ISPAT >1 21 Tata Coffee >1 
6 Tata Tea >1 22 Tata Steel >1 
7 Wipro >1 23 Tata - Jaguar >1 
8 Ballarpur >1 24 Tata 
Chemicals 
>1 
9 Opto Circuits >1 25 Videocon >1 
10 United 
Spirits 
>1 26 Lupin-Japan >1 
11 HPCL >1 27 Piralmal 
Healthcare 
>1 
12 M&M-UK < 1 28 Sun Pharma >1 






>1 29 Matrix >1 
14 ONGC-
Sudan 





< 1    
16 Sasken >1    
Table 6.6 summarises the long-term performance of the OFDI related Indian 
corporates involved in acquisition activity. The performance metric used is wealth 
relative. It is evident from Table 6.6 that out of the total sample of 30 OFDI 
related M&As by Indian corporates, the wealth relative of 27 companies showed 
results greater than one, indicating outperformance when compared to the 
benchmarking-control firm. In contrast, the wealth relative result for three 
companies showed less than one, indicating underperformance when compared to 
the benchmarking control firm. When the long-term performance using the wealth 
relative metric is expressed in terms of percentage, the outperformed companies 
comprise 90% of the total size, and underperformed companies comprise 10% of 
the total sample size. 
Table 6.7 presents the summary of long-term performance in terms of positive and 
negative performance of the Indian corporates under the three appraisal models. It 
is evident from the table that under the BHAR approach, out of the total of 30 




companies, 27 companies showed positive performance and three companies 
showed negative performance in terms of abnormal market returns. When 
expressed in percentage, 90% of the 30 Indian companies showed positive results 
while 10% showed negative results. 
Likewise, under the CAR approach, out of the total of 30 OFDI related M&As by 
Indian corporates, 24 companies showed positive performance and 6 companies 
showed negative performance in terms of abnormal market returns.  In terms of 
percentage 80% of the thirty Indian companies showed positive results while 20% 
showed negative results. 
In case of Tobin‘s Q, it is evident from Table 6.7 that of the total of 30 OFDI 
related M&As by Indian corporates, 29 showed positive results and one company 
showed negative results. In terms of percentage, 97% of the total sample showed 
positive results and 3% of the total sample showed negative results. 




BHAR CAR Tobin’s Q 
 Positive Negative Positive Negative Positive Negative 
30 27 3 24 6 29 1 




The changes in the sales, dividends and profit after tax in the post-acquisition 
period over the pre-acquisition period are shown in table 6.8 below. The change in 
growth of sales, dividends and profit after tax is obtained by applying the growth 
formulae as mentioned in the methodology Chapter 4. The figures are expressed 
in percentages. 
Comparing the changes in the performance in the pre- and post- acquisition 
periods 
Table  6-8: Growth (post-pre) in Sales, Dividends and Profit After Tax (PAT) in 
the post-acquisition of the OFDI related Indian corporates involved in 
Acquisitions. 
  Sales (%) Dividends (%) PAT (%) 
  Change  Result Change  Result  Change Result 
1 Tata Steel Corus 66 I 98 I 68 I 
2 DRL 162 I 87 I 221 I 
3 Ranbaxy 12 I 5 I -73 D 
4 Hindalco 74 I 9 I 43 I 
5 ISPAT 62 I  I 47 I 
6 Tata Tea 30 I 48 I 180 I 




7 Wipro 143 I 101 I 117 I 
8 Ballarpur -48 D -36 D -55 D 
9 Opto Circuits 407 I 577 I 692 I 
10 United Spirits 199 I 55 I 134 I 
11 HPCL 88 I -46 D -33 D 
12 M&M-UK 117 I 180 I 175 I 
13 ONGC-Petrobas 52 I 43 I 40 I 
14 ONGC-Sudan 89 I 123 I 95 I 
15 M&M-Germany 116 I 60 I 141 I 
16 VSNL -5 D -39 D -26 D 
17 Tata Motors 68 I 72 I 29 I 
18 Wochardt's 70 I 14 I -234 D 
19 Tata - Jaguar 48 I 37 I 1 I 
20 Tata Chemicals 104 I 62 I 105 I 
21 Videocon 69 I 623 I 358 I 
22 Lupin-Japan 102 I 251 I 254 I 






63 I 67 I 87 I 
24 Tata Coffee 67 I 65 I 8 I 
25 Sun Pharma 117 I 281 I 207 I 
26 Matrix 132 I 46 I -48 D 
27 Tata Steel 90 I 258 I 174 I 
28 United 
Phosphorous 
109 I 180 I 84 I 
29 TCS 308 I 281 I 307 I 
30 Sasken  97 I   194 I 
Note: I – indicates Increase and D – indicates Decrease 
It is evident from Table 6.8 above that the change in the growth of sales, 
dividends and profit after taxes is obvious in the post-acquisition period when 
compared to the pre-acquisition period. However, there are two companies: 
Ballarpur and VSNL at firm-specific level that experienced a decline in sales in 
the post-acquisition period. Likewise, in case of dividends there are three 
companies that experienced decline. They are Ballarpur, HPCL and VSNL. In 
profit after tax there are six companies that showed a decline in the post-
acquisition period and they are Ranbaxy, Ballarpur, HPCL, VSNL, Wochardt‘s 
and Matrix. 
















Sales 7268 10459.61 3.994 0.0002 




915     309.97 2.952 0.0031 
It is evident from Table 6.9 that the change in the post-merger operating 
performance is statistically significant with respect to all three variables used i.e., 
the sales, dividends and profit after tax. All calculated t-values are greater than the 
critical value and are significant at 1% level. In other words the probability of 
committing a Type I error when the sales (post-pre) t- values is 3.99 is 0.0002, 
when dividends (post-pre) t-values is 2.30 is 0.0145 and PAT (post-pre) t-value is 
2.95 is 0.003. The result shows that the OFDI related M&As by the Indian 
corporates lead to change in the operating performance of acquiring companies. 
During the period of the study i.e., 2000-08, the study found a direct correlation 
between the OFDIs by Indian corporates, the Sales, Total Assets, PAT, PBDIT 
and Dividends.  








Sales PAT PBDIT Dividends 
OFDI 1.000      
Total 
Assets 
0.928 1.000     
Sales 0.902 0.976 1.000    
PAT 0.846 0.943 0.989 1.000   
PBDIT 0.859 0.958 0.994 0.996 1.000  
Dividends 0.823 0.913 0.949 0.962 0.953 1.000 
Sources: Financial figures drawn from CMIE data base and OFDI from empirical 
evidence. 
Table 6.10 indicates a correlation between the OFDI flows and performance 
indicators of the Indian corporates involved in the OFDI related acquisitions. The 
results show a direct correlation between the OFDI flows and the performance 
indicators which include: Total assets, Sales, PAT, PBDIT and Dividends. 
The direct positive correlation between the OFDI activity and Total Assets 
indicates the increase in the size of the firm following the OFDI related M&As. 
Likewise, the direct correlation between the total assets and sales indicate that the 
growth in the size of the corporates following OFDI related M&As also resulted 
in increased in sales. Likewise, the positive correlation between sales and the 
PBDIT, PAT and dividends suggests that the increase in sales following the 
growth in the size of the Indian corporates involved in OFDI related M&As 




eventually resulted in increases in PBDIT, PAT and dividends. The correlation 
between sales, total assets, PBDIT, PAT and dividends suggests that the expected 
synergies from the identified drivers behind the OFDI related M&As by Indian 
corporates are working.  
6.4 Conclusions 
Short term perspective 
It is evident from the short-term results presented above that the cumulative 
abnormal results are positive and show evidence of statistical significance at the 
1% level. This indicates that investors remained positive to the news of the OFDI 
related announcements by the Indian corporates. It signals the confidence 
investors have in management. The results of the study do not support the null 
hypothesis and hence, the study rejects the null hypothesis.  
There are positive growth rates in the sales, dividends and profits in the post-
acquisition period when compared to the pre-acquisition period.  The findings of 
the study are significant and show evidence of significantly positive reactions by 
investors to the news of OFDI-related acquisitions by Indian corporates.  The 
experiences and influencing factors in international acquisitions by Indian 
companies are different from those in developed countries. Possible reasons for 
the difference in outcomes are explained in the following chapter.  
However, the firm-specific empirical results did reveal that some corporates did 
relatively well, while others did relatively poorly. These differences in the 




outcomes need explanation. The following chapter gives possible explanations for 
the poor performance of some companies from the short term announcement 
effect and also from the long term performance aspect. 
Long Term Perspective 
The empirical results show evidence of wealth creation to the acquiring firms in 
the post-acquisition period. In other words, there are abnormal stock returns 
created to the stockholders in the long run period following the acquisition 
activity. Under both approaches, the results indicate positive wealth effects to the 
stockholders of the acquiring companies. It is evident that the confidence 
expressed by the stockholders in the short run period following the announcement 
of the OFDI related M&As by Indian corporate is maintained and sustained in the 
long run post acquisition period. The results indicate that the market return 
performance of Indian corporates involved in acquisition activity created value in 
the post-acquisition period. In other words, the performance improvement is 
evident in the post-acquisition period. 
The positive empirical results in the post-acquisition period indicate low risk 
perception of the shareholders towards the Indian corporates involved in OFDI 
related M&As and as such the expected returns of the shareholders are lower than 
the actual firm returns. Hence, the abnormal returns to the Indian firms involved 
in OFDI related M&As in the post-acquisition period. The positive stock market 
performance of the Indian corporates in the post-acquisition period indicates that 
they are able to perform well in the changed institutional environment of the 




global arena.  The empirical results indicate significant growth in the performance 
drivers of sales, dividends and PAT in the post-acquisition period when compared 
to the pre-acquisition period. The chapter that follows will explain the possible 




CHAPTER 7: THEORETICAL EXPLANATION OF 
THE EMPIRICAL FINDINGS AT FIRM-SPECIFIC 
LEVEL 
7.1 Introduction 
In Chapter 6, the short term and long term market reactions to the OFDI related 
M&As were reported. The empirical results showed positive wealth effects to 
stockholders in the short and long-term periods and the empirical results 
supported rejection of the null hypotheses. However, specific firm-level empirical 
findings showed mixed results in the short term. For instance, out of the thirty 
OFDI related M&As by Indian corporates, 11 companies reported negative 
market reactions in the short term following the announcements of OFDI related 
M&As by Indian corporates, and the long term results show three companies 
failed to outperform the benchmarking company. 
The variations in the outcomes, such as why one M&A should receive an initial 
positive market reaction while another adverse market reaction, relate to the 
individual contexts and how the market assesses the changing return and risk 
parameters.  In this chapter a sample of five companies are chosen because of 
their differing outcomes. These cases are examined more closely in terms of 
secondary data released into the market at the time of the proposed M&A. The 
companies are Tata Steel, Hindalco and ONGC-OVL (all of which had negative 
short-term market reactions but positive post-acquisition returns); DRL, which 
had positive results in both the short-term and long-term, more typical of the 




majority of the companies; and finally Wockhardt, which experienced negative 
market reactions in both the short- and long-term.    Commentaries from financial 
analysts and commentators, and media releases from the company concerning a 
mooted M&A may impact investors‘ assessments of the return and risk 
parameters for each company.   
The aim is to illuminate information being released into the market that may have 
influenced investors about the merits of an M&A undertaking. The study will also 
identify the strategies behind OFDI related M&As by Indian corporates. To 
identify the strategies behind OFDI related M&As, the study considers secondary 
data comprising company records, documents, media reports and the regulatory 
policy issues of the Government of India and the Ministry of Trade and 
Commerce reports. The objectives and aims of the corporates relating to their 
strategic decisions are obtained through the vision and mission columns of the 
company annual reports. The general features of Indian OFDI activity are 
summarised in a table towards the end of the chapter. 
7.2 Explanations for differing outcomes 
Case 1: The first case to be examined is the biggest overseas acquisition ever by 
an Indian company. Tata Steel acquired Corus, formerly known as British Steel. 
Corus was three times the size of Tata Steel. Tata Steel was established in India 
under British rule in 1907. Its domestic experience is extensive, and its presence 
in 26 countries also indicates considerable international experience. In spite of the 




vast experience of Tata Steel, the markets reacted adversely following the 
acquisition announcement of Corus. The acquisition followed a bidding contest 
with Brazilian and Russian steel companies. The resulting valuation of $US 12.11 
billion was settled in cash.  Tata‘s debt to equity ratio increased. All this occurred 
at a time when there was a recession and excess capacity in the steel industry.    
Short-term empirical findings: The market reacted adversely to the OFDI 
related acquisition announcement of Corus by Tata Steel. 
It is evident from Table 6.2 of Chapter 6 of this study that Tata Steel‘s share price 
dropped following the acquisition announcement. This indicates that the market 
took a short-term view of the economic consequences.  
Reasons: The possible reasons
22
 for adverse market reactions following Tata‘s 
acquisition announcement of Corus include:  
Deal settlement and financial risk: Tata Steel acquired the Anglo Dutch steel 
producer Corus Group Plc (Corus) for US$ 12.11 billion (€ 8.5 billion). After 
acquiring Corus, Tata Steel emerged as the fifth largest steel producer in the world 
and second largest in Europe (Business line, 2
nd
 Feb, 2007). According to S. 
                                                 
22
 Based on secondary information 
 




Mukherji, Managing Director, ICICI Securities, (February 2007)
23
, this deal was 
referred as the first milestone for India Inc, for crossing the $10 billion mark. It 
was a landmark deal since an Indian company had taken over an international 
company which was three times its size. The deal was settled in cash which is 
different from mature markets where M&A transactions are typically settled at 
least partially through equity (see Chapter 4). However, the size of acquisition and 
the potential cash outflow of about $12 billion had an adverse impact on its 
financial risk profile (as per S&P reports presented below).  This deal resulted in 
an increase of 2.5:1 debt-equity ratio, which is much higher than the current 
industry average of 1:1 (Business line, 2007). 
Standard and Poor‘s Rating Services issued warnings following Tata Steel's 
announcement of its non-binding offer to acquire 100 per cent equity in Corus 
Group. It is observed that the Tata Steel had two negative effects from the media 
reports of Standard & Poor's Ratings Services. First, Tata Steel had been put on 
Credit Watch
24
   with negative implications and second, S&P also placed its 
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 Tata Win Booster for Corporate India's Confidence," The Economic Times, February 
01, 2007. 
24
   Credit watch is a notice from a credit rating agency to a bond issuer that a negative 
factor has arisen in the agency's review of the issuer's credit rating. If the issuer does not 
take steps to explain or alleviate the factor, the credit watch may be the first step toward a 
reduction in the issuer's rating. For example, a credit rating agency may discover a 
dramatic drop in an issuer's liquidity ratio, which increases the likelihood of default on a 
debt. It would then send a credit watch to the issuer. Alternatively, the credit watch is also 
re-evaluation of the credit quality of a firm's debt obligations by a rating agency. Being 
the object of a credit watch generally indicates the credit quality of a firm's debt has 
deteriorated and may be downgraded.  






   foreign currency rating on the steel company's senior unsecured bank 
loans of $750 million and $500 million on Credit Watch with negative 
implications. Earlier, the company enjoyed a BBB long-term corporate credit 
rating by S&P. 
Acquisition price: According to Business Line (2007), Tata Steel  had first 
offered to pay 455 pence a share, to close the deal at US$ 7.6 billion on October 
17, 2006, Companhia Siderurgica Nacional's (CSN) the Brazilian steel maker then 
offered 475 pence a share on November 17, 2006. Finally, an auction
26
 was 
initiated on January 31, 2007, and after nine rounds of bidding, Tata Steel could 
finally clinch the deal by out-bidding Companhia Siderurgica Nacional's (CSN) 
final offer of 603 pence a share by offering 608 pence  (Business Line, 2006). The 
                                                                                                                                     
(source: http://financial dictionary.thefreedictionary.com/Credit+Watch). 
25
 According to Standard and Poor credit rating agency definition BBB refers to adequate 
capacity of a firm (borrowing) to meet financial commitments, but more subject to 
adverse economic conditions.  
(source: ttp://www.standardandpoors.com/ratings/definitions). 
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 Since Tata Steel and CSN could not declare their final offer by January 31, 2007, an 
auction had to be initiated by The Takeover Panel which oversees mergers and 









competition among the bidders increased the bidding price to almost 34% higher 
than Tata‘s first bid of 455 pence per share  
Performance issues: Though the potential benefits of the Corus deal were widely 
appreciated, there were also doubts about the outcome and effects on Tata Steel's 
performance. For instance, Corus' EBIDTA (earnings before interest, tax, 
depreciation and amortization), which stood at 8%, was much lower than that of 
Tata Steel‘s 30% in the financial year 2006-0727.   
Moreover, there were concerns expressed about capacity underutilisation. There 
were media reports saying 40% of Corus‘ 20 million tonnes capacity was idle in 
the first six months of 2007 and job losses close to 10,000 were expected 
(Business Line, 2007).  Consequently, the stockholders might have reacted 
negatively as the idle capacity indicated a weak network distribution channel and 
the declining market share of Corus.  
The share market‘s focus on short term results may have coloured the initial 
reaction of the market to the proposed takeover. Tata Steel‘s management took a 
long-term strategic view, possibly reflecting an asymmetric understanding of 
available information between management and stockholders. Given the long 
industry experience of Tata Steel‘s management, they might have put a greater 









weight on long-term synergies that could be drawn from acquiring Corus. 
Stockholders might have been more influenced by information expressing short-
term concerns released from the secondary sources. This explains the variations in 
market reactions in the short-term and mid-term.  This observation is in line with 
the prior findings [Hackbarth and Erwan (2006), and Morellec and Zhdanov 
(2005)]. 
Long term empirical findings: Market remained positive in the post-
acquisition period. 
The short-term adverse results in the case of stockholders were understandable 
given the circumstances, whereas Tata‘s view was long term. Tata Steel had 
foreseen a shortage of steel supply in long term to meet global demand. It wanted 
to take advantage of the opportunities available.  
After acquiring Corus, Tata gained access to an established brand name, superior 
technology, and extensive networks of distributors in western markets. The 
empirical findings showing positive performance in the post-acquisition period 
indicating Tata-Corus Steel had obtained the expected synergies by making 
primary metals in markets closer to raw materials and establishing finishing 
(value-adding) facilities in the end-user markets (Athukorala, 2009). In other 
words, the acquisition of Corus enabled Tata to link their Firm Specific 
Advantages (FSA) such as labour intensive production, access to raw materials, 
accumulated managerial skills coupled with the advantages of access to the high 




margin markets and high technology in the West through Corus. It meant the 
company could leverage in western markets the cost advantage of operating from 
India, and differentiate in Asian markets due to better technology from Corus. 
These findings are in line with the asset-exploitation perspective of Makino, Lau 
and Yeh (2002) (details in Chapter 3). This acquisition enabled Tata to acquire 
competitive advantage in terms of local presence in high growth markets and to 
compete with other international players with synergies drawn from cost-
efficiency due to its de-integrated operations. It could leverage the cost 
advantages in mature markets. In emerging markets it had the advantage of 
product differentiation occurring due to superior technology. This is in line with 
the OLI theory (in Chapter 3). 
This acquisition demonstrates the competitive advantage to Tata Steel in making 
long-term strategic decisions, envisioning the synergies, and being prepared to 
face negative market reactions in the short term.   
For instance, the chairman of Tata Steel Ratan Tata said at the company‘s 2009 
Annual General meeting in response to criticism of the timing of the Corus 
acquisition: ―You cannot gauge the life of a corporate in one or two years. I hope 
we are able to look back over time and say that we took the right decision.‖ 
(Business Line, 28 August, 2009, ePaper). 
Tata Steel synergised its operations in the long term by acquiring Corus. It 
obtained competitive advantage in the form of technology, brand, distribution 




networking and cost efficiency through the acquisition. Therefore, the firm-
specific advantages of Tata-Corus Steel are evident and in line with the prior 
findings of Lall (1986) and Kumar (1998); Hoesel (1999) and Chen and Chen 
(1998). 
Case 2: Hindalco Industries Limited, a flagship company of the Aditya Birla 
Group, was established in 1958. It acquired a 100% stake of Novelis for US $6 
billion in 2007.  Novalis was a large loss-making entity. In settling the acquisition, 
Hindalco incurred a huge level of debt. There are similarities with the previous 
case of Tata Steel.  The achievement of long-term strategic benefits was 
dependent on the company managing to survive in the short-term. The share 
market did not share management‘s confidence for survival and long-term success.  
Short term empirical findings: Market reacted adversely in the short term.  
Deal settlement and financial risk: The mountain of debt that Hindalco inherited 
with Novelis ($2.4 billion), in addition to the huge debt obtained to settle the 
acquisition transaction, weighed on the Indian company. The net worth of Novelis 
was $322 million while its debt was $2.33 billion and the  debt-equity ratio was 
7:2 (Business line, 2009). Consequently, the market reacted cautiously and the 
market share price fell following the acquisition. 
Performance issues: The secondary information about Novelis being a loss-
making entity might also have influenced the negative stock market reactions 
following the acquisition announcement. The cost inefficiencies occurring due to 




fixed term contracts with Novelis‘ suppliers had negative implications. The losses 
incurred by Novelis were attributed to long-term contracts it had entered into; 
especially the fixed price contracts with top clients, which accounted for over 40% 
of sales. In order to attract more business from soft drink manufacturers, Novelis 
promised four customers not to increase product prices even if raw material prices 
went up beyond a point
28
.  A few months after Novelis signed those contracts, raw 
material prices shot up 39%. Novelis was forced to sell its products at lower 
prices than raw material costs to these four customers. Two of the four customers  
were Coca Cola and General Motors which accounted for 20% of Novelis‘s $9 
billion revenue. The decision not to increase product price for the four major 
customers led to losses of $350 million in 2006 (B. Prasad, Nov 2007). As the 
input costs started increasing in 2006, even as realisations remained fixed, the 
company‘s losses increased.  
It is understood from theory that the emerging markets can draw synergies when 
the performance (Tobin‘s Q) of the target firm is higher than the bidding firm. So 
the news of Novelis as a loss making entity
29
 at the time of acquisition might have 
discouraged the stockholders from being positive. The stockholders were 
therefore not convinced that Hindalco would deliver value by acquiring Novelis 
and hence, reacted negatively.  
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 See Prasad, Nov 2007. 
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Information asymmetry among the analyst knowledge: Variations in market 
reactions will arise due to information asymmetries among analysts. Upon the 
announcement of Hindalco‘s acquisition of Novelis, brokerage houses reacted in a 
variety of ways: Asit Mehta Intermediates and UBS Investment Research gave a 
―Buy‖ recommendation; IL&FS Investmart gave an ―Accumulate‖ 
recommendation; SSKI gave a ―Neutral‖ recommendation; Edelweiss Capital 
gave a ―Reduce‖ recommendation; Citigroup and Merrill Lynch gave a ―Sell‖ 
recommendation.  
According to Vishwanath (2010) the Indian market reacted negatively to the 
acquisition as investors considered the deal to be overpriced and the acquisition 
was expected to be a drain on the profitability of Hindalco due to the high 
leverage of Novelis. Besides, Novelis being a loss making company also worked 
against Hindalco‘s prices. Stock price of Novelis, on the other hand, soared 15% 
on the New York Stock Exchange following the news of the proposed acquisition.  
This explanation is in line with prior findings. Clement (1999) finds that financial 
analyst forecast accuracy is associated with variables that proxy for ability (i.e., 
experience), extent of resources available to the analyst (i.e., broker size), and the 
complexity of the task (i.e., number of firms and industries followed by the 
analyst). Variation in these factors can lead to information asymmetries among 
analysts, which in turn causes some analysts‘ reports to be more valuable to 
investors than others. 




Asymmetric information between the management and the stockholders:. 
Given the vast experience, Hindalco might have well understood the synergies it 
could draw by acquiring Novelis (though it was a loss making company). The 
losses of Novelis were incurred due to sudden market downturn and fixed-term 
price contracts, not due to inefficiencies in operations. However, the stockholders 
might have reacted to short-term concerns expressed in secondary sources of 
information, resulting in stock price declines following the announcement. 
Long term empirical findings: Market remained positive in the post-
acquisition period. 
Results: 
Though the markets reacted adversely following the acquisition announcement of 
Novelis, they corrected and showed positive results in the long term period i.e., in 
the post-Novelis acquisition period. Hence, this is a case of showing negative 
value effect in the short run, but positive wealth relative in the long run. This 
acquisition was a good strategic move for Hindalco.  
The competitive advantage acquired through vast domestic experience enabled 
Hindalco to be a low cost and integrated producer of aluminium. Hindalco 
emerged as a global player in the aluminium market, with a presence in countries 
on five continents (North and South America, Europe, Australia and Asia). Its 
scale of operations increased after acquiring Novelis which is ten times the size of 
Hindalco. The combination of Hindalco and Novelis is a case of bringing together 
a global integrated aluminium producer with low-cost alumina and aluminium 




production facilities combined with high-end aluminium rolled product 
capabilities. Hindalco is able to ship primary aluminium from India and make 
value-added products in the high-end market place.  The complementary expertise 
of both these companies is showing results through performance in the post-
acquisition period. This is in line with the prior findings (Lahovnik & Malenkovic, 
2011).  
The competitive advantage to Hindalco is also evident in the strategy it designed 
to decrease its debt-burden. The bridge loan taken to finance the Novelis 
acquisition was totally paid through rights issue
30
 (Business Line, Friday, 12, 
April, 2009). This reduced the interest burden to Hindalco and the fixed price 
contractual obligations of Novelis ended on January 1, 2010. (Business Line, 
Friday, 12 April, 2009).  
The empirical findings show positive operating performance in terms of growth in 
sales, free cash flows (dividends) and profit after taxes. However, in 2007-08, 
Hindalco saw a manifold expansion in its consolidated sales, from Rs 191 crore to 
Rs 600 crore (10 million = 1 crore), attributable to the acquisition of Novelis 
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(Source: Business Line, Sunday, July 19, 2009, ePaper). The post-performance 
results indicate that the combination of the two firms is potentially more valuable 
than the sum of their pre-acquisition (Novelis, a loss making unit, and Hindalco a 
profit making unit) and this is in line with Singh and Montgomery (1987). It is 
evident from Hindalco‘s acquisition that the market took a short-term view of the 
existing conditions and hence the negative results, but the long-term post-
acquisition performance shows wealth relative greater than one. 
Case 3: ONGC-OVL acquired a 15% stake of Petrobas-Brazilia. The settlement 
amount was USD $ 1400 million. ONGC was established in 1956 to make India 
energy-sufficient. Over the years, the company has discovered six of the seven 
producing basins in India and added 6.4 billion tonnes of oil and gas reserves. 
Today, according to Platts Top 250 Global Energy Ranking, ONGC is the number 
one exploration and production company in the world. The company aims to 
explore newer avenues for a greener planet, excel in its exploratory endeavours 
and evolve into a complete energy solution provider
31
.  
According to Saravanan (2006), in the case of ONGC, domestic competition grew 
after liberalisation policies implemented by the Indian Government in 1991. The 
Government prepared a plan called ―India Hydrocarbon Vision 2025‖ and 
suggested ONGC go global. The competition in domestic business and the hike in 
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oil prices motivated ONGC to create ONGC Videsh Ltd (OVL) for overseas 
operations. By 2006, ONGC was present in 14 countries and had 24 on-going 
projects. 
The market reacted negatively in the short-term. Explanations relate mainly to 
government ownership and corporate governance issues. 
Short-term empirical findings: Market reacted adversely in the short term.  
Reasons: The following are the possible reasons for negative reactions from the 
stock markets following the news of ONGC‘s acquisition of Petrobas- Brazil. 
Corporate governance
32
 model and minority interest: The issues raised by the 
media in connection to the minority shareholders‘ interest might have influenced 
the stock markets to react negatively. The Government of India holds 74.14% of 
shares. Government companies hold 10.09% shares and the remaining 15% are 
held by the general public and others.  
There were secondary reports
33
 saying the minority interests were not well 
protected. Goldman Sachs produced a report that pointed out various corporate 
governance issues with the company. The report raised issues like minority 
shareholders of ONGC being short-changed as the government had forced a 
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subsidy on the firm, as with other oil and gas firms, which was tantamount to the 
government (also its promoter) taking out cash from the firm.  Goldman Sachs 




As of March 2010, the board had 13 members comprising seven functional 
directors (including the chairman & managing director (CMD)) and six non-
executive directors (comprising two part-time official nominee directors and four 
part-time non-official directors) nominated by the Government of India. It is 
evident from the board mix that there is no international representation on the 
board despite ONGC going global. The board mix is local and its operations are 
international, and this might not be an effective balance. This is consistent with 
the World Bank report. For instance, ONGC does not seem to attract as large a 
proportion of FDI as its competitors in India. This may reflect the views about 
corporate governance, strategy, behaviour or other management attributes (World 
Bank Report, 2011). 
One reason for the negative reaction from the stock markets could be that 
ONGC‘s core expertise is in production of shallow water and onshore fields. The 
joint venture of BC-10 with Brazil involves exploration and production in deep 
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waters which is a divergence from India‘s existing core expertise. The fact that 
ONGC is a new comer in the international oil and gas arena means it faces 
considerable learning curve costs and risks. 
Subsidy burden  
From an international perspective, it has been observed that ONGC bears the 
largest petroleum product subsidies burden among national owned countries 
which include: PDVSA, Venezuela, PEMEX, Mexico, Petrobas, Brazil, Petro, 
China, Petronas, Malysia, Petro, South Africa, PTT Thailand, Sonatrach, Algeria, 
Statoil Norway (Silvana, Brandon, & Noora, 2011).  
Bureaucracy blocks growth strategies:  The delays caused in making decisions 
due to bureaucratic intervention hinder ONGC‘s strategy in deal approval. The 
Indian Cabinet famously blocked its bid for Nigeria's Akpo field in late 2005. 
China offers a simpler process: Sinopec's parallel takeover of Syria producer 
Tanganyika Oil required an extension to secure Beijing's approval, but advanced 
without any of the public fuss that surrounded ONGC's acquisition. (EC 
Apr.25,p6). 
35
Norwegian oil major Statoil and Brazil's Petrobras have quit Oil and Natural Gas 
Corporation's (ONGC‘s) K-G basin gas block over government delays in 
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approving their participation in the deep water acreage. ONGC will now have to 
do it alone and shoulder added risks in developing the acreage K-G DWN-98/2 
which is estimated to have in-place gas reserves of 14 trillion cubic feet. The 
state-owned firm does not have the production technology to produce gas from 
such water depth in the geologically hostile K-G basin. 
 ONGC chairman and managing director R S Sharma wrote to the oil secretary 
saying red tape was making international oil majors apprehensive over sharing 
exploration risks in acreages. ONGC in 2007 had farmed out 15% interest in the 
block to Petrobras and 10% to Norsk Hydro (now Statoil Hydro). "This was done 
by ONGC as a part of its strategy to capitalise on the technological experience of 
international companies of repute in the development of deep water discoveries,‖ 
Sharma wrote. 
 The block now has 10 discoveries and appraisal drilling is now required to be 
carried out to assess the potential before finalising development of gas fields.  
―Although the farm out agreements with Petrobras and Statoil were signed in 
August/September, 2007, Joint Operating Agreement (JOA) could not be signed 
with both these companies, initially, due to 9 months taken in obtaining approval 
on assignment of participating interest, and then one year in signing amendment 
to the Production Sharing Contract (PSC) from various parties, including the 
government," he wrote. 




Sharma also pointed out delays in other blocks. In the case of deep water block 
CY-DWN-2001/1 in the Cauvery basin, amendment to the PSC was duly signed 
by ONGC, Oil India and Petrobras and was submitted to the Indian Government 
for signing in January 2009. "The same is yet to be signed by the government," he 
said.  "It would kindly be appreciated that such delays lead to doubts and 
uncertainties," he wrote. "International oil companies have been expressing 
anxieties and apprehensions for such delays."  Withdrawal by the majors without 
participating in any activity in the block is bound to send ripples in the industry 
and jeopardise the initial gains of India in the NELP era as an E & P destination. 
Sharma also said Petrobras quit the block because of uncertainties about gas 
pricing and tax holidays.  "ONGC is making all needed efforts to adjust to the 
competitive business environment and level playing format. But, fact remains that 
it is very difficult to maintain business leadership with such deterrents.  In fact, 
the element of delay in decision/ approvals, including rig moratorium, has 
factored in some amount of uncertainty in steering drilling activities in large 
number of deep water blocks operated by ONGC," he added(EC Apr.25,p6). . 
According to World Bank Report (2011), India‘s governance indicators are above 
the regional averages and have been fairly stable over the period 2004-2008. But 
regulatory quality and control of corruption remain key concerns. 
Long term empirical findings show favourable results 




With high economic growth rates, India is a significant consumer of energy 
resources. But it lacks sufficient domestic resources and is a net importer of oil 
and natural gas. A central element of India‘s foreign affairs agenda is ‗energy 
diplomacy‘, which relates to the need to secure energy suppliers to meet rapidly 
growing industrial and consumer demand. The petroleum sector is dominated by 
SOEs, and reforms to reduce state control have been slow (World Bank Report, 
2010 
The ONGC‘s strategy to enhance domestic production and to find equity oil 
abroad helped to stabilise its oil and gas reserves and production. The ONGC‘s 
core expertise is in the production of shallow water and onshore fields (World 
Bank Report, 2011). Hence, the ONGC had to go overseas to ensure that a stable 
and secure supply of resources is available to fuel the country‘s energy-intensive 
growth. This has been the primary motivation behind overseas acquisitions by Oil 
& Natural Gas. This is in line with prior findings of Dunning (1998) (1981) and 
Homburg and Bucerius (2005).  
The competitive managerial advantages accrued to ONGC from its vast 
experience are evident in the strategy it adopted in relation to overseas ventures. 
For instance, ONGC-OVL had set a target of producing 60 million metric tonnes 
per annum (MMTPA) in 2025, but its output in 2006 was only 6.34 MMTPA. Its 
strategy for expansion was based on three entry methods - (a) wholly owned 
projects acquired during bidding of oil blocks in different countries, (b) 
production sharing contracts and (c) participation interests. It had established 




presence in major oil producing countries, including Russia, Qatar, Libya, Iraq 
and Iran. Even then, the output from major projects was insufficient to support 
India‘s crude requirements. To overcome the limitations, OVL had initiated 
expansion through acquisition of new projects during 2006 (Source: Business 
Line, Saturday, January 20, 2009, ePaper).  
It is evident that the BC-10, Brazil is showing results. According to CMD-ONGC 
(2010)
36
, the growth vehicle of ONGC Videsh Limited (OVL) with 40 projects in 
15 countries sourced 8.87 million tonne oil equivalent MTOE of oil and gas in 
FY‘10; the highest-ever. The BC-10 in Brazil, where OVL has 15% participating 
interest, began production on 12th July, 2009 and is currently producing 72,500 
bopd. International production accounts for about 14% of total production. 
Operates in 43% of its international projects and is a joint operator in an 
additional 12 per cent. Currently, has international production in Sudan, Vietnam, 
Syria, Russia, Columbia,Venezuela, RB; and Brazil and exploration projects in 
Myanmar, Egypt, and Iran.  
ONGC, the country‘s biggest oil explorer by sales and also the biggest Indian firm 
in terms of consolidated profits, has said that it acquired 43 overseas oil and gas 
land assets over the last six years.  ONGC Videsh has been acquiring one asset 
every one and half months over the last six years.  The state-run oil and gas major 
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ONGC has beaten the likes of Tatas, Birlas, and Mahindras, among other private 
business groups, in striking overseas acquisitions (Economic, 9th March, 2009). 
The deals were struck through its overseas arm ONGC Videsh Ltd (OVL). 
Compare this to OVL having just one such property in 2003. This translates into 
an average of seven deals a year, or OVL acquiring one asset every one and half 
months over the last six years. 
 According to an ONGC statement, "Investments in some of the properties have 
been paid back much before the evaluated payback period."  The contribution of 
overseas production to total production of ONGC group has moved up from 7.23% 
in 2002-2003 to 15.42% in 2007-08. ONGC has added 255.01 MTOE of reserves 
through overseas acquisition since FY04.  The PSU oil and gas major has 
compared its performance with global peers: ONGC's average lifting cost (2002-
06) is $4.83/barrel oil equivalent (Goodstein, et al.) as against the global peers 
average of $5.37/boe and ONGC's average finding cost (2002-06) is $2.29/boe as 
against the global peers average of $3.05/boe (Dutta & Jog, 2009). 
The concerns expressed by the secondary reports (Goldman Sachs) regarding the 
interests of minority shareholders interest were properly addressed by ONGC 
through its corporate governance practices in the long term. For instance, 
according to A.K.Hazarika, CMD - ONGC (2011), ―good corporate governance 




has been the focus area of the company.‖. ONGC was conferred ‗Maharatna‖37 
status by the President of India in April, 2011, and another significant 
achievement has been the recognition by the Transparency International. As per 
the ―Promoting Revenue Transparency (PRT) Report 2011‖ by Transparency 
International and Revenue Watch, ONGC occupies the top rank among 44 global 
oil and gas companies in the world as far as organizational disclosure practices are 
concerned (Annual Report, 2011).  
It is evident from the cases of ONGC, Tata steel and Hindalco that their focus was 
on long-term prospects and not on the short term. It is further observed that these 
companies‘ stocks performed poorly following the announcement of OFDI related 
M&As, but showed positive results in the long run. This reflects the ownership 
advantages to the Indian corporates in managerial decision making skills which 
has been acquired through their vast proven experience.  The preparedness of 
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facing the short-run downturns in the stock market for better and sustainable 
results in the long term manifests their confidence. This indicates that the study of 
short-term effects cannot capture the full effect of the M&As. Hence, the long-run 
studies are significant to look into the consequences of the M&As. 
Case 4: DRL Indian Pharmaceutical Company acquired Betapharm, the fourth 
largest generic pharmaceutical company in Germany, in February 2006, with 100% 
stake. The bid price was US$ 570 million. The M&A transaction was settled 
through cash payment. The acquisition was hailed as the biggest overseas 
acquisition made by an Indian pharmaceutical company. The synergies from the 
acquisition were expected to benefit both DRL and Betapharm according to Satish 
Reddy, Chief Operating Officer at Dr. Reddy's Laboratories
38
(DRL). 
The keystone for acquisition was DRL‘s past experience, strong track record and 
its international profile.  Dr. Reddy's Laboratories is India's leading 
pharmaceutical company with presence in over 100 countries. DRL manufactures 
a range of products such as active pharmaceutical ingredients, generic and 
branded finished dosages, speciality pharmaceuticals, and biopharmaceuticals 
(The Financial Express, Friday, February 17, 2006). 
Unlike the previous cases featured in this chapter, the market‘s initial reaction to a 
takeover was positive and the share price also improved over the longer term.  
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Short term empirical findings: Market reacted positively to the OFDI related 
acquisition announcement of Betapharm by DRL. 
Performance issues:  
Betapharm - a profitable unit: At the time of acquisition the operating 
performance of Betapharm was highly profitable and showed double-digit 
operating profit margins
39
. The stock markets might have been convinced with the 
performance of Betapharm and believed that the acquisition would add value to 
their stocks in future. According to organisation theory of asset exploration and 
prior findings (in Chapter 3) companies in emerging markets acquire overseas 
target companies in order to acquire new technological capabilities so that they 
can augment their existing potential skills and be more competitive in 
international markets. This is possible when the target company is superior in 
technology and performance. Hence, the markets reacted positively to the 
announcement of Betapharm‘s acquisition by DRL.  
History of international performance and acquisitions: The competitive 
advantage acquired through managerial and professional experience is evident in 
the case of DRL. Within a year of its inception, DRL became the first Indian 
company to export active pharmaceutical ingredients to Europe. In 1987, Dr. 
Reddy's obtained its first USFDA approval for Ibuprofen API and started its 
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formulations operations. In 1988, Dr. Reddy's acquired Benzex Laboratories Pvt 
Limited to expand its Bulk Actives business. In 1990, Dr. Reddy's entered new 
territory when, for the first time in India, it exported Norfloxacin and 
Ciprofloxacin to Europe and the Far East. In 1993, Dr. Reddy's Research 
Foundation was established and the company started its drug discovery 
programme. In 1994, Dr. Reddy launched a GDR issue of US$ 48 million. In 
1995, the company set up a joint venture in Russia. In 1997, Dr. Reddy's became 
the first Indian pharmaceutical company to out-license an original molecule when 
it licensed anti-diabetic molecule, DRF 2593 (Balaglitazone) to Novo Nordisk. In 
1998, Dr. Reddy's licensed anti-diabetic molecule, DRF 2725 (Ragaglitazar) to 
Novo Nordisk. In 1999, the company acquired American Remedies Limited, a 
pharmaceutical company based in India. In 2000, DRL became the first Asia 
Pacific pharmaceutical company outside Japan to be listed on the New York Stock 
Exchange (Kale.D, 2010).  
Information symmetry: The media reports and the analysts‘ views expressed 
before acquisition were positive. Likewise, the media was effective in releasing 
news relating to the performance of DRL in the post-acquisition period. Therefore, 
the information released through the media was positive and the stock market 
reacted positively to the announcement of DRL acquisition of Betapharm.  
Long term empirical findings: Market remained positive in the post-
acquisition period. 




DRL‘s vice chairman and CEO G V Prasad said, ―We strongly believe that this 
strategic investment will generate substantial opportunities for long-term value 
creation for both the companies.‖ (The Financial Express, Friday, February 17, 
2006). The acquisition scored high on synergies. The vice-chairman of DRL 
further said that the front-end presence of Betapharm‘s in German market 
complements DRL‘s domestic manufacturing advantage as well as its pipeline of 
generic and innovative products. For DRL, it meant ready access to the German 
generics business - the second-largest generic market in the world after the US. 
Added to that, the deal was also a good diversifier as DRL‘s US generics business 
was then under pressure. By the acquisition of Betapharm, DRL was able to 
expand its presence in the European market. Betapharm markets high quality 
generic drugs and has a strong track record of successful product launches. With a 
current portfolio of 145 marketed products, the company is one of the fastest 
growing generics companies in Germany. This acquisition strategy enabled DRL 
to gain an entry platform for the European generics markets and achieve a 
significant scale in the global market. The acquired firm is in turn expected to 
leverage DRL‘s product development and marketing infrastructure to achieve 
further international growth and expansion. This acquisition also includes a 
research centre which focuses on applied health management. 
G V Prasad explained the rationale for the Betapharm acquisition: ―Betapharm 
has contributed 20% of our revenues. German market is more challenging as even 
the government wants to decrease prices of generics. But it is different from the 




US. Branded generics have a longer lifecycle and price realisation is better. So it 
is good market to be in (Kale.D, 2010).  
Therefore, the identified driver behind DRL‘s acquisition of Betapharm is not to 
exploit existing competitive advantage, but to realise and augment potential 
competitive advantage. It is evident from prior findings in Chapter 3 that the 
Indian corporates tend to invest in mature markets in order to seek superior 
technology and other resources which they lack in their domestic markets. This is 
referred to as asset exploration strategy. This strategy will push them up the value-
chain. This strategy is appropriate for those corporates who have the firm-specific 
advantage with the similar technology (though not as superior as the high growth 
market). This strategy will make the Indian corporates compatible to seek and 
upgrade the superior skills. DRL could augment its existing potentialities by 
acquiring Betapharm. It is evident from Table 2.3 that DRL went global and 
invested in the US just seven years after its inception. This indicates the 
technology fitness of the company. It is evident from the empirical findings that 
DRL had positive stock market results in the short and long runs. The investors 
expressed confidence by remaining positive in the stock market in the short-term 
following the acquisition announcement of Betapharm and also in the post-
acquisition period. The empirical results also demonstrate the absorptive capacity 
of DRL. 
DRL‘s approach is in line with the  views of Mathews (2006), that firms from 
developing countries invest abroad to develop linkages with the world market in 




order to leverage strategic resources that in turn promote learning within the firm.  
In other words, firms from developing countries may use outward foreign direct 
investment not as a means of exploiting existing competitive advantage, but as a 
means of realising and augmenting potential competitive advantage. Therefore, 
the information released through the media was positive and the stock market 
reacted positively to the announcement of DRL‘s acquisition of Betapharm.  
Likewise, the on-going corporate news about DRL‘s performance and increased 
earnings following the acquisition of Betapharm had given positive signals. 
Coupled with the performance and growth in sales, PAT and dividends, DRL‘s 
stock market remained positive. 
Case 5: Wockhardt 
This is the case of Wockhardt acquisition of 100% stake of Negma Laboratories 
in France for US$ 265 million.  
Short term empirical findings: Market reacted adversely in the short term.  
Performance issues:  
Product diversification: The market might have reacted negatively because of 
the product diversification strategy of Wockhardt. According to Kale D (2010), 
Wockhardt has diversified into other businesses overtime. Currently, Wockhardt‘s 
product portfolio includes pharmaceuticals (bulk drugs and formulations), medical 
nutrition, Agri-sciences and hospitals. This diversified portfolio of products also 
makes the position of Wockhardt quite different from that of DRL and Ranbaxy. 




As with the prior findings, the companies may fail to add value when they drift 
from their core business.  
Business Strategy and Domestic Experience: It is evident from Table 2.2 of 
Chapter 2 that it is established in 1977 and in 1997 it had a joint venture in 
Botswana. It had taken 20 years from its inception to go overseas. This indicates 
that Wockhardt‘s business strategy to go overseas to expand its markets was slow 
when compared to other companies in the same sector. For instance, its 
counterpart DRL could internationalise within four years of its inception (evident 
in the above case). This indicates Wockhardt‘s low competitive advantages 
acquired through domestic experience. Hence, the stock markets might have not 
been convinced about the overseas acquisition of Negma Laboratories announced 
by Wockhardt. 
Absorptive Capacity: Wockhardt‘s first joint venture overseas in 1997 with 
Botswana before it spread its operations to UK in 2002 indicates (as per prior 
findings) that it did not possess superior technology and hence, invested in 
Botswana. This is in line with prior studies ((Makino, Lau and Yeh, 2002). As per 
the international organisation theory and prior findings it is understood corporates 
that invest in developed countries tend to possess superior technology and have 
absorptive capacity
40
.  This might have been one of the reasons for the negative 
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reactions from the stock markets following the announcement of Negma‘s 
acquisition by Wockhardt.   
Long term empirical findings: Under performed in the post-acquisition 
period. 
It is evident from the long term results (wealth relative measure and CAR) that 
Wockhardt did not create wealth for its stockholders. The empirical results 
indicate that Wockhardt is the only company in the pharmaceutical sector with 
negative CAR in the short term and long term. The possible explanations can be 
drawn from the OLI theory.  These empirical results lead to the question: Why did 
Wockhardt  receive a negative stock market reaction when it acquired Negma 
Laboratories from France while DRL received a positive reaction when it acquired 
Betapharm from Germany? According to Kale. D (2010), Wockhardt was started 
by the Khorakiwala family in 1959 as a small pharmaceutical distribution and 
selling entity. The company set up its first formulation plant in 1977 and soon 
established a bulk drug plant in 1983. In particular, the existence of a thriving 
hospital business makes it potentially possible for the company to be a fully 
integrated company, undertaking clinical trials and manufacturing drugs. The 
                                                                                                                                     
Developed Countries (DC), than those firms that do not possess such advantages (who 
tend to prefer investing in less developed countries).. Besides, for an asset-seeking FDI to 
occur in a developed country, the newly industrialised enterprises (Markides & Oyon) 
firms should possess related technological capabilities that are advanced enough to absorb 
the superior technological capabilities owned by the source firms in the DC (Makino, Lau 
and Yeh, 2002). 




company was privately held and listed on the Mumbai Stock Exchange in 1992 
and followed that with listings in Luxemburg in 1994 and the US in 2003. It is 
evident from Table 2.3 in Chapter 2, that DRL and Wockhardt  share some 
similarities: First, their host country is in Europe and second, they are in the 
pharmaceutical sector. In spite of the similarities, why the variations in outcomes?   
A possible explanation is that the variations occurred because of absorptive 
capacity, difference in the shareholding pattern and product diversification 
strategy. It is evident that though DRL was a late-comer compared to Wockhardt  
in the domestic market, it was however, the first company to invest in a mature 
market. Therefore, the markets might have considered the absorptive capacity as 
an important indicator for the future success for DRL and Wockhardt .  
The shareholding pattern
41
 of Wockhardt suggests 73.64% of shares were held by 
promoters and the remaining 26.36% held by financial institutions and the general 
public. On the contrary, DRL shareholding pattern suggests that 25.62% of the 
total shares were held by promoters and the remaining by financial institutions 
and the general public. The concentration of majority shares by the promoters 
might hinder them when making strategic decisions because of risk-aversion 
motive. For instance, prior findings indicate that concentrated shareholding may 
create entrenchment effects in addition to incentives effects (McConnell & 
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Servaes, 1990); (Mikkelson & Partch, 1989); (Morck, Shleifer, & Vishny, 1988) 
and, instead of imposing an efficient monitoring and control on managerial 
discretion, the large-block shareholders may produce their own set of agency costs 
(Roe, 1990).  
The markets might have considered the absorptive capacity as an important 
indicator for the future success for DRL and Wockhardt. Likewise, as with the 
prior findings, corporates involved in diversified product mix did not deliver value 
when compared to the non-conglomerates. Hence, the variations in outcomes.  
7.3 Identified drivers behind the OFDI related M&As by Indian 
Corporates 
The study adopts a firm-specific approach to examine the underlying factors from 
evidence available on OFDI related M&As of Indian companies at firm level. It 
briefs the intentions of the 30 selected OFDI related M&As by Indian corporates 
based on the secondary data. 
Based on the secondary information the factors underlying OFDI related M&As 
by Indian corporates are shown in Table 7.1. The discussion that follows in the 
study is drawn primarily from the above mentioned secondary sources.   
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portfolio, marketing 
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generic pharmaceuticals markets 
of Belgium and Southern Europe, 
brand, marketing and distribution 





paper Ballarpur Expand globally the paper and 
pulp operations, capacity 
enhancement, technology 
transfer, product portfolio,  
developing ancillary industry and 





Opto Circuits Market access, product portfolio, 
patents, technology and brand 
Strategic asset 
seeking 
automotive Tata Motors 
(Jaguar and 
Land rover) 
Brand, technology, global 










automotive Tata Motors 
(Daewoo) 
Synergies in marketing, research 
and product development, 









Delivering services, Shared 
services, product portfolio and 







oil HPCL Resource seeking, global 







Resource seeking, to overcome 
domestic competition and hike in 






food Tata Tea Brand, access to raw materials, 
global presence, wide clientele 
base, deriving efficiencies of 
integration and aggression in 
market place to gain market share 
Strategic asset 
seeking 









pharmaceutical Wochdardt Market access, product portfolio, 






Brand, technology, global 
presence, wide clientele base 
Strategic asset 
seeking 
telecom VSNL Global presence, shared services, 




forging Mahindra & 
Mahindra  
World class technology, wide 
clientele base, cost reduction, 
synergies by combining high-end 
player with the low-end players, 
brand and value creation 
Efficiency 
seeking 
beverages United Spirits Brand, global presence, wide 
clientele base, product portfolio 
Strategic asset 
seeking 
pharmaceutical Lupin  Market access, product 








Product portfolio, networking 
synergies leading to global 





pharmaceutical Sun Pharma Market access, product 
portfolio, lowering costs 










Mutual learning through 
technology and market expertise 
sharing, geographical networking 
through global presence 
Efficiency 
seeking 
Source: Compilation of the secondary data (media, publications, empirical 
evidence and official reports) 
It is evident from the above table that one common feature of all the OFDI related 
M&As is that they are all non-diversifying acquisitions. The drivers are identified, 
based on the secondary sources for the Indian corporates going global through 
acquisitions, include synergies drawn by combining a high-end player with low-
end players, resource seeking, global presence, technology, product portfolio, 
brand, patents, cost advantages, research and product development, shared 
services, access to resources and horizontal and vertical integration. 
The present study considers investments in production facilities situated in other 
than developed countries as a proxy for market seeking, investments made in 
production facilities in developed countries as a proxy for strategic asset seeking 
and investments made for acquiring relevant resources as a proxy for resource 
seeking. This is in line with prior studies as presented in Chapter 3 (Deng (2004), 
Buckley (2007)  and Sathye (2009)).  
The asset-exploitation perspective of FDI commonly posits that firms that possess 
firm-specific advantages utilise these advantages to operate abroad to seek 
markets or low-cost natural resources or labour force. The example of Tata 




Motors outlines the asset-exploitation perspective of the Indian corporates 
involved in OFDI related M&As. This is in line with prior studies (Makino, Lau 
and Yeh (Makino, et al., 2002) 
Tata Motors is a good example of asset exploitation strategy by an Indian 
corporate. For instance, according to Kumar (2008), Tata Motors is the first 
Indian company to be listed on the New York Stock Exchange. Tata Motors is a 
well-known automobile producer in India, which proved its unique ability to 
deliver value for money as represented in the development of the world‘s cheapest 
car – the Nano (Kumar, 2008). Tata also developed India's first sports utility 
vehicle, the Tata Safari and India's first indigenously manufactured passenger car, 
the Tata Indica. The company also makes the Tata Indigo and the Tata Sumo. 
Additionally, it markets and distributes Fiat cars in India. Tata Motors 
manufactures a wide range of buses as well as light, medium and heavy 
commercial vehicles (www.tatamotors.com). The company also manufactures and 
sells passenger buses in the light, medium and heavy segments.The competitive 
ownership advantage to Tata Motors lies in its new technologies combined with 
its managerial capabilities. It is evident from the above that Tata Motors possess 
firm-specific advantages in developing cars and other utility vehicles 
economically and intends to utilise these advantages to operate abroad and seek 
markets. Tata Motors acquired the two iconic brands Jaguar and Land Rover to 
improve its growth prospects worldwide. This acquisition enabled the company to 




operate its headquarters from Britain. This acquisition provides a significant 
expansion of car-making capability for Tata Motors. 
The case of DRL and Piramal are examples of pharmaceutical Indian corporates 
with asset-exploration perspectives.  According to Kale. D (2010), Indian firms 
are moving up the value chain by acquiring specific skills and technologies in 
advanced markets. In the high volume, low cost active pharmaceutical ingredient 
(API) market, Indian firms are now facing competition from Chinese firms which 
can manufacture bulk drugs at a cheaper rate than Indian firms. Indian firms are 
using access to technology as a differentiating factor where competition on the 
basis of cost has limitations. Nicholas Piramal‘s acquisition of Avecia or DRL‘s 
acquisition of Trigenesis show Indian firms‘ efforts to move up the value chain by 
augmenting existing capabilities through acquisition. Avecia, Nicholas‘ 
acquisition, makes toxic products and other high value drugs such as hormones, 
and owns fermentation equipment to make drugs more efficiently. These drugs 
require a high quality of safety and containment and therefore they are highly-
priced making them more profitable to innovators. DRL‘s acquisition of Trigeneis 
gives the company access to certain products and proprietary drug delivery 
technology platforms to develop a pipeline of drugs in the dermatology segment. 
One of Trigeneisis‘s proprietary technologies takes care of major challenges faced 
in the formulation and delivery of drugs in the areas of oral, injectables, inhaled 
and topical delivery. The above empirical findings show the motive of asset 




exploration by the Indian pharmaceutical companies which is in line with prior 
findings (Makino et al, 2002).  
7.4 Nexus between the OFDI Indian government policy and the 
identified drivers behind OFDI related M&As by Indian 
corporates 
It is evident from Tables 2.1 and 2.2 of Chapter 2 that the Indian Government‘s 
approach towards OFDI underwent drastic changes where there was a shift from 
restrictive policy regime to the liberalised policy regime. These policy changes 
provided opportunities for Indian corporates to go global through OFDI related 
M&As. The outcome was an increase in the amount of overseas investments by 
Indian companies. In other words, the policy changes adopted during the third 
phase triggered a sharp increase in OFDI related M&As. 
This indicates that the corporate decisions are affected by the legal framework 
governing international capital flows as well as by proactive policy measures to 
assist companies in their internationalisation process. Therefore, there is 
conducive scope for the government in India to either influence OFDI flows by 
creating a competitive business environment or to restrict through regulations. 
The nexus between Government of India policy and strategies adopted by Indian 
corporates support the three stage dynamic comparative model of government-
business relationships (the period considered was from 1980-1990) proposed by 
Agarwal and Agmon, 1990 (Chapter 3), with a slight difference i.e., the difference 




in the period under observation. The present study looked into the government 
policy changes from 1974 – 2008 and the contextual difference is much wider.  
The term internationalisation includes the OFDIs taking the form of M&As while 
in the Agarwal and Agnon model (1990) internationalisation was restricted to 
foreign exports, export markets and export promotion activities. 
It is evident from the above discussion that the Indian Government‘s OFDI 
policies impact the strategic decisions of business organisations. It supports  the 
institution-based view (Buckley, 2007; Peng and Delios, 2006) which states that 
the international strategies are shaped by the home institutional environment
i
 and 
the institutional constraints in emerging economies tend to be much stronger than 
those in developed countries and include the substantial influence of governments 
on companies‘ strategy decisions (P. Deng, 2008).  Likewise, it is understood 
from the literature that active government involvement in business via ownership 
or through regulatory framework is a rather common phenomenon in most of the 
latecomer and transition economies, especially in Asia (Peng, 2000 cited in Child 
and Rodrigues, 2005). 
The present study develops and proposes the emerging approach of Indian 
corporates in Table 7.2 based on the prior findings in Chapter 4 and discussion 
presented above. The traditional Indian approach signifies the approach of the 
Indian corporates prior to 2000 and the emerging approach comes after the 
liberalisation of OFDI policy.   




Table  7-2: : Changes in Approaches of Indian Corporates involved in OFDI 
related M&As 
 Traditional Indian Approach Emerging Indian Approach 






Approach Market Seeking with existing 
firm-specific advantages 
Strategic Asset-Seeking with 
existing firm-specific advantages 
coupled with acquired competitive 
advantages to effectively compete 
in global markets 
 
Synergy Levels Drawn from Cost controls Drawn from combination of low-
cost commodity player and value-
added  (branded) high end 
commodity player, Brand, 
Technology, Product differentiation, 





Greenfield or Joint Venture  Brownfield Investments & Joint 
Ventures 
 
Destination Developing countries Developed Countries 
 
Networking Limited in scope Sophisticated and widely distributed 
 
 







Technology Labour-intensive and less 
sophisticated 
Sophisticated and efficiency 
Transactions Technology Services Technology Transfers and Shared 
services 
 
Value-Chain Start point of the value chain 
Moving up the value chain  




Indian corporates have changed their approach over time and as a result of 
government policy changes. It is evident from the table above that under the 
traditional approach Indian corporate activity was narrow in scope, limited in 
terms of technology, production, position in value-chain and business focus. The 
type of investment was Greenfield or joint venture. On the other hand, under the 
emerging approach the corporate strategy has a wider focus. The corporates try to 
increase their market share through strategic asset seeking, which includes the 
existing firm-specific level advantages coupled with the acquired competitive 
advantages. This approach enables the corporates to effectively compete in 
international markets. The corporates expect to draw synergies through their 
complementary fit in terms of superior technology, network distribution and 
product differentiation. Unlike the organic growth under the traditional approach, 
the current preference of Indian corporates is inorganic growth through 
Brownfield investments.  
7.5 Comparison of Empirical Findings with Prior findings from 
Mature markets  
The following comparison shows how the context, situation and environment for 
Indian cross-border M&As differ from M&As in mature markets. The majority of 
the prior findings documented in the literature (Chapter 4) from the mature 
markets showed negative wealth effects to stockholders in the short term 
following announcements and in the long term subsequent to the mergers and 




acquisitions. Likewise, the global landscape changed over the period and 
phenomenon identified in mature markets relating to the short term and long term 
performance following M&A activity doesn‘t remain the same from Indian 
context. These differences which lead to the possibilities for variations in the 
empirical findings are presented below:   
 .Ownership structures: The institutional environment in Asian countries is 
different from the US and various researchers have suggested that agency 
problems may be less severe in Asian countries (e.g., Claessens et al., 2000), 
partly because they have a more concentrated ownership structure (i.e., wealth 
controlled by a few family groups or by central government). According to Ma et 
al., (2009) agency theory is not suitable to explain M&A activities in Asian 
emerging markets because of the differences in ownership structures between 
developed and developing countries. For instance, in India the majority of 
corporates that went for overseas investments are family-owned companies. 
First, the US has a well-developed legal system to protect the interests of 
shareholders and the welfare of consumers. This is different from many emerging 
economies that suffer from poor legal environments and weak enforcement of 
existing laws (LaPorta, Lopez-de-Silanes, & Shleifer, 1999). Second, cultural and 
governance differences between developing and developed markets lead to 
differences in the organisational structure of firms (Dennis & McConnell, 1986).  




Conglomerate Mergers: It is evident from the literature that conglomerate mergers 
were central from the period 1960 onwards in US. The distinguishing feature of 
the mergers occurring in the 1960s was to diversify or extend the acquiring 
companies‘ product mixes (Mueller, 1977). While, in India‘s case, all the OFDI 
related M&As by Indian corporates belong to the same sector and fall into the 
category of non-diversifying M&As. This difference could add to variations in the 
results. 
Mode of Settlement: Most of the research focuses on whether cash offers or 
equity offers are value maximising. There is reasonably consistent evidence that 
cash bids are associated with better performance in both the short run (Dong, 
Hirshleifer, Richardson, & Teoh, 2005) et al. 2005; Draper and Paudyal 1999; 
Travlos 1987; Walker 2000) and the long run (Cosh and Guest 2001; Linn and 
Switzer 2001; Loughran and Vijh 1997). The prior findings show evidence that 
stock-based deals are associated with significantly negative returns at deal 
announcements, whereas cash deals are zero or slightly positive (see Asquith, 
Bruner and Mullins (1987), Huang and Walkling (1987), Travlos (1987) and 
Yook (2000). 
One reason for this may be that acquirers decide on their payment method, 
depending on whether they expect higher or lower performance in the 
forthcoming periods. Hence, acquirers will pay in cash if they believe their shares 
are undervalued, and they will choose equity if they think their shares are 
overvalued. Cash payments might serve as a signal to the market that the 




acquiring firm‘s management expect an increase in firm value over the post-
acquisition period (Myers and Maijluf, 1984). Transactions paid with equity will 
result in a dilution of the share price, as the number of outstanding shares 
increases, while the value of the firm remains the same until expected synergies 
take effect (Mitchell et al.2004). 
As documented in the literature, the mode of settlement for majority of the 
companies involved in M&A activity in the mature markets was equity settlement. 
It is evident from the Table 2.3 in Chapter 2 that all Indian corporates involved in 
thirty OFDI related M&As settled their M&A transactions in cash.  
Regulatory Issues: US reported empirical findings suggest M&A regulation is 
costly to investors. Weir (1983) finds evidence suggesting that Federal Trade 
Commission antitrust actions benefit competitive rivals of the buyer and target. 
Jarrell and Bradley (1980) and Asquith Bruner and Mullins (1983) find that 
returns to merging firms were significantly higher before rather than after 
implementation of the Williams Amendment in October 1969. Schipper and 
Thompson (1983) considered four regulatory changes between 1968 and 1970 and 
found wealth reducing effects associated with increased regulation. 
More recently, the rules and regulations governing the international firms have 
been dramatically altered to facilitate operations of the foreign firms (UNCTAD, 
2008). Opening up of capital markets has been made easier (than before) for 
emerging multinational enterprises from developing countries to raise equity 




capital and debt, besides facilitating their listing of shares on foreign stock 
exchanges. [Ramamurti (2008); RBI (2009)]. 
Asset Exploitation: It is evident from the literature that firms are driven by an 
asset-exploitation perspective when they possess firm-specific advantages. They 
tend to expand and internationalise and use their scale of operations to the fuller 
extent. These corporates possess firm-specific advantages in the form of superior 
technology and brands. They have extensive distribution channels in mature 
markets and try to expand their market horizons. According to Mathews (2006), 
asset exploitation is not appropriate for corporates from emerging markets 
because they often seek to invest abroad to secure a competitive advantage they 
currently do not possess. It is true from Indian context, evidenced by Tata Steel 
and Hindalco. By combining their firm-specific skills with the competitive skills 
acquired through OFDI related M&As, Indian corporates are able to compete in 
international markets. They also draw synergies through complementary fit 
occurring due to disintegrated model of operations subsequent to the acquisitions. 
  




Table  7-3: Comparison between mature market and emerging market studies 




Equity settlements Cash settlements 
Asset 
Exploitation 
Corporates are driven by 
asset exploitation because 
they possess firm-specific 
advantages which enables 
them to compete in 
international markets 
Asset exploitation is possible 
only when the corporates 
acquire the competitive 
advantages and combine them 
to their firm specific 
advantages such that they can 
compete in the global markets 





Acquiring Firm‘s Tobin‘s 
Q > Target Firm‘s Tobin‘s Q 
Acquiring Firm‘s Tobin‘s Q 
< Target Firm‘s Tobin‘s Q 
Agency 
Problems 
More Severe because of the 
diffused ownership structures 
Less severe because the 
ownership structures are 
concentrated and  majority of 
them are either family owned 
or Government owned 
Regulations Increased Regulations Liberalised/Unregulated 
Legal Systems Well-developed Not-well developed 




Diversification Conglomerate Mergers Non-diversifying acquisitions 
Acquired and 
Target group – 
Geography  
Developed to Developed 
countries 
Emerging to Developed 
countries 
Table 7.3 presents the possibilities for differences in the outcomes of the studies 
from mature markets and Indian context due to underlying differences behind 
initiating the M&A transaction. 
From the review of literature presented in Chapter 4 it is evident that until 2000, 
the majority of M&A studies focussed on mature markets.  OFDI- related M&As 
are a recent phenomenon in emerging markets and  any studies undertaken about 
them have been recent. However, the studies undertaken in mature and emerging 
markets is that  with reference to OFDI related M&As have examined two issues 
in common. They are: (1) Short term market reactions following the 
announcements and (2) Long term performance following the M&As in the post-
acquisition period. 
It is evident from Section 7.4 that the context and situation for M&As initiated in 
mature markets are different from those in emerging markets, specifically India, 
and therefore outcomes are different too.  




7.6 Conclusions  
Theoretical explanations for the differing outcomes of the firm-specific empirical 
findings have been offered and given a basis for the development of testable 
propositions for future empirical researchers. For instance, the short term results 
supported the prior studies that the Indian corporates involved in OFDI related 
M&As performed well domestically prior to acquisitions. Through their 
performance they have established and consolidated overtime and proved 
themselves in their domestic markets. However, the firm-specific empirical 
findings are contradictory to the overall empirical findings. It is understood that 
the stock markets reacted negatively to the OFDI related announcements by 
Indian corporates in spite of their positive performance in the pre-acquisition 
period in domestic markets. The study provided explanations for the variations in 
outcomes. 
The study further examined the Indian corporates based on the prior findings and 
theory. It identified that Indian corporates acquired competitive ownership 
advantages through the OFDI related M&As. For instance, through acquisitions 
the Indian corporates had the advantage of being local in foreign destinations and 
avoided the disadvantages of being foreigners in European, UK & US markets. By 
undertaking integrated production networking, the Indian corporates linked the 
low-end players with the high-end players and were able to draw synergies and 
deliver value. In other words, the initial processing of raw materials was carried 




out in India closer to source and then the remaining processes were carried out in 
the acquired company‘s country which allowed them to have access to the 
technology and also interface with the customers of the acquired companies.  
Considering the Indian case, it is evident from the identified drivers that most of 
the acquisitions fall in a pattern that involves bringing together the low cost back-
end of an Indian company with the front-end having an interface with customers 
in developed countries. The empirical results indicate that the OFDI related 
M&As by Indian corporates are able to fully exploit the synergies and are 
delivering value to the shareholders. Though there had been differing outcomes in 
the short term performance following the announcement of OFDI related M&As 
by Indian corporates, the performance improved in the long term in the three year 
period following acquisition. 
The study has given theoretical explanations for competitive advantages occurring 
to Indian corporates as a result of vast experience in domestic business. From this 
perspective, the study offers testable propositions for future empirical researchers 
in the area of financing; implications on the capital structure of the OFDI related 
M&As by Indian corporates, the impact of international borrowings on the cost of 
capital, changes in cost structures, and so on.   
Likewise, in order to understand the linkage between the strategic investment 
decisions, boards, corporate governance variables and performance, the study 
proposes a need for further empirical analysis to examine competitive advantages 




arising from boards and effective corporate governance. A further empirical 
analysis can be undertaken to examine corporate governance characteristics of 
Indian corporates.  
The study has given theoretical explanation for the empirical findings and 
variations of outcomes in the short term and long term periods. The study also 
showed differing underlying factors behind initiating M&As, considering the 
studies from mature markets and India. By doing so, the study, thus, opens up 
possibilities for future empirical research. 
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CHAPTER 8: CONCLUSIONS OF THE STUDY 
8.1 Introduction 
This chapter concludes the major findings of the study, outlines contribution and 
presents its limitations.  
Encouraged by the financial reforms initiation by government of India, an 
increase in large scale mergers and acquisitions (M&As) by Indian corporates 
occurred. The majority of the Indian corporates which were hitherto protected and 
limited to their domestic environment and investments in developing countries are 
now exposed to international markets with the maturity markets as prime focus. 
There could be risks and challenges to the Indian corporates in the global arena. It 
is important to see how the Indian corporates perform in the international markets. 
The present study therefore examines the performance of Indian corporates 
involved in the OFDI related M&As. 
It is evident from the literature that the majority of studies in the area of cross- 
border M&As reported from 1950-2000 are dominated by developed countries. 
This is because M&A activity was popular in US, UK and Europe during that 
period. Cross-border M&As in emerging nations are relatively recent so the 
empirical findings are limited. This study is built on the wealth maximisation 
theory and Ownership, Location and Internationalisation theory. From an Indian 
context it is evident from Chapter 4 that the majority of Indian studies examined 
the patterns of the outward foreign direct investments, notable among them are the 
emerging pattern of India's outward foreign direct investment under influence of 




state policy: a macro view (Singh & Jain, 2009; Nayyar, 2008; Rajan, 2000 & 
Kumar 2008). The study of Kale (2009) considered only small scale companies 
which involved the investments less than USD$48 million. The study of Gubbi, 
Aulakh, Ray, & Chittoor  (Gubbi, et al., 2010) examined the post-acquisition 
performance for a sample size of 412. Their study did not examine the short term 
announcement effect. The study of Zhu & Malhotra, (2008) considered short term 
and long term performance of Indian acquiring firms. But it is limited in scope in 
which it considered only service sector cross border mergers and acquisitions by 
Indian corporates in the US only. 
The study is important because it is the first to assess the success of Indian 
corporates involved in overseas investments from the short term and long term 
perspective and across sectors. The study fills the gap in the literature in which it 
examines the aggregate performance and also looks into firm specific level 
performance. The study provides possible theoretical explanations at firm specific 
level for the variations in outcomes observed in the stock market performance 
following the announcements. This approach of theorisation opens up possibilities 
for future empirical research.  
The present study addressed the following two basic issues: 
 How does the market react to the news of an OFDI-related M&A? 
- Short-term announcement effect 




 Does corporate performance improve as a consequence of an OFDI-related 
M&A? 
-  Long-term share price movements 
8.2 Short term  
The study used event study method to observe the behaviour of the investors in 
the stock market to the news of an OFDI related M&A. The study included 30 
companies which are involved in OFDI related M&A transactions between 2000 
and 2008 from seven sectors. The study used market model to capture the effect 
of trade following the announcement and extended the interval to pre-event day (-
1), (0) event day (announcement day) and post event day (+1).  
8.2.1 Research Hypothesis  
The study uses the event method to test the hypothesis relating to the short-run 
share price performance of OFDI related Indian corporates involved in M&As.  
Ho: There are no abnormal returns on the announcement day (0) following the 
announcement of the OFDI related M&As. 
8.2.2 Methods – short term 
The present study measures the short-run performance of thirty OFDI related 
M&As by Indian companies. The study considers a three-day short-event window 
surrounding the acquisition announcement period. It includes a day prior to the 




announcement and the event day (announcement day) and a day following the 
announcement. The study concentrates only on a short-run event study method, 
restricting analysis to a short-event window (closely surrounding the 
announcement day). The event date for the study is set to be the date of 
announcement of the respective M&A event. This provides the best comparison of 
the various methods because the shorter the event window, the more precise the 
tests. 
8.2.3 Analysis of Results 
It is evident from the empirical results that the stock markets reacted positively in 
the short run following the announcements of the OFDI related M&As by Indian 
corporates. The empirical findings of the study showed positive results following 
the announcements of the OFDI related M&As by the Indian corporates. The 
abnormal returns are positive throughout the event window (-1, 0, -1). The AAR 
is statistically significant at 1% a day prior to announcement, significant at 5% 
level on the announcement day, and significant at 10% on the post event day. The 
Cumulative Abnormal Returns over the event window (-1, 0, -1) are statistically 
significant at 1% level.  It indicates the creation of wealth to the stockholders of 
the bidding firms following OFDI related M&As. The empirical test results 
supported the rejection of the null hypothesis at 5% level of significance. 
However, in the case of a few companies, the empirical results also showed 
negative abnormal returns following the news of OFDI related M&As by the 




Indian corporates. Hence, there are differing outcomes in the short term at firm-
specific level. 
8.3 Long term  
The present study measures the long-run performance of the Indian companies 
involved in thirty OFDI related M&As. The study considers a maximum 36 
months following the acquisition event month. In this way it minimises the 
possible econometric problems arising from the use of longer horizons. The 
period of the study signifies acquisition activity and covers selected Indian firms 
involved in OFDI related M&As during 2000-2008. 
It examines the shareholders wealth effects as a consequence of OFDI related 
M&As of Indian corporates.  
8.3.1 Hypotheses of the study (Long term perspective) 
The study tests the post-acquisition performance following OFDI related M&A 
with the following hypotheses: (1) Ho: There are no abnormal returns to the 
acquiring firms following the acquisition activity in the long run and (2) Ho: 
Financial performance in the post-acquisition period is no greater than the 
operating performance in the pre-acquisition period. 




8.3.2 Methods used 
The present study pursues two different approaches to test the first null hypothesis 
and assess the long-term performance of the OFDI related M&A firms.  The 
method chosen is in line with the studies conducted and documented in the 
literature (Ikenberry, et al., 1995), (S. P. Kothari & Warner, 1997), (Lyon, et al., 
1999) and (Zhu & Malhotra, 2008). The first is one of the most commonly used 
techniques in the literature. i.e., CAR using the market model. The market returns 
of the Bombay Stock Exchange (BSE) Index and the monthly returns of the firm 
are used.  
The second approach calculates long-run abnormal returns considering the buy-
and-hold strategy. The study attempts to overcome the issues relating to the 
BHAR. The study uses a control firm approach and matches the OFDI related 
Indian company‘s abnormal market return with the control firm that is chosen 
from the BSE Index based on a set criteria. To be considered, the control firm 
should be of the same size, and belong to the same sector and should not be 
involved in acquisition activity. The selection criteria is in line with Barber and 
Lyon (1997) who document that matching sample firms to control firms of similar 
size yields test statistics that are well specified in all sampling situations.  
The second hypothesis is tested by assessing the operating performance of the 
sample firms. The study uses ex-ante and ex-post approach and employs Tobin‘s 
Q and considers three years‘ pre-event and three years‘ post-event in line with 




prior studies (Zhu & Malhotra, 2008). The significance of the mean changes in the 
two periods is tested by using t-test.  
The study also employs the wealth relative method proposed by Ritter (1991) to 
explain the performance of the firms.  
8.4 Analysis of Results 
Long term: The empirical findings of the study show positive results in the post – 
acquisition period following the OFDI related M&As by the Indian corporates. It 
is evident from the empirical results that the BHAR t value is higher than the 
critical t-value at 1% level of significance while CAR is higher than the critical t- 
value at 5% level of significance. Likewise, Tobin‘s Q t-value is higher than the 
critical t-value at 10% level of significance. Therefore, the first null hypothesis of 
no abnormal returns to the acquiring firms following the acquisition activity in the 
long-run is tested. The empirical results supported the rejection of null hypothesis 
at 1% level of significance in the case of the BHAR approach and a 5% level of 
significance in the CAR approach. The second null hypothesis, which assumes 
operating performance in the post-acquisition period is no greater than the 
operating performance in the pre-acquisition period, is rejected at the 10% level of 
significance. The empirical test results indicate that there are abnormal stock 
returns created to the stockholders in the long-run period following the acquisition 
activity. 




These results under both the approaches indicate positive wealth effects to the 
stockholders of the acquiring companies. It is evident that the confidence 
expressed by the stockholders in the short-run period following the announcement 
of the OFDI related M&As by Indian corporate is maintained and sustained in the 
long-run post-acquisition period. The results indicate that the market return 
performance of Indian corporates involved in acquisition activity created value in 
the post-acquisition period. In other words, the performance improvement is 
evidenced in the post-acquisition period. 
8.5 Explanation for variations in outcomes of the empirical 
findings 
In Chapter 6, the aggregate empirical results did not support the null hypotheses 
and hence, was rejected. The empirical findings showed evidence of positive 
wealth effects to the stockholders. However, the firm-specific level empirical 
findings showed mixed results. The empirical results revealed that some 
companies did relatively well while others did not. In Chapter 7 the study offered 
some plausible explanations for the empirical findings of the short term 
performance and long term performance of the OFDI related Indian corporates 
involved in M&As at firm-specific level.  
The differing outcomes at firm-specific level were observed following the 
announcements of OFDI related M&As by Indian corporates. The study chose 
five companies and considered the secondary information released closer to the 




announcements in order to understand the market reactions. The companies are 
Tata Steel, Hindalco, ONGC-OVL (all of which both had negative short-term 
market reactions but positive post-acquisition returns), DRL (which had positive 
results in both the short-term and long-term, more typical of the majority of the 
companies), and finally Wockhardt (which experienced negative market reactions 
in both the short-and long-term).    Commentaries from financial analysts and 
commentators and media releases from the company concerning a mooted M&A 
may impact investors‘ assessments of the return and risk parameters for each 
company.   
It is evident from the literature that firms are driven by asset-exploitation 
perspective when they possess the firm-specific advantages. They tend to expand 
and internationalise and use their scale of operations to the fuller extent. These are 
those corporates which possess firm-specific advantages in the form of superior 
technology, brands and extensive networks of channels of distributions in the 
mature markets and they try to expand the horizons of their markets. This is 
relevant to mature markets. According to Mathews (2006), asset exploitation is 
not appropriate for corporates from emerging markets because they often seek to 
invest abroad to secure a competitive advantage they currently do not possess. 
This is true from an Indian context and evident from the cases of Tata Steel and 
Hindalco. By combining their firm-specific skills with the competitive skills 
acquired through cross border mergers and acquisitions, the Indian corporates are 
able to compete in the international markets.  




For instance, from an Indian context, the case of Tata-Corus Steel is a good 
example of an Indian corporate with asset-exploitation perspective. In fact, by 
acquiring Corus, Tata gained access to an established brand name, superior 
technology, and extensive net-works of distributors in the western markets. The 
empirical findings showing positive performance in the post-acquisition period 
indicates that Tata-Corus Steel obtained the expected synergies by making 
primary metal in markets close to raw materials (India) and establishing finishing 
(value-adding) facilities in the end-user markets (Athukorala). In other words, the 
acquisition of Corus enabled Tata to link their firm specific advantages (FSA) like 
labour intensive production, access to raw materials, accumulated managerial 
skills coupled with the advantages of access to the high margin markets and high 
technology in the west through Corus. In western markets it could therefore 
leverage the cost advantage of operating from India and product differentiation 
based on better technology from Corus in Asian markets. This acquisition enabled 
Tata to acquire competitive advantage in terms of local presence in high growth 
markets and compete with the international players with the synergies drawn from 
cost-efficiency due to the de-integrated operations, and also leverage the cost 
advantages in the mature markets. In the emerging markets it had the advantage of 
product differentiation occurring due to superior technology.  
It is understood from the above case that asset-exploitation by the Indian 
corporates is possible only through acquiring firms in mature markets.  




The asset-exploration perspective of outward foreign direct investments is 
appropriate to the emerging markets because they try to expand into the high-
growth markets by acquiring strategic assets (i.e., technology, marketing, and 
management expertise) which are available in mature markets. The corporates 
from mature markets are not driven by the asset-exploration perspective because 
they already possess the required infrastructure for innovation and further 
development of new products. This perspective has more relevance to the 
corporates from emerging economies. As discussed in Chapter 7, the case of DRL 
is a good example of Indian corporates taking an asset-exploration perspective. 
Summary of Empirical Findings 
Short term perspective 
The short-term results are positive. The AAR (event day) and CAR (event 
window) show evidence of statistical significance at 5% and 1% levels 
respectively. They support the rejection of the null hypothesis. This indicates that 
investors received the OFDI-related announcements by the Indian corporates 
positively. It signals the confidence investors have in management. The empirical 
findings of the study did not support the null hypotheses and hence the study 
rejected it.  
It is interesting to note that the Indian corporates involved in OFDI related M&As 
settled their M&A deals through cash payments. The majority of them raised 
funds from international banks or through rights issue. In some cases they created 




special purpose vehicles to raise funds from the country of the target company. 
With this, it is obvious that the Indian corporates demonstrated their abilities in 
the international capital markets and raised funds for large acquisitions, which 
reflects their reputation in relation to successful performance.  
It is understood that the stockholders are convinced by the views expressed by the 
Indian corporates relating to OFDI related M&As and hence reacted positively to 
news of OFDI related M&As. The short run results indicate faith, hope and 
expectations vested by stockholders in the long run performance of the Indian 
corporates involved in OFDI related M&As. 
Long term perspective 
The empirical findings reveal that the Indian corporates have shown performance 
growth in the domestic market prior to acquisitions.  But in order to operate in the 
international market the Indian corporates had to align with international brands.  
Therefore, the Indian corporates preferred the OFDI related M&As because they 
provided an opportunity to draw synergies from their firm specific advantages 
(FSA), such as labour intensive production, access to raw materials, accumulated 
managerial skills coupled with the advantages of the acquired/target companies 
through Brownfield investment strategies. This is in line with the prior findings of 
Makino (2002). With the intention to understand the OFDI strategies of Indian 
corporates, the study identified drivers behind their OFDI related M&As.  




The success of OFDI related M&As has been assessed by their outcomes through 
the empirical results. The study indicates that the OFDI related M&As by Indian 
corporates enabled them to acquire the hitherto missing competitive ownership 
advantages and operate in the high-value growth markets of the mature markets. It 
is evident from the study results that there are positive wealth effects following 
the post-acquisition period. This indicates that the strategic moves of OFDI 
related M&As by Indian corporates are working, that managers have rightly 
undertaken the positive net present value projects and the stockholders approve of 
Indian   corporates investment in OFDI related M&As. 
8.6 Contribution of the study 
The contributions of the study towards the literature are presented below:  
New Empirics: This study is the first among Indian studies to consider the 36- 
month post-acquisition period to assess the performance of the Indian corporates 
involved in 30 OFDI related M&As. This study includes four mega deals in which 
the M&A transaction amount exceeds USD$ 1000 million (1 billion). This study 
is comprehensive and includes companies from seven sectors: (1) Metals & 
Mining; (2) Oil, Gas & Energy; (3) Chemical/Fertilisers; (4) Food & Beverages; 
(5) Information Technology; (6) Health and Pharmaceuticals; and (7) 
Manufacturing & Processing. 
New Methods: This study used different approaches – CAR, BHAR, Wealth 
Relative measure and Tobin‘s Q to assess the long-run performance and to ensure 




robustness of the results. The study addressed the question: How successful are 
the Indian companies in creating value to the shareholder in the long run? In 
addition to reviewing the market reactions, explanations as to why the market 
reacted the way it did based on financial reports, company disclosures and other 
informed comments are proposed. The study supports the view that wealth effects 
cannot capture the full effect of M&As in the short term and hence, the long-run 
studies are significant to look into the consequences of the M&As.  From an 
Indian context, this study is unique because it adopted a wider approach and 
considered quantitative data for assessing the outcomes and secondary data for 
explaining the variations in outcomes. In other words, this approach provided 
tentative theoretical explanations for observed differences. The theorisation 
opened up possibilities for future empirical research.  
New Findings: The study identified the drivers behind OFDI related M&As by 
Indian corporates and provided plausible ways to interpret and contend the 
underlying factors. For this purpose the study adopted a firm-specific approach to 
identify the underlying factors behind OFDI related M&As of Indian companies 
based on secondary information. This approach enabled the study to synthesise 
the identified drivers behind OFDI related M&As by Indian corporates into two 
main classifications - asset exploration and asset exploitation. This simplified both 
the understanding of the corporate strategy and the explanation for the variations 
in outcomes. Coupled with the prior findings, identified drivers and empirical 
findings, the study presented the reasons why mature market OFDI related M&As 




differ from the Indian context. Those reasons were context, situation and 
environment. The study also showed differing underlying factors behind initiating 
OFDI related M&As by considering the studies from mature markets and India. It 
has outlined reasons for the differences in the outcomes of cross-border M&As 
based on prior findings from mature markets and empirical findings of Indian 
corporates. Based on prior findings, the theory and secondary information, the 
study presented changes in the approaches taken by Indian corporates before and 
after the Indian Government‘s liberalisation reforms, in particular changes to 
OFDI policy.  
Before policy liberalisation, Indian corporates were involved in expanding 
markets with the existing capacity in the developing countries whereas after 
liberalisation, they expanded into international markets by acquiring target 
companies from mature markets. Their scale of operations expanded. This helps 
in understanding the dynamics relating to corporate movements following the 
reforms. The study identified the contextual differences in OFDI related M&A 
strategies between the developed countries and India and contends that agency 
theory and CEO-hubris theory may not be appropriate in the Indian context given 
the shareholding patterns.  The study also identified that the Indian public sector 
companies with the Government of India as majority stakeholder are slow to 
internationalise.  




Of the thirty OFDI related M&A transactions considered in the study, only three 
OFDI related M&As belong to the public sector and they are driven by natural 
resource seeking as a prime motive.  
8.7 Limitations of the study 
The limitations of the study can be drawn from the scope of the study. The scope 
of the study is limited to examining the short-term market performance following 
the announcements of OFDI related M&As by the Indian corporates and 
examining the long-term market performance in the post-acquisition period 
following the OFDI related M&As by the Indian corporates. The study did not 
examine the shareholding patterns, characteristics of board of directors and other 
corporate governance variables like size structure and composition because they 
are out of the scope. Further examination of these variables will help in fully 
comprehending the results.  The study could have looked into the details of capital 
structure changes following the acquisitions.  
8.8 Suggestions for future empirical researchers 
The following are some of the areas identified by the study while examining the 
outcomes of OFDI related M&As by Indian corporates. The study considers them 
worthwhile to be examined and tested by future empirical researchers.  
- Corporate governance has been much emphasised in recent years. One could 
undertake a more comprehensive study to investigate the role of governance 




variables in the research domain of M&As. Further the issues relating to the CEO 
hubris can be undertaken. 
- One could undertake a study to examine if the mode of financing the M&A 
transaction and mode of settling the M&A transaction makes a difference. 
- There could be an extension to this study to examine the changes in degree of 
risk and liquidity of an acquiring firm‘s shares subsequent to an acquisition event. 
- One could undertake a study to examine the price pressure effect surrounding 
the announcement days and look into the issues of information effect versus price 
pressure effect. 
- One possibility is to look into the implications to the country‘s economy  as a 
consequence of internationalisation. How does internationalisation influence the 
dynamics of lending institutions, competition, prices, quality of services, 
innovation, society and the country in general?  
- One can test the linkages between the policy changes, motives behind cross- 
border mergers and acquisitions and performance. 
- With regard to methods, one can undertake and examine the empirical results by 
changing the length of the estimation period under different approaches and 
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Trends and Pattern of Indian Outward Foreign Direct Investment 
The analysis of the changes related to overseas investment presented in Table 
Appendix 1 below brings out the fact that the Indian Government has eased the 
difficulty arising for Indian companies in undertaking OFDI. The big boost of 
Indian outbound investment since 2000 can be attributed to the policy changes 
initiated by the Government of India to encourage Indian companies to go cross 
border (L. Singh & Jain, 2009). 
Table Appendix-1: Selected Changes to Indian Overseas Investment Policy  
 
1 In 2004, Indian companies were permitted to undertake overseas 
investments by market purchases of foreign exchange without prior 
approval of RBI up to 100% of their net worth; up from the previous limit 
of 50%. An Indian company with a satisfactory track record is allowed to 
invest up to 100% of its net worth within the overall limit of US$100 in a 
foreign entity engaged in any bona fide business activity from 2004. 
2 In 2004, Indian companies in special economic zones are permitted to 
undertake overseas investment up to any amount without the restriction of 
the US$ 100 million ceiling under the automatic route, provided the 
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funding is done out of the Exchange Earners Foreign Currency Account 
balances. The three years profitability condition requirement was removed 
for Indian companies making overseas investments under the automatic 
route. 
3 In 2004, overseas investments were allowed to be funded up to 100% by 
ADR/GDR proceeds up from the previous ceiling of 50%. Further, an 
Indian firm that had exhausted the limit of US$100 million in a year could 
apply to the RBI for a block allocation of foreign exchange, subject to the 
terms and conditions as may be necessary.  
6 In 2004, overseas investments were opened up to registered partnership 
firms and companies that provided professional services. The minimum 
net worth requirement of Rs. 150 million for Indian companies engaged in 
financial sector activities in India was removed for investment abroad in 
the financial sector.  
7 From 2004 onwards, Indian firms are allowed to undertake agricultural 
activities, which were previously restricted, either directly or through an 
overseas branch; and are now permitted under the automatic route.  
8 In 2004, the RBI further relaxed the monetary ceiling on Indian 
companies' investment abroad. Indian companies can now invest up to 
100% of their net worth without any separate ceiling even if the 
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investment exceeds the US$100 million limit. Furthermore, Indian 
companies can now invest or make acquisitions abroad even in areas 
unrelated to their business at home.  
9 In 2005, banks were permitted to lend money to Indian companies for 
acquisition of equity in overseas joint ventures, wholly owned 
subsidiaries (WOS) or in other overseas companies as strategic 
investment. 
10 In 2006, the automatic route of disinvestments was further liberalised. 
Indian companies are now permitted to disinvest without prior approval of 
the RBI in select categories. To encourage large and important exporters, 
proprietary/unregistered partnership firms were allowed to set up a 
JV/WOS outside India with the prior approval of RBI. 
11 In 2007, the ceiling of investment by Indian entities was revised from 
100% of the net worth to 200% of the net worth of the investing company 
under the automatic route of overseas investment. The limit of 200% of 
the net worth of the Indian party was enhanced to 300% of the net worth 
in June 2007 under automatic route (200% in case of revisited partnership 
firms). In September 2007, this was further enhanced to 400 % of the net 
worth of the Indian party.  
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12 The Liberalized Remittance Scheme (LRS) for resident individuals was 
further liberalised by enhancing the existing limit of US$ 100 per 
financial year to US$ 200 per financial year (April-March) in September 
2007.  
13 The limit of portfolio investment by listed Indian companies in the equity 
of listed foreign companies was raised in September 2007 from 35% to 
50% of the net worth of the investing company as on the date of its last 
audited balance sheet. Furthermore, the requirement of reciprocal 10% 
shareholding in Indian companies was dispensed with. 
14 The aggregate ceiling for overseas investment by mutual funds registered 
with SEBI was enhanced from US$ 4 billion to US$ 5 billion in 
September 2007. This was further raised to US$ 7 billion in April 2008. 
The existing facility to allow a limited number of qualified Indian mutual 
funds to invest cumulatively up to US$ 1 billion in overseas Exchange 
Traded Funds, as may be permitted by the SEBI, would continue. The 
investments would be subject to the terms and conditions and operational 
guidelines as issued by SEBI.  
15 Registered trusts and societies engaged in manufacturing/educational 
sector were allowed in June 2008 to make investment in the same 
sector(s) in a Joint Venture or Wholly Owned Subsidiary outside India, 
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with the prior approval of the Reserve Bank.  
16 Registered trusts and societies that have set up hospital(s) in India have 
been allowed since August 2008 to make investment in the same sector(s) 
in a JV/WOS outside India, with the prior approval of the Reserve Bank.  




 APPENDIX: B 
 
1) Tata Steel Acquires –Millennium 
As per the Tata Company‘s internal report, April 2006, Tata Steel has made 
strategic moves in order to capitalise the favourable   environment for steel in the 
global market through acquisition moves and by positioning itself in strategic 
locations. Tata Steel's acquisition of Millennium in 2004-2005 is an example of 
how the company is implementing this growth strategy.  
Managing director B Muthuraman explains the company's strategy in pragmatic 
terms: "In my view, globalisation is a method by which you put the right part of 
the value chain in its right place in the world, and link it up to finishing facilities 
in places where customers exist, and primary manufacturing facilities in places 
where manufacturing is competitive." The strategy termed as Asian beachhead 
behind the acquisition of Millennium Steel is to grow from domestic player to 
East and South East Asian market player. In other words, the acquisition of these 
two deals marked an effective transition for Tata Steel from being a leading 
domestic player to a strong regional player in the East and South East Asian 





The acquisition of Millennium Steel, Thailand's dominant steel producer, 
consolidated Tata Steel's gains. Millennium's three operating units give the 
company a cumulative capacity to produce 1.2 million tonnes of steel per annum 
through the electric arc furnace route. Along with a long products rolling capacity 
of 1.7 million tonnes a year, geared towards the construction and automotive 
sector, Millennium provides Tata Steel strategic space in the heart of the ASEAN 
region, enhancing its market position in South East Asia. 
2) Tate Tea acquires Tetley 
When Tata Tea acquired the Tetley group last February, it was hailed as a 
landmark deal - the coming together of a company that was very strong on the tea 
production side and the other very strong on the marketing side. According to 
Chairman,  Krishna Kumar, "I see us fusing all these entities into one super global 
company - maybe with a listing on the New York Stock Exchange, the London 
Stock Exchange, the Bombay Stock Exchange and so on - seamlessly operating as 
one entity, deriving all the efficiencies of integration and imparting the necessary 
aggression in the marketplace to gain market share. It will be a very successful 
global tea company, owned by the Tata, an Indian company and very successfully 
run across the globe," he added.  
The Tetley group has a strong marketing network in 35 countries across the world 
while Tata Tea has a strong production base in India and Sri Lanka. It is also 
looking at acquiring tea gardens in Africa. In addition to this, it is looking at large 
scale sourcing of tea from Bangladesh. "The synergies between the two 
companies are very strong and bringing them together does make sense. But this 
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is only at a conceptualisation stage. It may take a while to happen," Krishna 
Kumar told The Economic Times. Tetley blends, packs, markets and distributes 
tea products, principally in the UK and the US. It is presently the second largest 
tea bag concern in the world, producing approximately 20 billionn tea bags per 
annum (February 01, 2001 | The Economic Times). 
3) United Spirits  acquires White & Mackay 
United Spirits Limited, the flagship of The UB Group acquired on May 16th, 
2007, a hundred percent of Whyte & Mackay for Â£595m. Whyte & Mackay is a 
leading distiller of Scotch Whisky, owning brands including The Dalmore, Isle of 
Jura, Glayva, Fettercairn, Vladivar vodka and the eponymous Whyte & Mackay 
blended Scotch. The company also owns several other Scotch Whisky brands such 
as Mackinlays, John Barr, Cluny and Claymore amongst a host of others. 
Whyte & Mackay is a key strategic acquisition for The UB Group and its 
chairman Dr Vijay Mallya, because of its premium brands and perennial source of 
Scotch Whisky. For instance, the Invergordon Distillery near Inverness is one of 
the largest Scotch Whisky distilleries with a capacity of producing 40 million 
litres of alcohol per annum. This production resource will provide United Spirits 
with a perennial source of Scotch Whisky to meet its global requirements in the 
future. In addition, Invergordon will remain a key strategic provider of bulk 




Dr Vijay Mallya, chairman of United Spirits Limited said ―We have a large and 
growing business in India and have made recent forays into Russia and China. 
United Spirits have created some of the world‘s largest brands of drinks. Until 
today, the only missing link in our portfolio has been Scotch and due to the 
shortages and rapidly increasing prices of Scotch Whisky, we needed a reliable 
supply source to secure our future considering that we use scotch in our Indian 
blends. The potential for premium Scotch Whisky in India is enormous and, with 
the acquisition of Whyte & Mackay we now have a strong portfolio of 
internationally recognized brands that we will immediately introduce into the 
Indian market and use our strong distribution muscle fully to our advantage. In 
addition we now have access to international distribution and can look forward to 
exporting our brands from India.‖ (Source: May 16, 2007,  
TheBusinessEdition.com News). 
4) Tata Steel Acquires Corus: 
 On January 31, 2007, Tata Steel Ltd, one of the leading producers in India 
acquired the Anglo-Dutch steel producer Corus Group Plc. for £13.7 billion. The 
acquisition was the biggest overseas acquisition by an Indian company. Tata Steel 
emerged as the fifth largest steel producer in the world after the acquisition. The 
acquisition gave Tata Steel access to Corus‘ strong distribution network in 




Tata Steel‘s acquisition of Anglo-Dutch steelmaker Corus does make strategic 
sense. The move is in line with its de-integration model that involves making 
primary metal in markets close to raw materials and establishing finishing (value-
adding) facilities in the end-user markets. The synergies expected of this 
acquisition would be in the areas of procurement of materials, shared services and 
operational efficiencies. Further, this deal links lowest cost producers of steel, raw 
materials and growth makers (Tata) to high margin markets and high technology 
in the west (Corus). The cost advantage of operating from India can be leveraged 
in western markets, and differentiation based on better technology from Corus can 
work in Asian markets. (Source: Business Line, Business Daily from The Hindu 
Group of publications, Friday, February 02, 2007 and Wednesday, May 13, 2009 
ePaper). 
5) Suzlon Energy:  
Netherlands AE – Rotor Holding BV, a subsidiary of Pune-based (India) Suzlon 
Energy, the world‘s sixth largest wind turbine maker, acquired Belgium‘s Hansen 
Transmissions International NV for € 465 million (US $ 565 million) in cash. 
Hansen is the world‘s second largest manufacturer of wind turbine gearboxes with 
capacity to produce 3,600 MW gearboxes every year. Hansen is adding another 
700 MW capacity at its two plants in Belgium.  
Tulsi R Tanti, Chairman & Managing Director, Suzlon Energy said, 
 ―The acquisition of Hansen gives us technological leadership and will make 
Suzlon the leading integrated wind turbine manufacturer in the world. Although 
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the company will run as the independent business unit, the acquisition of Hansen 
will allow us to integrate gearbox technology into the total turbine solution 
enabling a more reliable and a more competitive product in the market place. We 
find Hansen‘s technology, products and production facilities to be of the highest 
quality. The company has an excellent management team and over a period of 
time we will work with them in developing supply chain synergies, expanding 
capacity in new emerging markets in Asia. Hansen‘s strong presence in the 
industrial gearbox is also an important dimension of the business and we see a 
good opportunity to strengthen it further.‖  
Describing the acquisition as a significant milestone, Girish R Tanti, Director 
International Business Development and HR, Suzlon Energy, said,  
―Hansen is an efficiently run business, the quality of team and man power has 
been most impressive. Hansen has a healthy order book position for the next two 
years and we expect the business to be managed in the same manner as the 
management has very ably done over the last couple of years.‖  
Aditya Sanghi, Country Head investment banking, YES Bank said, ― With this 
acquisition Suzlon has truly emerged as a global player with significant market 
presence, manufacturing base and R&D centers across the North America, 
Europe, India, China, South Korea and Australia. With a presence across the 
entire turbine technology chain, we see Suzlon becoming further cost competitive 
and providing efficient and robust wind energy solutions to its customers.‖ 
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(Reported by Suzlon and news sources and company. www.suzlon.com  and  
www.hansentransmissions.com).  
6) ONGC Videsh Ltd acquires Petrobas and Great Nile oil project 
Over the years, India became heavily dependent on imported crude oil. For the 
growing Indian population and developing Indian industry, the rising cost of crude 
was becoming a burden. Oil & Natural Gas Corporation Ltd (ONGC) was one of 
the leading exploration & production (E&P) companies in India. The domestic 
competition to ONGC grew after liberalisation policies of the Indian Government 
in 1991. The government prepared a plan called ―India Hydrocarbon Vision 2025‖ 
and suggested ONGC go global. The competition in domestic business and the 
hike in oil prices motivated ONGC to create ONGC Videsh Ltd (OVL) for 
overseas operations. By 2006, ONGC was present in 14 countries and had 24 
ongoing projects. 
OVL had set a target of producing 60 million metric tonnes per annum (MMTPA) 
in 2025, but its output in 2006 was only 6.34 MMTPA. Its strategy for expansion 
was based on three entry methods - (a) wholly owned projects acquired during 
bidding of oil blocks in different countries, (b) production sharing contracts and 
(c) participation interests. It had established presence in major oil producing 
countries like Russia, Qatar, Libya, Iraq and Iran. Even then, the output from 
major projects was insufficient to support Indian crude requirements. To 
overcome the limitations, OVL had initiated expansion through acquisition of new 
projects during 2006. 
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ONGC Videsh Ltd (OVL) has signed a Memorandum of Understanding 
(Mamdani & Noah) with Brazil's Petrobras for strategic co-operation and 
participation in exploration and production (E&P) of hydrocarbons on land and in 
shallow and deep waters. 
Brazil's Petrobras and State-owned ONGC would partner in offshore exploration 
and production activities in India and Brazil. Both the companies will jointly bid 
for offshore exploration blocks in the forthcoming New Exploration Licensing 
Policy (NELP) rounds in India and Brazil's ninth round of bidding slated to be 
held in the second half of 2007. Speaking to newspersons at the sidelines of the 
Petrotech-2007, G Estrella, Director (Exploration and Production) of Petrobas 
said, "Petrobras and ONGC have formed a joint working group to explore 
opportunities to collaborate in E&P activities in India and Brazil."  
On the possibility of picking up stake in ONGC's deepwater find in Krishna-
Godavari basin, Mr Estrella said that the working group would explore every 
possibility of partnering ONGC in exploration and production of oil and gas and 
other emerging energy sources like gas hydrates. Petrobras produces roughly two 
million barrels of oil – the bulk of which is produced in Brazil - and is a major 
player in the deep and ultra-deepwater exploration segment. The company has 
already paved the way for ONGC Videsh Ltd, the overseas arm of ONGC, to 
acquire a stake in BC-10 discovered oilfield in Campos Basin of Brazil. "We are 
interested in exploring hydrocarbon in India and preparing the roadmap for 
participation in NELP-VII will be a priority for the joint working group," he said. 
ONGC will be the Petrobras's main partner in NELP-VII, he added. On ONGC's 
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foray in Brazil, he said, "we have already roped in OVL in Brazil and will jointly 
bid in the ninth round bidding in 2007‖. (Source: Business Line, Business Daily 
from The Hindu Group of publications, Saturday, January 20, 2009, ePaper). 
7) Ranbaxy Acquires Terapia 
Ranbaxy acquired 96.7% of Terapia from Advent International for US $324m. 
Terapia is the largest independent generic company in Romania. Established in 
1921, it has a strong brand name and a consistent track record of growth and 
profitability. Terapia is an integrated, commercially focused pharma company 
which has a broad portfolio and deep new product pipeline, excellent R&D 
capabilities, world class in-house bioequivalence facilities, low cost 
manufacturing, and strong distribution network that includes the largest and most 
powerful generic sales force in the Romanian pharmaceutical market. 
 
For Ranbaxy, Terapia delivers strategic Romanian and pan European synergies 
helping to unleash new opportunities. Ranbaxy will provide Terapia with 
additional products to launch in the domestic market at very cost competitive 
levels, thereby lowering costs and delivering value to both consumers and the 
domestic healthcare budget. The combination of Terapia with Ranbaxy‘s existing 
Romanian activities creates the number one generics company in the Romanian 
market and will additionally boost Ranbaxy‘s presence in the fast growing 
commonwealth of independent countries (CIS) like Russia, formerly Soviet 
Union, Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, Azerbaijan and Ukraine. Ranbaxy Laboratories 
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Limited (Ranbaxy) and Terapia S.A. (Terapia) of Romania announced today that 
they have signed a definitive agreement providing for the acquisition of Terapia 
by Ranbaxy. The deal will combine the strengths of the two premier generic 
companies and will allow Ranbaxy to leverage its expanded base in the rapidly 
growing Romanian pharmaceutical market, across the European Union and the 
CIS markets. 
Commenting on the acquisition, Malvinder Mohan Singh, CEO & Managing 
Director, Ranbaxy Laboratories Limited said, ―Terapia represents exceptional 
value for our stakeholders. Within the Ranbaxy fold, it unleashes multiple 
synergies of product development, product flow, low cost manufacturing, 
proximity and access to high growth markets, in country presence and sound 
fundamentals while being EPS accretive to the group immediately. The 
transaction is compelling and furthers us on our path to becoming a top five global 
generic company.‖ 
Commenting on the deal, Joanna James, Managing Director Central Europe at 
Advent International said, ―We have been strategic investors in Terapia and it has 
been our endeavour to add value to the entity at every point in the value chain. 
With consolidation imminent in the pharmaceutical industry, scale and global 
presence will be critical. We believe Ranbaxy is best equipped to take the 
company forward into its next phase of growth.‖ 
Peter Burema, President, Ranbaxy, Europe, CIS, Africa & Latin America, said, 
―Ranbaxy‘s acquisition of Terapia, the largest independent generics player in 
 306 
 
Romania, gives it a platform to further leverage its primary care presence across 
the European Union and the CIS markets through a strong product basket and 
future pipeline, in addition to Ranbaxy‘s own products and pipeline. The product 
portfolio of the two companies is highly complementary.‖ 
Welcoming the entire Terapia team on board, Malvinder Mohan Singhadded, 
―Together we are best placed to carve a name for ourselves amongst the best 
generic pharmaceutical companies in the world.‖ 
Romania is the fastest growing pharmaceutical market in the Central & Eastern 
European (CEE) region with an approximate annual growth of 34% from 2002 to 
2005 versus the growth of 24% for the region. The high growth is coupled with a 
large market opportunity, as Romania is the second largest country by population 
in CEE. Romania is amongst countries with an increasing per capita expenditure 
on pharmaceuticals. This provides significant head-room for the company to 
grow. Romania is also scheduled to join the European Union beginning January 1, 
2007, opening up additional possibilities for market expansion. Since 
establishment of its operations, Romania has been one of the group‘s fastest 
growing markets. This track-record and the continued strong outlook for the 
market, led to a decision to look for acquisition opportunities in the market to 
establish a higher level of sales and to become a leader in the attractive Romanian 
generics market. 
Terapia enjoys high brand awareness locally and regionally as a result of its 
strong sales & distribution setup. It has the largest field force amongst all generic 
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pharmaceutical companies with a full coverage of general practioners (GPs) and 
specialists. They also cover all of the 4000 pharmacies and 450 hospitals in the 
country. The combined entities will have the largest field force of all 
pharmaceutical companies, both originators and generic companies. Terapia 
distributes approximately 65% of its domestic sales through its own integrated 
distribution unit, a unique asset allowing it to better ensure availability of its 
products at pharmacies and to capture a greater share of the product value chain in 
comparison to its peers.  
Ranbaxy gains access to Terapia‘s product basket of 157 marketing authorizations 
with a strong focus on the fast growing segments of CVS, CNS & musculoskeletal 
therapeutic segments. These presently comprise 71% of the company‘s domestic 
sales. Enalapril, Aspenter (Acetylsalicylic acid), Diurex 50 (Spironolacton + 
Furasemidum Combination) & Pentoxi retard (Pentoxiflin) are some of Terapia‘s 
successful products in the domestic market.  
8) Opto Circuits acquires EuroCOR GmbH  
Continuing its goal of aggressive growth and diversification in the healthcare 
segment, Opto Circuits (India) Ltd. (OCIL), India‘s leading manufacturer of non-
invasive healthcare equipments based in Bangalore, has completed the acquisition 
of EuroCOR GmbH, a company that designs and manufactures various kinds of 
stents in Germany.  
EuroCOR manufactures cardiac and peripheral stents of various types, including 
drug eluting coronary stents used in critical cardiac care. It is one of the largest 
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manufacturers of stents. By acquiring EuroCOR, OCIL gets to access the existing 
as well as potential market for stents globally. 
Announcing the acquisition, Vinod Ramnani, said: ―This acquisition of EuroCOR 
gives us a strong foothold in the global arena for stents. The total global market 
for stents was valued at $6 billion (Rs. 27,750 crore) in 2004 and is expected to 
rise at $10 billion (Rs. 46,250 crore) by 2008. Whilst we are barely scratching the 
surface now, we expect that the strong R&D base of EuroCOR will lead us in the 
direction of greater market share and also better margin business. This acquisition 
is another milestone in the history of the growth of Opto Circuits, and will help 
improve shareholder value.‖ 
Said Dr.Michael Orlowski, ―We have a presence in more than 26 countries 
worldwide. Although we are present in India, this acquisition by Opto Circuits 
gives us a great opportunity to access the vast potential offered by this country. 
We are excited by the prospect of tapping latent potential in developing 
countries.‖ EuroCOR‘s stents have CE approval and have found very rapid 
acceptance worldwide. The company is in the process of applying for food and 
drug administration (FDA) and other major approvals necessary for selling in the 
US. EuroCOR currently sells its products in over 26 countries around the world. 
EuroCOR‘s current order book is to the tune of €1.7 million (Rs. 9.26 crore), and 
it is expected to report a top line of approximately €4 million (Rs. 21.78 crore) in 
the current fiscal year. EuroCOR is projecting a topline of €10 million (Rs. 54.46 
crore) for its next fiscal year.  
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Summing up the deal and its implications for OCIL, Vinod Ramnani said: ―We 
are confident of promoting EuroCOR products in the Indian subcontinent, Far 
East, Europe, Middle East, Central & South America. The size of the Indian 
market for EuroCOR‘s products is expected to continue to expand at double-digit 
rates. We are ideally positioned to achieve a 10% targeted market share for such 
products in the coming years.‖  Sourced: Adfactors Public Relations Pvt Ltd 
(Published on Tue, Dec 13, 2005 at 18:30 | Source : Moneycontrol.com). 
9) Hindalco Acquires Novelis 
Mumbai Feb 11 Hindalco Industries agreed to acquire US-based aluminum 
products maker Novelis Inc for $6 billion in an all-cash deal. The deal was 
announced at a news conference on Sunday by Kumar Mangalam Birla, chairman 
of the AV Birla group. The deal reiterates corporate India's new appetite for 
international acquisitions, and ca,e barely a fortnight after the Tata-Corus deal, 
which made Ratan Tata the toast of Indian industry. "It is a significant event for 
Hindalco and the AV Birla Group," said Birla. This almost doubles Hindalco's 
turnover in one fell swoop, he said, adding that it catapults the Group right to the 
threshold of the Fortune 500 group of companies. Hindalco will pay $44.93 in 
cash for each outstanding common share of Novelis, roughly 15% premium to the 
market price.  
The company has `ring-fenced' itself to handle a possible "superior" counterbid, 
said Debu Bhattacharya, Managing Director of Hindalco. "Theoretically there is 
always room for another bid, it is always possible," said Birla. "But we don't 
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expect that to happen." The party that makes a "superior" counterbid has to pay 
around $100 million to Hindalco as "break-fee," making it a trifle expensive. 
Assuming that the party has to pay $2-3 more per share to better Hindalco's deal, 
the net increase with the break-fee could mean up to $5 more per share than our 
bid, said Mr Bhattacharya. The agreement requires 66.66 per cent of Novelis 
shareholders present and voting to tender their shares. Otherwise, Hindalco will 
walk away. If this condition is satisfied, the remaining one-third of shareholders 
will be "squeezed out," (will have to sell to Hindalco). Novelis is a widely held 
company, its shareholders being largely hedge funds and institutional investors. 
The company operates in 11 countries, has 36 operating units and 12,500 
employees. Its revenues stood at $8.5 billion in 2005. Novelis posted net loss of 
$102 million during the third quarter of 2006 (the calendar year is the company's 
fiscal year).  
For the AV Birla Group, the acquisition marks its increased internationalisation. 
Post-acquisition, over 50 per cent of the group's business could come from 
operations outside India, which is currently at 30 per cent. Also, 20 per cent of the 
group's total workforce would also be based outside India, said Birla, (Source: 
Business Line, Business Daily from The Hindu Group of publications, Monday, 
February 12, 2007, ePaper). 
 
10) M&M acquires German forgings firm 
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Mumbai, Jan 29: Mahindra & Mahindra Ltd, through its subsidiary Mahindra 
Forgings Global Limited based in Mauritius, has acquired 90.47% stake in 
German forgings company Schoneweiss & Co. GmbH., for an undisclosed sum. 
Schoneweiss is a family-owned German company with over 140 years of 
experience in the forging sector, and is one of the top five axle beam 
manufacturers in the world. The company specialises in suspension, power train 
and engine parts, and has a forging capacity of 50,000 tpa and turnover of Euro 90 
million (for CY 2005). Its top customers include the DaimlerChrysler Group, 
MAN, Scania and Volkswagen. Schoneweiss has three manufacturing plants in 
Hagen and Gevelsberg, Germany with a total manpower of 550 people.  
Anand Mahindra, vice chairman & managing director, Mahindra & Mahindra, 
said, ―This acquisition creates for us a strong European base as it is fully 
harmonious with our existing presence in Germany through Jeco AG. We are now 
well on the path to capitalise on and consolidate our position towards becoming a 
globally significant player in the forgings business.‖ Kotak Investment Banking, 
Mumbai and M&A International GmbH, Kronberg, Germany advised Mahindra 
& Mahindra while InterFinanz, Dusseldorf acted as consultants for the 
Schoneweiss Group, (Source: The Financial Express, Tuesday, January 29, 2007). 
11) Tata Chemicals Acquires Brunner Mond and Magadi 
Tata Chemicals Limited acquisition of the Brunner Mond Group brings together 
companies with long and proud histories to form the third largest soda ash 
producer in the world embracing both the major soda ash technologies - natural 
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and synthetic. The combined output from the current Tata, Brunner Mond and 
Magadi plants stands at 2.6m tonnes, a figure that will rise to 3m tonnes when the 
project to double the capacity at Magadi Soda in Kenya comes on stream later this 
year.  
For Tata Chemicals this transaction represents another step towards building a 
global soda ash business. The combined business - the third largest soda ash 
business in the world will expand geographies across Europe, Asia and Africa 
besides strengthening the market leadership position in India.  As per the Martin 
Keighley, the Managing Director (Europe), the expected benefits from the new 
alliance and ownership includes: maximising the mutual learning between the 
companies can bring to each other, wealth of technological and market expertise 
to share and the great experience and success in the management of change and 
the driving of business improvement initiatives (Source: www.Brunnermond.com 
& Brunner Mond News). 
12) Sun Pharma acquires Hungarian plant from Valeant  
Sun Pharmaceutical Industries, an Indian drug maker, has purchased raw materials 
and a dosage form manufacturing facility in Hungary from Valeant 
Pharmaceuticals. According to Dilip Shanghvi, Sun Pharma‘s managing director, 
quoted by In-PharmaTechnologist.com, facilities in Eastern Europe offer low 
operating costs and, at the same time, easy access for expansion to the large 
pharma market of Western and Central Europe. As Hungary became an EU 
member last year, Sun Pharma will benefit from free movement of goods in the 
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EU and from involvement in the rapidly growing pharma markets of the ―new‖ 
EU member states, which record much faster expansion than ―old‖ EU members.  
The move is designed to complement Sun Pharma‘s European entry strategy as its 
UK Medicines and Health Products Regulatory Agency (MHRA) approved its 
plant in India, and are expected to allow for a quick product roll out. 
(www.pharmapoland.com). 
13) Lupin acquires Kyowa  
Kyoma has a significant presence in the fixed-rate treatment Diagnosis Procedure 
Combination (DPC) based payment system in Japan hospitals sector in Japan. 
Injectable products enjoy a significant usage in the DPC hospital segment, and 
generic injectable penetration is slated to grow significantly in future. There are 
currently over 1,400 DPC hospitals in Japan, covering over 35% of all hospital 
beds nationwide, and a market size of $11 billion, says Lupin. 
In a separate development, Kyowa has entered into a strategic alliance involving 
comprehensive operational support to be provided by IH‘s site management 
organization (SMO) subsidiary I‘rom Co for clinical studies conducted by Kyowa 
for the Japanese market. I‘rom is known as the pioneer of the SMO business in 
Japan, and the alliance seeks to utilize Irom‘s expertise to support Kyowa. Lupin‘s 
Japanese subsidiary, Kyowa Pharmaceutical Industry Co., Ltd. is amongst the 
fastest growing generic pharmaceutical companies in Japan with sales 
of JPY 11.6 Billion for the fiscal year ended March 2011, contributing 11% of 
Lupin‘s consolidated revenues. Kyowa is a market leader and has strong 
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presence  in  the  Neurology,  Cardiovascular Gastroenterology and 
Respiratory  segments. The company covers 94% of the 1,400 psychiatric 
hospitals in Japan.  
 Commenting on the acquisition, Vinod Dhawan, president, Asia Pacific, Middle 
East, Africa and Latin America at Lupin, said: ―Japan is a growth market of 
strategic focus for Lupin. IP‘s strong presence in the DPC hospital segment in 
Japan, through its line of injectable products, is an ideal fit with our existing oral 
business portfolio in Japan. The acquisition will not only strengthen our presence 
in the Japanese market but would also provide for a stronger growth footprint in 
this priority market.‖ 
Mr Dhawan said Lupin expects sales at I'rom Pharma to each $75 million in the 
current fiscal year ending March 2012. The combined sales of Kyowa and I'rom 
Pharma would reach $230-$240 million in fiscal 2012, raising Japan's 
contribution to Lupin revenue to 15% from 12% at present, he noted. Ray 
Tsunoda, president and representative director of Kyowa, added: ―This acquisition 
will allow Kyowa and IP to leverage their strengths and competencies to create 
meaningful synergies that would augment Lupin‘s growth in the Japanese 
generics market. The success which Kyowa has experienced after becoming a part 
of the Lupin family will certainly be shared by IP.‖ (Source: the pharma letter  
www.pharmaletter.com). 
 
14) Tata Motors acquires Jaguar and Land Rover 
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Ratan Tata, Chairman of Tata Motors said, ―This is a momentous time for all of 
us at Tata Motors. Jaguar and Land Rover are two iconic British brands with 
worldwide growth prospects.‖ He continues to say that both British brands will 
retain their own unique identities and that Tata will give its full support in order to 
grow and prosper. Land Rover and Jaguar employ about 16,000 people. Jaguars 
are manufactured at Castle Bromwich in the West Midlands and Halewood on 
Merseyside on a production line shared with Land Rover, which also 
manufactures at a plant in Solihull. 
Tata, which owns the Anglo-Dutch steel maker Corus, and Tetley Tea, is the 
bidder favoured by the trade unions, but they will be looking for assurances over 
investment, plant and job security. At the Geneva motor show this month, Tata's 
head, Ratan Tata, said he planned to keep "the image, touch and feel", of the two 
marques. "There is no reason to tinker with the brands. Our challenge is to make 
them grow." Jaguar and Land Rover are part of Ford's premier automotive group, 
which last year sold the Aston Martin marque for £450m to a Middle East-backed 
consortium. Under Tata, Jaguar and Land Rover are expected to stick to existing 
business plans for the next few years, with the headquarters operation remaining 
in Britain. Acquisition of the UK marques will mark a significant expansion of the 
Indian company's car-making capability, which includes models such as the 
Indica, Indigo and Sumo Grande, (Source: Friday 28 March 2008, The Guardian). 
 
15) Tata Motors Acquires Daewoo 
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MUMBAI, FEB. 18. Tata Motors announced and signed the Investment 
Agreement for the acquisition of Daewoo Commercial Vehicle Company Ltd. 
(DWCV) for a total price of 120 billion Korean won (about $102 million or Rs. 
465 crores). Ratan Tata, Chairman, Tata Group, said, "This is indeed a major step 
for Tata Motors and a milestone for the group in its quest for globalisation. I am 
confident that both companies will derive considerable benefits from this 
agreement.‖ 
DWCV is Korea's second largest heavy truck maker with a modern plant in 
Kunsan that has an annual production capacity of 20,000 medium and heavy 
vehicles. It enjoys a market share in excess of 25 per cent in the Korean heavy 
truck segment. Both Tata Motors and DWCV believe that they can extract 
significant synergies in several areas such as marketing, research and product 
development and other operational areas.  
Ravi Kant, Executive Director (Commercial Vehicle Business Unit), Tata Motors, 
said, "The complementary product range of the two companies and strengths in 
product development and international marketing will open new opportunities for 
both companies. We are excited at the possibilities of this co-operation and will 
now work towards a successful integration with the commitment of the 
management and the dedicated workforce of DWCV.‖ Tata Motors' capacity is 
two lakh units annually and while it makes vehicles in the 200 hp range, the 
Daewoo facility can make vehicles in the 200-400 hp range (Source: Thursday, 
Feb 19
th
, 2004 - The Hindhu).  
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Wochdardt acquires Negma Labs 
The Mumbai-based Wockhardt Limited announced their fifth buyout in Europe by 
acquiring French pharmaceutical company Negma Laboratories in all-cash deal 
worth $265 million (around Rs 1090 crore). The transaction is valued at 1.8 times 
the sales and 9.7 times the EBITDA of Negma Laboratories. France is the third 
largest pharmaceuticals market in Europe after Germany and the UK. With the 
buyout, Wockhardt says it will be the largest Indian pharmaceuticals company in 
Europe with more than 1500 employees. Negma Labs, the fourth largest 
independent pharmaceuticals group in France with sales of $150 million, owns a 
portfolio of 172 patents and has a few molecules under pre-clinical stages of 
development. The company has various drugs belonging to the osteoarthritis, 
rheumatology and hypertension segments. 
Earlier, Wockhardt had bought Wallis and CP Pharmaceuticals in the UK, 
Esparma in Germany and Pinewood Labs in Ireland. Habil Khorakiwala, the 
chairman of Wockhardt,  said, ―The acquisition will allow us to extend our 
patented portfolio to other European markets. Further, it will provide us the right 
entry vehicle to the French generics market, valued at $2 billion. With this 
acquisition, we are on the fast track to achieve our corporate strategy of $1 billion 
in turnover by 2009.‖  
An analyst from IDBI Capital said that Wockhardt‘s entry into the French market 
was well-timed. The growth rate in the major European pharma markets like the 
UK and Germany is now stagnant due to high competition and state intervention. 
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Therefore, it is better to focus on other emerging markets like France, Spain and 
Italy. The revenues from the conventional markets are eroding. An early entry into 
the other emerging markets will reduce competition as well as bring in better 
prospects, he added. With the Negma acquisition, Wockhardt‘s European business 
will account for more than 60% of the company‘s total revenues. Wockhardt, 
which at present has a portfolio of 130 products in the European market, will 
launch 24 more drugs in Europe next year. With this buy, the company will have 
four manufacturing facilities in Europe. (Source: 3
rd
 May, 2007, the Financial 
Express). 
VSNL Acquires Teleglobe International 
Videsh Sanchar Nigam has entered into an agreement to acquire Teleglobe 
International Holdings Ltd for $239 million (over Rs 1,000 crore). This 
acquisition will put VSNL among the top three companies in the world in terms of 
international wholesale services, and make it a leading player in terms of telecom 
services encompassing the wholesale, enterprise and retail sectors, said Mr N. 
Srinath, Director, VSNL. The Tyco Global Networks (TGN) buy made VSNL the 
biggest supplier of submarine cable connectivity in the world. Teleglobe's 
wholesale voice/voice-over-Internet-protocol and Global Tier-1 IP network can be 
overlaid on the TGN network to provide value-added services to enterprise 
customers across the globe, he said. (Teleglobe made an important acquisition in 




Teleglobe has an extensive global network that reaches more than 240 countries 
and territories with advanced voice, data and signalling capabilities and ownership 
interests or capacity in more than 80 sub-sea and terrestrial cables, said a 
statement from VSNL. Through Teleglobe, VSNL will be able to access more 
than 200 direct and bilateral agreements with leading voice carriers, many of them 
incumbent carriers within their countries or large international wireless service 
providers. In addition, VSNL also gains an international workforce. As a global 
operator, VSNL requires scale and acquisitions to facilitate this, said Mr Srinath. 
―VSNL‘s vision is to become a leading global player in wholesale voice and 
bandwidth and enterprise data services.  This agreement, coupled with the TGN 
acquisition and recently announced plans to expand into new markets, will move 
us closer to the size and network breadth needed to achieve this goal.‖  This 
strategic transaction creates a complementary combination of Teleglobe‘s 
extensive wholesale voice VoIP/TDM network, Global Tier I IP Network, and 
deep customer base with VSNL‘s integrated telecom services to strengthen its 
position as a leading international telecoms provider, (Source: Business Line- 
Internet edition: Financial Daily from THE HINDU group of publications, 
Tuesday, Jul 26, 2005). 
Sasken Communication acquires Botania Hightech 
Sasken Communication Technologies Ltd (Sasken), a pioneer in the telecom 
R&D and support space, today announced the 100% acquisition of Finland based 
Botnia Hightech Oy (Botnia), a leading provider of wireless R&D and testing 
services. Sasken will pay € 35.5 million (Euros Thirty Five point five million) for 
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Botnia in an all cash deal. Sasken is a global provider of software and support 
services for the communications industry. Sasken works with Network OEMs, 
semiconductor vendors, Terminal Devices OEMs and Operators across the world. 
Botnia Hightech is a globally operating wireless technology company. The core 
business areas are hardware, software and mechanical design and testing related to 
these areas. The company improves the competitiveness of the customers by 
accelerating their R&D and testing processes to achieve leading products. 
Based at Kaustinen, Finland, Botnia Hightech is an important supplier of 
Hardware, Software, Mechanical Design and Testing Services to leading mobile 
handset vendors. Botnia‘s services can be applied in R&D projects, subprojects, 
tester design, as well as in cost reduction. They also offer tailor-made turnkey 
solutions. Botnia Hightech Oy‘s main operations are in Finland with additional 
operations in Denmark and Germany. For the year ended April 30, 2006, Botnia 
reported revenues of € 17.7 million with a Profit After Tax of € 2.9 million.  
Sasken has been a leader in providing R & D and support outsourcing services to 
companies across the communications value chain. This acquisition is expected to 
help Sasken scale its offering portfolio faster. Sasken has been focusing on a 
strategy of deepening relationships with Tier 1 customers and Botnia‘s customer 
base will further complement the same. The acquisition also gives Sasken a 
presence in Finland, which will add to its global development centers in Mexico 




Rajiv Mody, Chairman of the Board and Chief Executive Officer, Sasken said, 
―We are tremendously excited by the opportunities that this deal opens up for both 
Sasken and Botnia. Europe leads the world in the development of wireless 
technology. Botnia‘s European presence and their expertise combined with 
Sasken‘s global reach and India based development centers will enable us to offer 
a compelling portfolio of value added solutions to our customers across the 
globe.‖  
According to Matti Paasila, Chairman of the Board of Botnia, ―Botnia Hightech 
has established itself as a successful high-tech company that is a household name 
in Finland. In Sasken, we have found an ideal partner to build on this strong 
foundation and become a global leader in the wireless communication space. We 
expect growth in our Finland business, as well as to gain the ability to serve global 
customers through this partnership. The cultural affinity between our two 
organizations will be the key factor in the success of our joint endeavours‖. 
(Source: Press release by Sasken Global -July 26, 2006).  
Videocon acquires Thomson SA (CRT Business) 
Videocon Group on Tuesday announced the acquisition of French media services 
and technology major Thomson SA's colour picture tubes manufacturing business, 
for Euro 240 million (Rs 1,200 crore), through its offshore entity — Eagle 
Corporation Ltd. Under the agreement, Videocon will acquire Thomson's 
manufacturing facilities in China, Mexico and Poland, V N Dhoot, Videocon's 
CMD, told reporters. For Videocon, which makes TVs, microwave ovens, 
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refrigerators, ACs and washing machines, the purchase allows it to expand outside 
its home market, where it's facing competition from Korean electronic makers LG 
Electronics Inc and Samsung Electronics Co (Source: Times of India June 29, 
2005). After the latest acquisition, the total turnover of the Videocon group is 
expected to be Rs 17,500 crore ($4 billion) with more than Rs 8,700 crore coming 
from global operations. 
 ―We would help Videocon become the global leaders in CPT business through 
our technological supremacy and in turn we will bring in our strength into India,‖ 
Frank Dangeard, CEO of Thomson SA said. Thomson‘s facilities include full-
fledged R&D facilities at various places located in Europe and China along with 
access to a large resource of the patents and IPRs relating to the most basic 
technologies in CPT. Except for one facility in China, which has the Chinese 
government as minority shareholder, all the business interests are 100% owned by 
Thomson, (Sources: The Financial Express:  Wednesday, Jun 29, 2005). 
ISPAT acquires Finmetal Holdings 
Ispat invest $ 300 million for acquiring the 2.2 million steel plant. The total 
investment for the acquisition, combined with further investments and 
environment management costs, will be $300 million. As per official source of the 
company, Global Steel Holdings, one of the group‘s holding companies, has 
signed an agreement to acquire Finmetals Holding, which controls a 71 per cent 
stake in Bulgaria‘s largest steel mill, Kremikovtzi. Ispat group‘s move to acquire 
Finmentals Holding follows its abortive attempts to take over Kremikovtzi.  
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After the privatisation of the Kremikovtzi mill, the Bulgarian authorities imposed 
restrictions on it, including non-transfer of assets. This prompted the Ispat group 
to bid for Finmetals Holding. The Ispat group now operates and manages 14 
million tonnes of steel making capacity in the Phillippines, Libya, Nigeria, India, 
Bulgaria and another 1.4 mtpa of coke making facilities in Bosnia and iron mines 
in Nigeria with over 260 million tonnes of reserves. Ispat proposes to take up its 
plant capacity at Dolvi near Mumbai in India from 3 million tonnes to 5 million 
tonnes over the next couple of years (Source: Mumbai, April, 2005, Business 
Standard). 
Matrix Laboratories acquires Docpharma 
Matrix Laboratories Ltd announced on June 19, 2005  that their Board of 
Directors had approved to acquire a controlling stake in Docpharma NV (Eurolist 
of Euronext Brussels, DOCPH), from Chairman and founderLeon Van Rompay 
and other key shareholders (the "Reference Shareholders") for a price of EUR 34 
per share. Commenting on the transaction, N Prasad, Chairman & CEO of Matrix 
stated: "The acquisition of Docpharma accelerates our evolution as a growing 
force within the global generic pharmaceutical industry. This transaction allows 
us to gain direct access into the under-represented, high growth generic 
pharmaceutical markets of Belgium and southern Europe. We will continue our 
strategy of partnering with the generic companies world-wide, while continuing to 
develop our presence in Docpharma's target markets. Docpharma's strengths in 
product selection, branding, marketing and distribution are highly complementary 
to our traditional strengths in product development and manufacturing. Given the 
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lack of any operating overlap between our companies and the strong commitment 
shown by Docpharma management to the combined entity, we expect a seamless 
and timely integration process. We look forward to partnering with Leon and Stijn 
as they become part of our core management team and help lead our efforts in 
Europe." (Source: Press Release by Matrix Laboratories Ltd, June 29, 2005). 
Leon Van Rompay, CEO and founder of Docpharma, commented: "This is a 
strategically important step in the development of Docpharma. The combination 
with Matrix will create a vertically integrated player providing Docpharma with 
significant economies of scale and improvements in terms of product sourcing, 
product development and production cost and speeds up our ability to bring 
products to market. This partnership will enable us to accelerate the growth of our 
combined businesses in Europe. The markets in which we operate continue to 
offer enormous potential and with the support of Matrix Laboratories, providing 
outstanding quality products produced according to FDA and European cGMP 
standards, we very much look forward to taking full advantage of these 
opportunities." Stijn Van Rompay, COO of Docpharma added: "We are very 
excited about this combination as it provides us with a new platform to drive our 
business. We found the Matrix management team to be extremely open, focused 
and efficient and are looking forward to working with them closely to build a new 
leader in the European generic industry." 
The combined entity will integrate Matrix's considerable manufacturing capacity 
with Docpharma's strong marketing and distribution platform in key growing 
markets within southern Europe, making it one of a select few generic 
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pharmaceutical companies in its key markets with the ability to compete on the 
basis of cost advantage as well as marketing differentiation. Management of both 
companies believes that there is significant opportunity to drive both cost and 
revenue synergies as a result of this combination (Source: Press Release by Matrix 
Laboratories Ltd, June 29, 2005). 
HPCL acquires Kenya Petroleum Refinery 
Hindustan Petroleum Corporation Ltd (HPCL acquires 67 percent stake in Kenya 
Refinery Ltd in a deal valued around Rs. 2,200 crore ($500 million). The 
company has conducted studies in 20 countries for opportunities in the petroleum 
sector. (Source: Corporate report: Sept 21, 2005). 
Ballarpur acquires Sabah Forest Industries 
Ballarpur Industries Ltd. (BILT), India‘s leading paper manufacturer, today 
announced the completion of the acquisition of 97.78% Sabah Forest Industries 
SDN. BHD. (SFI), the largest integrated pulp and paper mill in Malaysia. The 
value of the acquisition is estimated to be USD 261 million. The signing 
ceremony to mark the transfer of ownership was conducted today between Mr. 
Gautam Thapar, Chairman, Ballarpur Industries Ltd. & Datuk Albert Cheng of the 
Lion Group in presence of the Right Honourable Datuk Seri Musa Haji Aman, 
The Chief Minister of Sabah. The acquisition is being jointly done with JP 
Morgan who will have a beneficial ownership of 20% equity of SFI. The 
acquisition is through Ballarpur Paper Holdings BV, a substantial subsidiary of 
BILT. (Source: Friday, March 16, 2007). 
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Gautam Thapar, Chairman BILT said, ―Acquisition of Sabah Forest Industries is 
in line with our strategy to globally expand our paper and pulp operations. To 
achieve the true potential of SFI, in the first phase alone, BILT will invest US $ 
100 million for increasing the paper capacity to 200,000 tonnes per annum and 
pulp capacity to 250,000 tonnes.‖ Sabah Forest Industries (SFI) operates the 
largest Pulp and Paper mill in Malaysia with paper capacity of 1,44,000 MTPA 
and pulp capacity of 1,20,000 tonnes per year. SFI holds a concession for 
approximately 2,89,000 hectares of forestland by the State Government of Sabah. 
This concession is valid for 99 years from January 1, 1996 to December 31, 2094. 
Apart from the pulp and paper mill, SFI‘s other assets include a jetty and a power 
plant facility. 
―BILT would also help SFI to achieve operational bench-marks, improved 
productivity parameters as well as introduce value-added products including 
coated paper into SFI‘s portfolio. BILT would also be able to support SFI by 
raising the level of information technology currently adopted to run its operations. 
In a span of 8-10 years we would be investing close to US$ 1 billion, which 
would encourage ancillary industry adding further fillip to the local economy,‖ 
further added Mr Thapar (Source: Friday, March 16, 2007, Moneycontrol.com). 
TCS acquires Financial Network Services (FNS) 
TCS‘ first major international acquisition comes at a time when Indian software 
firms have begun taking on their global peers in bagging big-ticket deals. All the 
190 employees of FNS will be absorbed into TCS and this acquisition will 
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strengthen the company's portfolio of banking and financial services. Revenue 
from the acquisition will start to come in with immediate effect. FNS has a top 
line of $25 million and its products are used by 115 banks in Asia, Latin America, 
Africa and West Asia.  
TCS, which has had a long standing relationship with FNS, is also the 
implementation partner for the FNS product in State Bank of India's core-banking 
solutions across its 10,000 branches. TCS has implemented this product at Central 
Bank of India and Indian Bank. With this acquisition, TCS adds a core-banking 
product to its financial services solutions portfolio of Quartz (private investment 
banking product) and NCS (custody product). Product revenue currently accounts 
for 10-11 per cent of the $750-million revenue TCS earns from the BFSI sector. 
According to S Mahalingam, CFO, TCS; ―From a strategic perspective, the FNS 
acquisition will help us in being a complete solutions provider for the global 
banking industry. We have gained a deep insight into the FNS product through 
our implementations and this will form the nucleus of our core banking strategy 
for the global market.‖ He further added that FNS had good deals in the pipeline 
and that TCS hoped to benefit from this in the near future. ―This acquisition will 
add great value to us as it enhances the range of our asset-based solutions for the 
banking industry, besides giving us a number of new global banking customers in 




FNS has a development centre in Australia, besides a product support centre in 
Manila. These two centres will team up with TCS‘ banking product centres in 
India and Switzerland. NG Subramaniam, head of TCS' global banking practice, 
said, ―FNS‘ product is a robust, well-established solution and we are confident of 
being able to implement this in any bank in any part of the world.‖ We will 
compete aggressively in the core banking enhancement and replacement market 
by leveraging its capabilities developed on complex banking projects.‖ The TCS 
stock gained marginally to close at Rs 1415.95 on the Bombay Stock Exchange 
today, up from Rs 1402.30 posted yesterday (Business Standard: Our Burea, 
Bangalore/Mumbai Oct 21, 2005). 
United Phosphorous acquires Cerexagri 
Mumbai-based pesticides company United Phosphorus Ltd (UPL) on Wednesday 
said it is acquiring Cerexagri, the crop protection unit of French chemicals 
company Arkema, for close to euro 111 million. When completed, the acquisition 
will make UPL the third largest generic agrochemical company in the world, UPL 
informed the exchanges. Cerexagri has over 70 years of experience in the global 
market and has a strong distribution presence in Europe and the US, which 
together accounts for about 80% of the annual sales revenues. A profitable 
company, it has manufacturing sites mainly in Europe and employs a total of 




UPL has a product portfolio of insecticides, herbicides and fumigants, which 
would complement the fungicides range from Cerexagri. Moreover, the selling 
platform provided by the broad and deep distribution capabilities of Cerexagri 
would create a truly global and competitive combined entity, the company said. 
This positioning would be further enhanced by UPL‘s strong manufacturing and... 
R&D capabilities based in India. The acquisition of Cerexagri will be UPL‘s fifth 
acquisition in this calendar year following the acquisitions of Advanta BV, Crop 
Serve, products from Bayer Cropscience and Bensulfuron from Dupont. UPL was 
represented by YES Bank Ltd and Close Brothers in the transaction. Arkema, 
which was spun off from Total in May 2006, is a manufacturer of industrial 
chemicals, including acrylics, fluorochemicals, technical polymers and 
agrochemicals. (Source: Thursday, Nov 16, 2006, The Financial Express). 
Tata Coffee acquires Eight O Clock Coffee 
Tata Tea Ltd. and Tata Enterprises (Overseas) AG, the international arm of the 
Tata Group, joined the special purpose vehicle (SPV) floated by Tata Coffee Ltd. 
to buy the U.S.-based Eight O'Clock Coffee Company from venture capital fund 
Gryphon Investors for Rs. 1,015 crore ($220 million). The New Jersey-based 
Eight O'Clock Coffee Company is a top roaster and distributor of branded "value 
gourmet" and whole bean coffee with a market share of 52 per cent and 46 per 
cent respectively in the U.S. The company distributes its product through Wal-




Within the broad U.S. retail coffee category, Eight O'Clock Coffee is the third 
largest brand by volume, behind Folgers and Maxwell House. The brand is 
uniquely positioned in the coffee marketplace at a mid-level price point with high 
quality 100 per cent Arabica beans and 150 years of brand equity. Sales have been 
growing at a compounded annual growth rate of over 14 per cent in the last three 
years. The acquisition is in line with the vision of Tata Tea Ltd., of which Tata 
Coffee is a 51 per cent owned subsidiary, to become a global beverage player.  
 
It follows a string of acquisitions by Tata Tea in various countries, including 
Tetley globally, Good Earth Tea in the U.S. and JEMCA in the Czech Republic. 
With the acquisition of Eight O'Clock Coffee, Tata Tea will now have significant 
scale in all-important markets in Asia, Europe and North America (Source: 
WWW.hindu.com).  
M&M acquires British Forging 
Mahindra and Mahindra Limited (M&M) group acquires British company shares. 
Indian auto major Mahindra and Mahindra Limited (M&M) acquired majority 
shares in Britain's largest auto forging company, Stokes Group Limited. M&M 
acquired 98.6 percent shares in the 25-million pound Stokes Group from its 
existing shareholders. According to a company press release, Stokes Group is the 
largest automotive forging company in Britain with state of art net-shaped forging 
technology.  The Vice Chairman and Managing Director M&M, Anand Mahindra, 
said: "We believe the Stokes acquisition demonstrates our commitment to build a 
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world-class business that serves its global customers and enhances value for 
M&M's stakeholders." The Stokes Group includes three companies with two 
manufacturing companies situated at Walsall and Dudley, near Birmingham. 
Stokes' major customers are Koyo Bearings, GWK Group, Land Rover, ZF, 
Bosch, Benteler, Visteon, Ford and Jaguar. The above acquisition further 
strengthens M&M's Mahindra Systems and Automotive Technologies (MSAT) 
Sector. MSAT's unique model aims at offering a full range of services from 
design to delivery covering engineering services, strategic sourcing of 
components and supplying of auto component as Tier-1 manufacturers. M&M 
president Hemant Luthra said: "The acquisition offers multiple benefits to MSAT 
and Stokes stakeholders. European customers can continue to get high quality 
product from a better-capitalised supplier at economic pricing. "Indian customers 
would get access to world class technology and the rich legacy of experience that 
the Stokes management team brings to the table. Both would benefit from the 
design capabilities of Mahindra Engineering Services (MES) that can accelerate 
product development." According to Luthra the senior management team of 
Stokes will continue under the M&M umbrella and their expertise will be used to 
enhance the quality of M&M's domestic forging business. The $2.59 billion 
Mahindra Group is the largest multi-utility vehicles and tractors in India and has 
built a strong base in technology, engineering, marketing and distribution 






                                                 
 
